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1I N T R O D U C T I O N
The Apocalyptic Male
ON AUGUST 11–12,  2017,  a coalition of white supremacists, neo-Nazis, 
and other white ethnonationalist organizations occupied the streets 
of Charlottesville, Virginia, in protest of the removal of a monument 
to Confederate General Robert E. Lee. Dubbed by its organizers the 
“Unite the Right” rally, the event began with a parade of white men 
carrying lit tiki torches and chanting in unison “Jews will not replace 
us.”1 The following day, far-right protestors engaged in violent attacks 
against a growing group of opponents, resulting in dozens of injuries 
and the death of one counterprotestor.2 Particularly striking was the 
macabre nature of the protestor’s performance: white men bearing an 
assortment of Nazi and neo-Nazi uniforms, torches, automatic rifles, 
skull facemasks, gas masks, white hoods, KKK robes, paramilitary and 
guerilla uniforms, homemade weapons, pro-Trump regalia, and quasi-
ironic signs featuring the smirking icon of online hate groups, Pepe the 
Frog. The rally served as a stage for a series of arresting performances 
in which aggrieved white men consummated the fantasy of violently 
terrorizing, if not upending, a society nominally committed to the pro-
gressive goals of race and gender equality. The protest was a ghoulish 
image event that presented social progressives with a chilling vision of 
the death of liberal democracy. Above all, the protest announced the 
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new smirking public face of white nationalism, a movement that revels 
in taboo performances, nihilism, sadism, masochism, death, lawless-
ness, and cathartic acts of violence. Moving from the fringes of inter-
net culture to the main stage of public life, the Charlottesville protest 
previewed an emerging form of white male identity politics that far 
exceeded the boundaries of white nationalism. The event represents a 
politics that seeks to radically deterritorialize liberal democracy and 
openly embraces cruelty and creative acts of destruction as its organiz-
ing principles. At its extremities, this rendition of white masculinity 
strives not for political reform but instead a cataclysmic remaking of 
the social order that would restore white men to their entitled place in 
society.
The events at Charlottesville serve as a representative anecdote for 
what I have deemed the “apocalyptic turn” in white masculinity, “an 
embodied model of masculinity that seeks a permanent resolution to 
immanent crises of the male self in the imminent collapse of femi-
nized society.”3 With their perennial pronouncements of the so-called 
crisis of white masculinity, a network of men’s rights organizations, 
online hate groups, and like-minded aggrieved men have generated 
a powerful narrative of victimization in which white men have been 
emasculated by the family court system, affirmative action programs, 
man-hating feminists, gold-digging ex-wives, political correctness, job-
taking immigrants, the social acceptance of queer intimacy, and even 
television situation comedies that satirize oafish working-class fathers.4 
This powerful script of white male victimization was amplified dur-
ing the 2016 presidential election. The Trump presidential campaign 
decried the loss of white male status to immigrants and foreign com-
petitors and embraced the hypermasculine virtues of zero-sum com-
petition, subjugating one’s opponents, and boastful pride in both self 
and nation.5 Ostensibly, the call to “Make America Great Again” hailed 
a melancholic subject beseeched by an intoxicating fantasy of return 
to an imagined past before feminism, the Black freedom struggle, and 
queer activism fundamentally questioned cisgender heterosexual white 
men’s primacy in all aspects of public and private life. Popular articu-
lations of wounded white masculinity reflect the rise of a reactionary 
politics of white male resentment that seizes tropes of victimhood and 
marginalization even as it celebrates white male primacy. While the 
economic, social, and political status of white men remains compar-
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atively undisturbed, the rhetoric of white male victimhood nonethe-
less asserts that relative gains by women, people of color, immigrants, 
and GLBTQ movements threaten white men’s social status and upward 
mobility.6 Aggrieved by feminism, multiculturalism, secularism, and 
demands for structural equality, the reactionary posture of white 
male victimhood brackets the historical context of male dominance 
and violence in an effort to position men as the forgotten casualties 
of identity politics.7 The character of contemporary white masculinity 
is increasing bellicose, particularly where white men view themselves 
as besieged by others. This particular expression of white masculinity 
engenders an unconscious desire for a social cataclysm that will per-
manently return white men to prominence.
This book examines how and why contemporary white masculinity 
is increasingly animated by images of death, mayhem, destruction, and 
the apocalyptic as a response to demands for inclusion that might oth-
erwise augment white men’s structural privilege. Exemplified by Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump’s slogan “Make American Great Again,” white 
masculinity has become organized around melancholic attachments to 
an imagined past when white men were supposedly whole. In addition 
to being incapable of moving forward, white masculinity is haunted by 
a destructive impulse to publicly restage the scene of its traumatic loss. 
In turn, this investment in loss ultimately sutures white male subjec-
tivity to its wounds. Consequently, the enactment of trauma becomes 
the very condition of possibility for the recovery of white masculinity. 
This compulsive return to loss is characteristic of what Freudian psy-
choanalysts refer to as the death drive, or the subject’s enjoyment of 
a symbolic regression to an imagined state, prior to the formation of 
the subject, and therefore prior to its traumatic entry into subjectivity. 
The compulsion to repeat constitutes a performance of mastery aimed 
to give the subject a coherent image of the self. As Sigmund Freud 
astutely inquired, “How is it then that in melancholia the superego can 
become the gathering-place for the death instinct?”8 In responding to 
this question, this book contends that there is something about white 
men’s inability to experience and address social change as anything 
other than a catastrophic loss that aggregates those destructive aspects 
of the drive(s) that are antithetical to the subject’s self-preservation.
In their crude mimicry of racial and gender identity politics, some 
white men are increasingly drawn to narratives of victimhood and per-
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secution and, in turn, are invited to violently deflect the death drive 
outward in response to perceived injuries. While violence has long 
been an attribute of hegemonic masculinity, the so-called crisis of 
masculinity is increasingly organized around a thanatopolitics, a poli-
tics of death, that seeks to extinguish that in society that threatens the 
white male ego—not just women and people of color, but institutions 
that represent the threat of emasculation, including government and 
the mass media among others.9 To understand the violent implications 
of this apocalyptic turn in masculinity, this book examines the tex-
tual, mediated, and performative nuances of contemporary white male 
backlash rhetoric, including that of gender-motivated mass shooters, 
white supremacists, online misogynist communities, survivalists and 
“doomsday preppers,” pro-gun activists, and political demagogues. 
To capture the scope and diverse character of apocalyptic manhood, 
I explore a wide variety of textual forms including manifestos, net-
worked media, public performances, image events, and unconventional 
genres of political address that craft a composite image of aggrieved 
white masculinity. Here my aim is not to address white masculinity or 
white men as empirical phenomena, but instead to treat the mascu-
linity crisis as a signifier or cultural figure that circulates widely and 
speaks loudly. Hence, this book is not a critique of flesh-and-blood 
subjects, but rather a series of discourses and images that address white 
men as if they are victims. I contend that proclamations of crisis par-
ticularly resonate in US public life as a consequence of a media sys-
tem and digital culture that privileges shrill voices, grotesque image 
events, manufactured controversy, and the exploitation of lived pain.10 
This book considers how white masculinity is enacted and how white 
male subjects are addressed in a media culture that is addled by fear, 
outrage, and cruelty.
Taken together, I argue, the texts that convey an image of white 
men in crisis construct a version of white masculinity that is consum-
mated through the destruction of civil society and liberal democratic 
publics, as well as antisocial and destruction behaviors, taboo and even 
sadomasochistic performances. At the intersections of critical rheto-
ric, media studies, and performance, this book illustrates how death 
and fatalism have come to underwrite representations and expres-
sions of white masculinity. Preoccupied with fantasies of victimiza-
tion, a mosaic of discourses and images invite aggrieved white men 
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to think of themselves as structurally oppressed and, in turn, to “take 
their country back” even if it means tearing apart the social fabric of 
liberal democracy. Although white masculinity is not reducible to an 
essence, and it is true that white men suffer alongside others, this book 
investigates how texts that construct what it means to suffer as white 
and male enlist their audiences in the fraught reproduction of cultural 
melancholia and the death drive.
In the remainder of this chapter, I offer a guiding theoretical frame-
work to make sense of the melancholic and self-destructive tone that 
characterizes contemporary white masculinity. This framework histori-
cally situates the proverbial “crisis of masculinity” as white men begin 
to constitute their identities not solely through primacy—strength, 
individualism, and self-sufficiency—but also through marginalization. 
Next, drawing from Freudian psychoanalysis, I theorize the relation-
ship between white masculine victimhood, cultural melancholia, and 
the death drive. Here I argue that death and trauma have become the 
organizing tropes of white masculinity—both of which are underwrit-
ten by the compulsion to repeat and revisit without adequately mourn-
ing the past. In this way, white male victimhood constitutes a politics 
of death in the name of life. Finally, I sketch an approach to unfurling 
the constellation of diverse texts and psychical structures that consti-
tute the scope of white masculine victimhood and attend to the affor-
dances of different rhetorical forms that constrain and enable how 
white masculinity can be represented and enacted in the present politi-
cal moment.
WHITE MEN AS VICTIMS?
In the 1999 adaption of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club, the anony-
mous protagonist (Ed Norton) laments being part of a generation of 
men raised by women in the absence of their fathers. Further emas-
culated by consumer culture and wage slavery, his generation of men 
had become soft. Speaking with (and through) his alter ego Tyler Dur-
den (Brad Pitt), the two come to the conclusion that “we are a gen-
eration of men raised by women. I wonder if another woman is what 
we need?” Their creation of “fight club” was an attempt to deliver men 
from the phoniness and femininity of late capitalism to the raw violent 
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masculinity of the primal past.11 Hence, the two adopt an ethos of self-
destruction to counteract the demands of a feminized society. “Hitting 
bottom,” as Durden characterizes it, means achieving self-actualization 
by abandoning the artifice of self-improvement, consumer lifestyles, 
and social conformity. Smirking at advertisements featuring the per-
fectly sculpted bodies of Calvin Klein models, the protagonist asks 
Durden, “is that what a man looks like?” to which Durden replies, “self-
improvement is masturbation, now self-destruction .  .  .” The inquisi-
tive tone that precedes the ellipses invites audience to an open-ended 
consideration of male masochism as a response to emasculation. While 
self-improvement equates to feminine narcissism, self-destruction dis-
mantles the ornamental façade of an emasculating culture that, in Dur-
den’s words, has men “chasing cars and clothes, working jobs we hate so 
we can buy shit that we don’t need.” The film portrays self-destruction 
as a creative and liberatory act, the last resort for men who see them-
selves as structurally oppressed—mere “slaves with white collars.”
Fight Club indexed an array of millennial masculine anxieties that 
have culminated in the present dark and nihilistic phase of the so-
called crisis of masculinity.12 Whereas Rambo: First Blood (1982) res-
onated with white male baby boomer’s feelings of displacement and 
victimization following America’s defeat in Vietnam, Fight Club sug-
gests that the total feminization of society by consumerism, and what 
Joshua Gunn and Thomas Frentz refer to as the “cultural decline of 
the father figure,” has left contemporary white men with no nation to 
“take back” or remasculinize.13 Seemingly, white men’s only alternative 
is to divest themselves of the concept of a liberal society altogether. 
Put another way, Fight Club consummated a fantasy of male autarky 
wherein white men embrace destruction and homosociality to ren-
der themselves independent of and invulnerable to women.14 The film 
marked the broader cultural development of a more elusive, diffuse, 
and fragmented form of white masculinity that Claire Sisco King calls 
“abject hegemony.”15 Reveling in masochism and self-destruction ren-
ders the male body abject by making it bear grotesque wounds that 
threaten the borders of subjectivity. Blood and other bodily wastes are 
material that must be expelled to establish the subject as fully symbolic 
so that it bears no trace of its relation with nature.16 In King’s estima-
tion, “white masculinity prevails not by expelling that which is Other, 
but by sacrificing its own fictions in order to absorb, assimilate, and 
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make room for Otherness, offering up, for instance, cherished narra-
tives of masculine strength, aggression, and invulnerability in order to 
indulge in femininity, passivity, and lack.”17 Diffuse and amalgamated, 
abject white masculinity benefits from being able to accommodate 
“a multitude of incarnations of what the ‘white’ and the ‘masculine’ 
can be.”18 Although masochism places the male body in what Freud 
called a “characteristically female situation,” this interpretation of 
abject masculinity suggests that masochism enables men to disavow 
that hegemonic masculinity still ultimately structures society.19 Hence, 
self-destruction is but a creative reservoir of strategic advantages for 
white men as they address the present iteration of the so-called crisis 
of masculinity.
Bearing one’s wounds—physical or emotional, real or perceived—
has become a powerful way of articulating white masculinity in Amer-
ican culture. Abject white masculinity is underwritten by a powerful 
script of victimization that blames feminism and multiculturalism for 
white men’s dwindling social and economic privileges. When one lives 
a life of entitlement, even the most modest demands for equality can 
be perceived as an assault. This book suggests that the apocalyptic turn 
in the rhetoric of white masculinity is the by-product of a nearly forty-
year effort to position white men as victims of identity politics and 
policies mandating formal equality. Sally Robinson contends that fol-
lowing decades of social upheaval in which white men were asked to 
share their social and economic privileges with women and people of 
color, “post-sixties American culture produced images of a physically 
wounded and emotionally traumatized white masculinity.”20 In addi-
tion to new antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action programs, 
deindustrialization and the decline of American manufacturing and 
family farming undermined male primacy in America’s labor force.21 
The transition from an industrial to a service economy untethered 
hegemonic masculinity from its long-standing association with profes-
sions that required physical skill.22 As Susan Faludi argues, in an “orna-
mental culture,” the necessity of male labor was replaced by “celebrity 
and image, glamour and entertainment, marketing and consumer-
ism.”23 In addition, America’s military defeat in Vietnam emasculated 
a nation whose collective identity was premised on a hypermasculine 
war culture that venerated military heroes and celebrated American 
exceptionalism.24
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Besieged by these socioeconomic forces, some white men began 
to speak about themselves as victims and blamed women and minor-
ities for their woes. Despite the fact that white men still outpaced 
every other demographic in economic opportunities and social privi-
lege, mere exposure to the kind of structural precarity experienced by 
women and minorities provoked a reactionary response from certain 
demographics of white men.25 In contrast to the stoic masculinity of 
the 1950s, the post–1960s white man put his suffering on public display. 
That he no longer seemed invulnerable to economic and social precar-
ity was evidence of not only white men’s share in structural oppression 
but also the systematic displacement of white men altogether.
Invoking victimhood seems counterintuitive if it is the case that 
hegemonic masculinity is defined by attributes such as physical 
strength, virility, self-reliance, independence, and self-confidence.26 
Yet, victimhood is a powerful trope in American culture that elevates 
the moral status of the subject who suffers. John Mowitt’s notion of 
“trauma envy” and Wendy Brown’s theorization of “wounded attach-
ments” illustrate how a preoccupation with victimization can forge 
political communities solely on the basis of shared trauma.27 Thus, 
Bryan McCann underscores the importance of distinguishing between 
therapeutic and material victimhood, the former an appropriation of 
victim status as a means of acquiring credibility and the latter a tan-
gible experience with structural oppression.28 Masculine victimization 
is more characteristic of the former, and thus serves as a “convenient 
strategy by which publics can deflect blame and insist upon their own 
moral purity by being a victim or sympathizing with one.”29 Masculine 
victimhood encourages white men to speak about common human 
vulnerability as if it were systemic structural oppression. Hence, nar-
ratives of white masculine victimhood conflate material and therapeu-
tic victimhood to destabilize the social conventions by which justice is 
adjudicated.
In part, victimhood’s appeal is owed to its long-standing relation-
ship with the political genre of melodrama. Melodrama foregrounds 
agonistic moral polarities, the spectacular yet virtuous suffering of 
innocent victims, heroic acts of redemption, and overwrought pathos 
and sentimentality. Elisabeth Anker argues that the generic conven-
tions of melodrama have found their way out of novels and films and 
into post–9/11 political discourse. Melodramatic political discourse, she 
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writes, “depicts the United States as both the feminized, virginal vic-
tims and the aggressive, masculinized hero in the story of freedom, 
as the victim-hero of geopolitics.”30 Inviting the public to ruminate on 
their injuries, political melodrama legitimizes violence and the consoli-
dation of state power as necessary components of national healing. On 
account of the genre’s cultural work, men’s rights discourse has taken 
up many of these melodramatic qualities, including virtuous suffering, 
unjust persecution, innocence, and a call for heroic salvation. Suffering 
of any kind, for that matter, seems to underwrite white men’s efforts to 
lay claim to the status of the victim-hero. Victimhood unmoored from 
the materiality of justice can be an intoxicating discourse that can lead 
otherwise caring and thoughtful individuals to feelings of resentment 
and animosity.
While white supremacist and men’s rights groups take the claim 
for granted, how is it that objectively privileged white men have come 
to understand themselves as victims? Michael Kimmel offers perhaps 
the deepest historical account of white male victimhood in which he 
argues that the pre–World War II masculine archetypes such as the 
self-made man and artisan hero were undone by the emasculating 
forces of mass culture and the rise of a service economy. The resul-
tant masculine mystique was based on a recognition that male arche-
types that embodied unassailable strength, rugged individualism, and 
stoicism not only were fraudulent but were quite literally killing men 
who were unable to escape a vicious pattern of overwork, emotional 
repression, and self-medication.31 While factory workers felt powerless 
and isolated, white-collar organization men felt that they were cogs in 
the corporate machine. America’s failure in Vietnam further demon-
strated that the American warrior archetype was no longer a reliable 
foundation for white masculinity. A new generation of baby boomer 
men rebelled against the stoic masculinity of their fathers. Even Betty 
Friedan suggested that masculinity oppressed men too, noting that “it 
seems to me that men weren’t really the enemy—they were fellow vic-
tims, suffering from an outdated masculine mystique that made them 
feel unnecessarily inadequate when there were no bears to kill.”32 The 
idea of men’s liberation drew strength from the other liberation move-
ments of the period, even harboring potential for identification and 
coalitional politics with the feminist movement, the civil rights move-
ment, and gay liberation. At the outset Warren Farrell, now a promi-
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nent antifeminist, convened NOW’s taskforce on the male mystique 
and ran consciousness-raising groups for men. By the early 1970s there 
were a litany of key writings that suggested that men, too, suffered 
from the “problem without a name” and also endured lives of quiet 
desperation.33
Men’s liberation adopted a victimization narrative when it took a 
hard right turn in the 1980s and became enveloped in the antifeminist 
backlash that was part and parcel of the Reagan Revolution.34 Early 
aspirations toward solidarity with other liberation movements were 
dashed by white men’s newly found vigor for frontier manhood and 
avenging action heroes.35 Moreover, despite the downward trajectory 
of the working class, men were exhorted to invest in the same market-
place myths used to deindustrialize American cities and ship jobs over-
seas. The decade’s backlash against entitlement programs, affirmation 
action, and political correctness all took aim at feminists (also called 
“feminazis”) as the source of men’s victimhood.36 Antifeminists char-
acterized feminism and other liberationist causes as a demand for spe-
cial rights that unfairly advantaged women and minorities over white 
men.37 Men’s liberation proponents began to speak about men as vic-
tims of family courts and divorce proceedings, domestic abuse, fal-
sified sexual harassment and rape allegations, and affirmative action 
programs. Farrell even proposed a men’s Bill of Rights to enshrine pro-
tections against feminism.38 Others such as Robert Bly, Robert Moore, 
and Douglas Gillette offered therapeutic correctives that sought out the 
mythopoetic foundations of manhood as an alternative to renegotiat-
ing the gender division of labor. Bly’s Iron John (1990) and Moore and 
Gillette’s King, Warrior, Magician, Lover (1990) presented a softer bou-
tique image of manhood dredged from ancient archetypes. Yet, this less 
aggressive form of men’s liberation ultimately affirmed that men had 
been led astray by modernity and that there was an innate social order 
that affirmed men’s birthright to power.39 Bly also echoed the belief that 
men have been unjustly accused by feminism and should not accept 
the blame for patriarchy. In short, they disavowed the need for social 
change in favor of changing men’s emotional expectations.
As those who have written about mass shootings and white extrem-
ism have observed, guns and paramilitary culture, militias, online hate 
groups, and conservative talk radio also offered sanctuary to white men 
who felt dispossessed by demographic shifts and identity politics.40 
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Much like the aforementioned scholars, Douglas Kellner’s historiciza-
tion of contemporary white male victimization begins with the vast 
social upheaval of the 1960s in which feminism, gay liberation, and 
the counterculture transformed the institutions, practices, and values 
that white men once took for granted.41 This transformation in social 
values also coincided with an inflationary economy and the global 
restructuring of capital that put downward pressure on wages and led 
to the decline in traditionally male professions such as manufactur-
ing. The combination of social change and downward economic pres-
sure caused white men to reconstruct their political identities, some 
retreating to apocalyptic fantasies and extremist violence. In response 
to the dizzying pace of social change, these institutions provided men 
both a narrative that made sense of their feelings of alienation and an 
affirmation that white male identity was a distinct and vitally impor-
tant aspect of American culture. Kellner writes that “this situation gave 
rise to a new strain of white male identity politics fueled by intense 
rage, resentment, paranoia, and apocalyptic visions, often exploding 
into violence and finding solidarity with militia movements, right-
wing hate and extremist groups, Christian fundamentalism, survival-
ist sects, and talk radio and Internet subcultures.”42 He calls the new 
white male identity politics a kind of “postmodern pastiche,” as it often 
blended Christianity, white supremacy, and other militant beliefs into a 
shallow and psychotic identity characterized by paranoia, anxiety, and 
antimodernism.43
The contemporary men’s rights movement is a heterogeneous mix-
ture of formal and ad hoc communities, many of whom gather adher-
ents through networked media. The men’s rights message varies widely 
depending on the community they target, ranging from divorced 
dads and pickup artists to white supremacists and male separatists. 
Although some groups identify as pro-feminist men’s organizations or 
therapeutic emotional support groups, the more vitriolic and increas-
ingly visible organizations are those that speak to white male victim-
hood and constantly cycle rage into public life.44 For instance, Voice for 
Men founder Paul Elam uses a victimization narrative to justify spou-
sal rape as well as domestic battery as a form of self-defense. In a par-
ticularly nauseating piece of “satire,” he explains, “women, please listen 
to Whoopi Goldberg. If you don’t want to be slapped, backhanded, 
punched in the mouth, decked or throttled keep your stinking hands 
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off of other people. A man hitting you back after you have assaulted 
him does not make you a victim of domestic violence. It makes you a 
recipient of justice. Deal with it.”45 Matt Forney, a writer for the men’s 
rights website Return of Kings, often publicly fantasizes about gender 
violence. He argues that “women should be terrorized by their men; 
it’s the only thing that makes them behave better than chimps.”46 All 
couched in a smirking irony, these passages exemplify the kind of vio-
lent fantasies fomented in a series of online portals dedicated to decry-
ing the victimization of white men.
While men’s rights can be easily dismissed as a fringe movement, 
hundreds of thousands of men (and some women) visit these sites 
annually. As of January 2018, Reddit.com’s Red Pill subreddit—a page 
populated with violent misogyny—has 245,500 subscribers.47 The 
men’s rights subreddit also has over 175,000 subscribers. Elam’s website 
generates 20,000 to 30,000 visitors per day.48 Canadian psychologist 
and virulent men’s rights activist Jordan Peterson’s Youtube.com lec-
tures have received over forty million views.49 Other sites that devote 
a significant attention to men’s rights topics include Infowars, which 
has averaged twenty million visitors per month since 2013,50 and Bre-
itbart News, which surged from approximately eight million to eigh-
teen million visitors per month following Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign announcement in the summer of 2015.51 As this significant 
amount of web traffic suggests, the message of white male victimhood 
has attracted a very large audience.52 This audience will continue to 
grow as men’s rights websites cross-pollinated with alt-right groups 
such as the National Policy Institute. Chris Cantwell, one of the orga-
nizers of the Unite the Right Rally at Charlottesville, is a prominent 
example of how men’s rights activists have been enlisted in the cause 
against “white genocide.” What both groups share—and the similarities 
are many—is the belief in the ongoing persecution of white men and, 
in R. W. Connell’s words, an “apocalyptic awareness of the historicity of 
masculinity itself defined the political goal.”53 The synergy between alt-
right, white supremacy, and men’s rights organization explains both the 
visibility and the intensity of the rhetoric of white male victimhood. 
If white men are to believe that they are not only marginalized but at 
war for their very survival—then extreme acts of spectacular violence 
seem all the more rational. Of course, I read much of men’s animos-
ity as misguided and misplaced. Hence, my focus is on verbal, medi-
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ated, and embodied discourses that address white men as victimized 
subjects rather than on white men themselves. This book is interested 
in the recent apocalyptic tone in the rhetoric of white masculinity and 
what kinds of anxieties it tends to circulate. At this moment, the narra-
tive of persecution seems to hold the attention of white men more than 
any other discourse. In light of this, the next section offers a psycho-
analytical framework to understand the connection between victimiza-
tion, melancholia, and the death drive.
MASCULINITY, MELANCHOLIA, 
AND THE DEATH DRIVE
This book traces how white masculine victimhood is underwritten 
by the perverse effects associated with what Freud called the “death 
instinct,” which has been subsequently reformulated as the death drive. 
I am concerned with how the death drive is externalized or deflected 
into public life toward external persecutors to stave off and defend 
against threats to the ego that germinate from within.54 In other words, 
the rhetoric of white male victimhood constructs an external tormen-
tor onto which its audience can project those fears and anxieties that 
are generated from the internal desires of the subject. Projection, then, 
does less to address specific imminent needs than it does existential 
dread, or the immanent and recursive crises of the white male subject. 
The apocalyptic man, then, is beseeched to invest in imagery and nar-
ratives of death and lawlessness to address the subject’s unending ano-
mie and project a fantasy of self-mastery. For Joshua Gunn and David 
Beard, such ritualistic behavior constitutes the terrain of the “apoca-
lyptic sublime” that “replaces the traditional sense of impending cat-
aclysm (an ‘ending’) with a sense of never-ending crisis.”55 For those 
white men who consider themselves persecuted victims, the apoc-
alypse is nigh: their institutions have been taken over by their ene-
mies, their rights and freedoms have been dispossessed, their reign at 
the top of the socioeconomic ladder has been deposed, their society 
has collapsed. This is the message emanating from conservative talk 
radio, paramilitary culture, and networked media.56 Hence, the white 
male subject repetitively gazes backward toward an imagined time and 
place where he was supposedly whole. In their view, the present can-
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not nor should not be reconstructed but instead discarded altogether. 
But white male victimhood belies the multitude of ways in which the 
existing social order is still organized around hegemonic masculinity. 
In one sense, white male victimhood is a response to external threats 
such as demographic shifts and policy changes that have forced men 
to sacrifice some of their entitlements—albeit very few.57 In another 
sense, white male victimhood is also a deflection of an internal per-
secution in which a perceived trauma is disavowed and suffering kept 
at bay through the compulsion to repeat and domesticate past experi-
ences. The failure of white men to adequately address the confounding 
effects of rapid social change has produced a state of cultural melan-
cholia wherein white men’s feelings of absence are addressed as if they 
were genuine loss recurring in the present. In turn, that imagined loss 
is incorporated into a subject haunted by and preoccupied with death 
and mayhem, some intent on inflicting suffering on others.
Freud identifies the death drive with those aspects of the mental 
apparatus that do not protect life or preserve pleasure.58 Whereas Eros 
represents the life instinct that strives toward well-regulated pleasure 
and survival, Thanatos represents the subject’s drive toward equilib-
rium or quiescence that preceded its existence. Freud’s initial inquiry 
found that the death drive is often muted and otherwise repressed, 
sublimated, or externalized by the ego. But the death drive is neither 
merely innate preparation of organic life’s inevitable return to inor-
ganic matter nor the termination of life, but instead a symbolic regres-
sion of the subject to a state absent of tension and antagonism between 
the libido and the ego (which strives for self-preservation). Character-
ized as a drive, we find in Freud not a biological argument but a cul-
tural concept that symbolic life is inherently regressive. Joan Copjec 
observes that Freud’s writings about death and regression are incom-
prehensible if we take instincts to be the same as drives, which are the 
product of the pleasure principle and, thus, social reality. For Freud, 
the subject undergoes two deaths; the “first is the real death of the bio-
logical body, after which there is usually another, the second, exempli-
fied by the various rituals of mourning that take place in the symbolic. 
It is with this second death that we are concerned when we speak of 
the Freudian concept of the death drive.”59 In other words, while our 
biological life moves forward, our symbolic life continually looks back-
wards and can be best characterized by the compulsion to repeat and 
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disavow the loss that is subjectivity. Hence, Copjec surmises that “the 
death drive and the compulsion to repeat are thus the inevitable corol-
laries of symbolic life.”60 Our psyche and our social life are both unwrit-
ten by this mechanism of regression that forces the subject to repeat in 
order to bind its existence.
In Eros and Civilization, Herbert Marcuse elaborated further on 
the symbolic rituals of death and mourning when he argued that “the 
death instinct is destructiveness not for its own sake, but for the relief 
of tension. The descent toward death is an unconscious flight from 
pain and want. It is an expression of the eternal struggle against suffer-
ing and repression.”61 While Freud’s earlier work argued that all men-
tal phenomena are governed by repression (the pleasure principle), his 
later observance of clinical responses to trauma found that subjects felt 
compelled to repeat past traumas rather than remember them as hap-
pening in the past. The subject relives traumatic events as a way of 
binding those experiences, and so integrating them into their psyche.62 
For instance, Freud observed in his grandson Ernst a refusal to be 
undone by the trauma of his mother’s absence by staging a game in 
which he threw a tethered toy, exclaiming “fort!” (gone!) and upon its 
retrieval declaring “da!” (there!).63 Through repetition, Freud’s grand-
son tamed the displeasure of loss by shifting from passive to active 
agent in relation to trauma.
The trouble with reading the compulsion to repeat as the ego’s mas-
tery of trauma is that the death drive’s radical unbinding of the sub-
ject cuts against the possibility of its domestication.64 In one sense, the 
compulsion to repeat trauma is actually a form of unbinding in which 
traumatic subjects revisit without mourning loss (melancholia). Yet, in 
another sense, the compulsion to repeat is part of fulfilling the subject’s 
need for mastery. Freud’s theorization of the death drive is incompat-
ible with the claim that repetition fulfills the subject’s need for con-
trol. As Kaja Silverman explains, “the death drive seeks to reduce the 
organism once again to nothingness, and so poses a radical challenge 
to the organization of the psyche. If repetition is indeed to be located 
at the level of the drive, then it must be understood to subvert rather 
than consolidate control.”65 In other words, we must “differentiate the 
death drive from these other types of repetition so as to arrive at a 
clearer understanding of the role that is plays within historical trauma, 
and its subset, war trauma.”66 Hence, we might distinguish how the ego 
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insulates itself from the death drive differently than it does the libido. 
In the latter, the threat of the libido is sublimated into erotic activity 
whose effect might be characterized as release. The libido is managed 
but is by no means inimical to the coherence of the ego. The death 
drive, however, confronts the subject with its own feigned coherence, 
and its effect is to shatter or unbind the ego. In other words, the repeti-
tion associated with mastery is the same repetition that forces the sub-
ject to experience object loss as ego loss. The compulsion to repeat for 
the sake of taming displeasure also forces the ego to experience with-
out mourning loss; hence, the ego re-experiences threatening trauma 
while never fully achieving mastery. Unlike the libido, the death drive 
is never fully sublimated and, as such, is projected as aggression toward 
others. The subject is caught in a perpetual re-enactment of fort/da.
White men’s attachment to loss—real and imagined—explains both 
why white men refuse to move forward and their preoccupation with 
catastrophe.67 That is to say that the fantasy of return is accompanied 
by a confrontation with the ego-shattering void upon which white 
masculinity must be feigned and belabored. Silverman notes that white 
masculinity is particularly vulnerable to the unbinding implications of 
the death drive because it is premised on the fantasy of self-mastery 
and control—neither of which repetition fully achieves. Hence, white 
masculinity remains oriented toward and within the past, ceaselessly 
unbinding itself while attempting to recover its unicity. The masculin-
ist slogan “Make America Great Again” is premised on the fraught con-
struction of a meridian between “before” and “after,” or that there was 
a time at which male subjectivity was whole.68 But, as scholarship on 
cultural trauma illustrates, subjectivity is itself feigned and fragmented, 
yet must constantly seek some underlying yet illusory anchor.69 As 
Dominick LaCapra suggests, the difference between absence and loss 
provides clues to how traumatic male subjects have become haunted by 
melancholia.70 Whereas loss refers to specific events such as the death 
of a loved one or a traumatic historical incident, absence is a transhis-
torical and inchoate sense of lack. Speaking to the significance of this 
distinction, LaCapra writes:
When absence is converted into loss, one increases the likelihood of 
misplaced nostalgia or utopian politics in quest of a new totality or 
full unified community. When loss is converted into (or encrypted 
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in an indiscriminately generalized rhetoric of) absence, one faces the 
impasse of endless melancholy, impossible mourning, and intermi-
nable aporia in which any process of working through the past and 
its historical losses is foreclosed or prematurely aborted.71
Put differently, because one can never recover what one never had, 
conflating the historicity of loss with the transhistoricity of absence 
mistakes lack for a specific traumatic event or violent interruption of 
the psyche. Thus, the general precarity common to human existence 
can be reinterpreted as a discrete traumatic event that is more charac-
teristic of loss than of lack.
Freud’s distinction between melancholia and mourning provides an 
additional explanation of how white men are encouraged to read the 
presence of difference and uncertainty through the lens of trauma.72 
Freud distinguishes mourning and melancholia as different responses 
to loss, or in this case, when absence is mistaken for loss. While 
mourning is the process by which the conscious mind grieves a trau-
matic injury, melancholia entails an inability to fully register the loss 
of an object. Melancholia is a perverse form of nostalgia in which the 
narcissistic ego disavows a traumatic wound by psychically internaliz-
ing the existence of a lost object. Judith Butler argues that melancholia 
characterizes “those identifications which are formed from unfinished 
grief [and] are the modes in which the lost object is incorporated and 
phantasmatically preserved in and as the ego.”73 If the lost object can-
not exist in the external world, it is made to exist within the psyche “to 
disavow that loss, to keep it at bay, to stay or postpone the recognition 
and suffering of loss.”74 For white masculinity, melancholia explains the 
fixation with remaking the present in the image of a time before men 
were supposedly wounded. As this lost object can longer exist, or never 
existed, it must be internalized. Thus, object loss is experienced as ego 
loss. At the same time, melancholia is also accompanied by feelings of 
ambivalence concerning the lost object. The subject cannot overcome 
or move past their grief because they are conflicted—if not guilty—for 
perhaps desiring loss even if they felt attached to the lost object. Either 
way, the notion of wholeness is a feigned form of subjectivity that can 
never be recovered because the lost object never existed. While white 
masculinity is strategically framed in terms of loss, it is more fitting 
to conceptualize it as a lack: an illusory sense that the white male self, 
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or subjectivity for that matter, was ever whole. The ambivalence that 
accompanies melancholia, in part, explains white masculinity’s inco-
herence: men seek to overcome their traumatic feelings of loss, and yet 
it is loss they require to make the case for masculinity’s recovery.
Finally, the odd consonance between melancholia and the death 
drive highlights why white masculinity is so closely aligned with mas-
ochism. There is something about the inability to grieve (or unfinished 
grieving) that aggregates those aspects of the drive that are antithetical 
to the subject. In part, this is the case because melancholia represents 
both a similar regression and a disavowal of loss that postpones suffer-
ing. As Butler explains, “where melancholy is the refusal of grief, it is 
also always that incorporation of loss, the miming of the death it can-
not mourn.”75 Put differently, the very death that melancholia disavows 
becomes incorporated into the subject through the repetition. As the 
death drive constitutes the regressive striving of the psyche toward 
equilibrium—the melancholic (and cruel) superego makes efficient use 
of such regression. Hence, white masculinity has come to embody a 
regressive posture that revels in self-abasement and masochistic fanta-
sies of persecution. The death drive produces masochistic attachments 
by compelling the subject to repeat unpleasant experiences.76 Follow-
ing Silverman, David Savran observes that in his writings on female 
masochism, Freud actually names a distinctly masculine pathol-
ogy in which the male sufferer is positioned as female.77 When Freud 
observed female masochism it was in men “being pinioned, bound, 
beaten painfully, whipped, in some way mishandled, forced to obey 
unconditionally, defiled, degraded.”78 But, as noted earlier, masochism 
does not unsettle the polarity of gender identification but instead func-
tions, according to King and Gunn, as a “valorization of the suffering 
of men-as-womanly objects.”79
In another sense, white male masochism also converges with the 
death drive in the operation of surplus repression, in which Marcuse 
suggests we invest in our own subjugation in pursuit of the perfor-
mance principle. Marcuse’s Marxist uptake of Freud suggests that the 
drives are shaped by historical forces; that under advanced capitalism, 
repression has outlived its necessity for civilizational survival. Capi-
talism, therefore, requires surplus repression so that subjects invest in 
domination and toil and sublimate their desires into productive enter-
prises. Repressive desublimation channels the erotic and creative ener-
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gies of the libido into commodified forms of leisure.80 Capitalism also 
makes use of Thanatos by transforming death into “an instrument of 
repression” or a “token of unfreedom.”81 That is to say that death might 
be valorized as a sacrifice that alleviates our collective guilt or threat-
ened in a way that compels those of us who toil to surrender to life. 
It is the death drive that animates life under capitalism, or rather that 
capitalism’s ideological manipulation of drives is to locate loss, suf-
fering, and recuperation outside the subject. Masochism and surplus 
repression resist the theoretical possibility that Eros might liberate us 
from an unnecessarily repressive society. The question remains: to what 
extent is liberation even a possibility if it is the case that subjectivity 
is inescapably underwritten by object loss and compulsive repetition?
White men’s peculiar fascination with death and destruction reflects 
how oblivion has been incorporated into the psyche of the melancholic 
white male subject. In this book, I am interested in how the death 
drive has been mobilized to extinguish those ideas and attachments 
that align themselves with Eros. Liberation of the libido—even if illu-
sory—is the enemy of contemporary men’s rights groups who identify 
feminist and queer movements as the culprits responsible for their suf-
fering.82 Doomsday preppers, survivalists, mass shooters, men’s rights 
activists, pro-gun activists, demagogues, and white supremacists alike 
cling to life in the name of death. Their apocalyptic fantasies are orga-
nized around compulsive repetition, masochism, and melancholia—
they carry death with them everywhere they go. As a rhetorical critic, 
I am primarily concerned with the symbolic life of the death drive, 
or how discourses and performances of white masculine victimhood 
propel the death drive into public culture by playing out repetitive sce-
narios of trauma, victimization, and persecution. This form of white 
male identity politics disrupts our conventional connotations of justice 
and equality—even disarticulating them from life-affirming expres-
sions of hope and replacing them with profound pessimism. As Hamil-
ton Carroll summarizes, “white masculinity turns to a reactive strategy 
under which it redefines the normative by citing itself as a marginal 
identity.”83 White male victimhood rehearses the same politics of iden-
tity that white men believe dispossessed them of their birthright. Yet, 
the rhetorical performance of victimhood brings neither mastery nor 
wholeness, merely an interminable and recursive encounter with lack. 
In this way, white male victimhood becomes an unending and cyclical 
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politics of death in the name of life. It is no surprise, then, that white 
men who identify as victims also demonstrate a proclivity for apoca-
lyptic fantasies and imagery of death: they are quite literally haunted by 
the symbolic life of the death drive.
RHETORICAL CRITICISM, 
PSYCHICAL STRUCTURES, AND FORM
This book is concerned with how the compulsive repetition that char-
acterizes the death drive manifests itself culturally in an array of differ-
ent rhetorical forms. To wit, neither does this book provide a critique 
of individual neuroses nor is it directed against individual men who 
adhere to the rhetoric of victimhood. My concern instead is with the 
figural—the signifiers, public personae, and subject positions that are 
constituted in language and circulated through different forms and 
genres of public discourse, often with an idealized audience in mind. 
Though at points my critique highlights the symbolic activity of par-
ticular men, I attend to white men as cultural figures who necessarily 
serve as conduits for bigger things. As such, I am not concerned with 
hidden internal conditions of the mind that are obfuscated by signifiers 
but with what Gunn calls “psychical structures” that denote “recurrent 
strategies and defenses that are culturally derived.”84 I read repeti-
tion not as a symptom to be diagnosed but rather as a performance 
of control and habitual sense-making activity that attempts to domes-
ticate radical contingency. As Edwin Black illustrates in his compari-
son of rhetorical criticism and psychoanalysis, both are less invested 
in distinctions between appearance and reality than “the premise that 
appearances have real consequences.”85 Motives and investments are 
conveyed as much, if not more so, through what is said than what is 
concealed.
Repetition can be characterized as a form of enjoyment, a con-
cept that names the subject’s investment in a fantasy that nonetheless 
organizes, accumulates, and provides a sense of mastery over the sub-
ject’s world. Jacques Lacan contends that durable social formations are 
the product of the Symbolic’s (language) necessary failure to medi-
ate the Real.86 The Real is not reality but instead a material and mind-
independent realm that is accessible to us only through mediation. 
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Despite conditions of impossibility—the vast chasm between the Sym-
bolic and the Real—the subject labors and invests in reality to obtain a 
sense of coherence, however feigned. Christian Lundberg explains that 
“enjoyment is the compulsion to repeat as to give coherence to the sub-
ject’s world by investing it with identity and a set of predictable habitu-
ated relationship with the world.”87 Enjoyment, however, should not be 
conflated with pleasure. It’s very unlikely that compulsive iterations of 
victimhood or simulations of world-ending doom bring subjects any-
thing akin to joy or happiness, yet subjects nonetheless express desire or 
a deep investment in attaining a hypothetical object. Calum Matheson 
summarizes the relationship between repetition and enjoyment as such:
This is the repetition compulsion, in which the subject tries again 
and again to attain something that eludes its grasp . . . There is jouis-
sance in repetition not because speaking subjects necessarily enjoy 
the possibilities of destruction or rebirth in and of themselves, but 
because repetition gives a sense of mastery over the contingency of 
the world. Jouissance isn’t happiness or joy. Rather, it is an investment 
in something, a kind of attachment that may very well be painful but 
is nonetheless compelling.88
Hence, repetition creates the conditions of possibility (Imaginary) for 
the making and unmaking of enduring social arrangements. It is in 
the persistent reiteration of victimhood and rebirth—its melancholic 
longings for hypothetical objects that the subject never possessed—that 
accounts for adherence to and consummation of masculinist fantasies 
of death and rebirth.89 Marcuse reminds us that the drives are both 
psychological and historical, meaning that they are, in part, both motor 
and by-product of cultural forces.
As a rhetorical critic invested in understanding the cultural entail-
ments of psychical structures in the context of a manufactured crisis of 
white masculinity, my mode of inquiry concerns how patterns of pub-
lic discourse take form and organize a subject’s encounters with and 
investments in those socially durable arrangements that constitute real-
ity. This approach also entails creating a cultural map of victimhood 
attachments so as to track how and to what effect masculinist fanta-
sies traffic across a variety of textual forms, media, genres, embodi-
ments, and networks. How might an array of texts organize white men’s 
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encounter with victimhood and court particular investments in such a 
painful proposition? Drawing from Black, I ask: what would these dif-
ferent forms have their audience become?90 Herein, the act of rhetori-
cal criticism attends not to hidden patterns or idiosyncrasies that link a 
series of diverse texts, but instead to both the singular and cumulative 
affordances of rhetorical forms and the content that populates them. 
For Caroline Levine, the concept of affordance engenders both the 
potential uses latent in particular sociological or textual forms and the 
modes of thinking and characterizations of reality that are constrained 
and enabled by reliance on particular forms.91 By form I mean any pat-
tern of experience or arrangement of elements that order, shape, and 
configure content according to an implicit or explicit organizational 
structure. For instance, whereas a form like a binary imposes rigid and 
mutually exclusive categories onto content, a hierarchy imposes a top-
down structure that by nature ranks and subjugates lesser values.
Further, we might also consider how a textual form like narrative 
orders information according to rising action or a genre such as melo-
drama imposes moral polarity and a preoccupation with the persecu-
tion and redemption of innocent victims. Hence, I am also concerned 
with the rhetorical entailments of particular genres of public discourse, 
which are themselves distinct types of forms that organize and arrange 
discourse in response to recurring situations.92 Although not all forms 
are genres, all genres are forms and, as such, tend to organize content 
according to recognizable patterns. But, as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson explain, “a genre does not consist merely of 
a series of acts in which certain rhetorical forms recur .  .  . Instead, 
a genre is composed of a constellation of recognizable forms bound 
together by an internal dynamic”93 Genre is neither a label for a text 
nor a description of particular elements that reside in a text, but rather 
a description of recognizable forms that recur in the public imaginary. 
In any case, attention to form tells us how a pattern imposes order 
onto content and dictates how audiences are invited to understand and 
relate to particular messages. Such an approach might enable critics to 
grasp “both the particular constraints and possibilities that different 
forms afford, and the fact that those patterns and arrangements carry 
their affordances with them as they move across time and space.”94
This approach to criticism suggests that it is the nature of form to 
impose its own particular and arbitrary sense of order onto content, 
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and, therefore, that a privileging of form accounts for how different 
texts elicit different modes of identification and degrees of investment. 
In this way, form imposes order in a manner similar to psychical struc-
tures. Thus, in the chapters to come, I argue in a general sense that the 
affordance of repetition is that it privileges a backward gaze, habitual 
re-enactment, and re-experience of past as both present and prologue. 
An inflection on form stresses the importance of patterns that structure 
content and, therefore, how audiences are invited to take up and make 
sense of that content. But I am also concerned with the affordances of 
specific forms of mediation and symbolic action such as reality televi-
sion, Reddit, online manifestos, public performances, political rallies, 
and tweets in which appeals to white masculine victimhood are made 
manifest yet are also constrained by the unique structure demanded by 
each platform.
This book is invested not in what hidden meanings are unearthed 
when texts are subjected to critique but rather in what texts do to 
and do for aggrieved white men. I argue that each form anchors its 
imagined audience to reality in distinct ways and thus constrains and 
enables the audience’s relationship to politics. For instance, where 
the techniques for producing reality television impose authoritative 
(though impossible) unmediated access to the Real (chapter 1), digi-
tal platforms that support men’s rights rhetoric afford intimacy, self-
disclosure, and a magical sense of agency over users’ so-called social 
programming (chapters 2 and 3). By contrast, chapter 4 focuses on the 
affordances of guns and the white male body as co-extensive of state 
sovereignty and how embodied paramilitary performances affirm white 
male authority. This insight gives way to the final chapter’s analysis of 
the affordances of other modes of political address, including Presi-
dent Trump’s embrace of melodrama as a genre of political discourse 
to amplify his electorate’s suffering as well as his use of unconventional 
platforms (political rallies, Twitter) to speak to his electorate without 
the pesky conventions of empathy and rejoinder. Each form establishes 
another way in which the content of victimhood is arranged, orga-
nized, and enacted.
As Rita Felski suggests, quite often the impulse in criticism (cri-
tique, to be more accurate) in the humanities has been to interrogate 
hidden meanings and thus narrow and relegate the function of texts to 
either obscuring or occluding systems of power.95 I myself am no less 
24 •  I N T R O D U C T I O N
guilty of indulging this impulse. But we might take Felski’s polemic as 
an occasion for thinking about other functions of both texts and pro-
fessional criticism. For instance, it might behoove rhetorical critics to 
consider how form asserts an agency all unto itself. Such an approach 
would be consistent with Kenneth Burke’s statement on form as “the 
creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate sat-
isfying of that appetite.”96 Form modulates audience attitudes toward 
ideas that populate particular texts and cultivates enjoyment, expec-
tation, and identification with a desired object. Hence, I take Felski’s 
directive as an opportunity to explain the rhetorical pull of form in 
activating particular relationships between the speaker, audience, 
and content. As Felski explains, “once we take on board the distinc-
tive agency of art works—rather than their imaged role as minions 
of opaque social forces or heroes of the resistance—we cannot help 
orienting ourselves differently to the task. Such a shift is desperately 
needed if we are to do better justice to what literature does and why 
such doing matters.”97 The goal of criticism herein is to explain how the 
rhetoric of white masculine victimhood is neither a rhetorical delusion 
nor an obfuscation of white male power. Such an incredulous approach 
would risk merely blaming individual men, leaving us with an anemic 
understanding of how and why this rhetoric cultivates such toxic iden-
tifications. A more provocative question would be to ask what makes 
such a discourse seem so plausible in the face of so much evidence to 
the contrary? What is the structure of enjoyment that enraptures white 
men, cultivates macabre attachments, and enlists them in a project of 
remaking the world with fantasies of the end in mind? Criticism can 
illustrate rhetorical functions beyond obfuscation, including registers 
such as enjoyment, conversion, reconfiguration, transformation, iden-
tification, and subjectification—all of which explain the affective force 
of white masculine victimhood in terms of both the present cultural 
context and the endurance of psychical structures.
To account for the diverse range of discourses explored in this 
book, it is important to distinguish between the rhetorical effects of 
mediation, performance, and political address. In the first three chap-
ters, I address two unique forms of media that developed in conjunc-
tion with one another over the past two decades: reality television and 
networked media. As Marshall McLuhan surmised, transformations in 
media necessarily “alter the pattern of interdependence among peo-
T H E A P O C A LYP T I C MA L E •  25
ple.”98 Taken together, both forms afford connectivity and blur bound-
aries between the private and the public self. Both privilege speed and 
accessibility to platforms, information, celebrities, and the private 
lives of others. As Nick Couldry notes, “the most puzzling aspect of 
this whole landscape is the notion that the media provide a ‘central’ 
space where it makes sense to disclose publically aspects of one’s life 
that one might not otherwise disclose to anyone.”99 Reality television 
and networked media encourage audiences to conflate access to medi-
ated personas with encounters with the unmediated subjectivity of oth-
ers.100 While neither platform can provide unmediated access to the 
Real, they can certainly plug subjects into circuits that connect them 
with a compelling portrait of an authentic expression of one’s person-
hood. Of concern here is the darker side of the democratization and 
accessibility of new media—that television and networked media are 
often devoid of space for empathy and time for critical reflection. For 
instance, Brian Ott and Greg Dickinson observe that the media ecol-
ogy of social media platforms affords narcissism, simplicity, careless-
ness, and even cruelty toward others.101 Reality television scholars have 
similarly observed the same behaviors, values, and attributes valorized 
in popular reality programming—all of which are delivered with a 
wink of dissociative irony.102 In chapter 1, I begin with an inquiry into 
how the techniques of producing reality television have helped lend 
authenticity and political credibility to the taboo and hypermasculine 
ethos of doomsday prepping. Examining the National Geographic pro-
gram Doomsday Preppers, I argue that the reality format helps recast 
the apocalypse as an opportunity to demonstrate the necessity of male 
skills against a cultural moment seemingly enraptured by misandry.
Chapter 2 shifts attention to men’s rights discourse on websites 
such as Reddit, Return of Kings, and a Voice for Men by attending to 
the narrative structure of the manosphere—a constellation of online 
forums, blogs, and news sites steeped in tales of white male victim-
hood. This chapter is concerned with how patterns of discourse within 
online platforms court particular investments in users that tends to 
cycle negative emotions into public life. I argue that networked men’s 
rights activism takes on a perverse form of consciousness-raising—
co-opting a feminist form—that seeks to awaken men to their supposed 
subjugation by women so that they can turn the tables on feminism. I 
suggest that networked media afford men space for personal confes-
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sions and intimate diatribes even as it relieves them of obligations 
to demonstrate empathy. Networked men’s rights discourse orga-
nizes male attention economies around an ascendant mythology of 
“men who sit at screens”: a previously untenable network of aggrieved 
men seeking to literally reprogram reality. Building on the networks 
explored in the previous chapter, chapter 3 explores the epidemic of 
spectacular mass killings carried out by white men, paying particu-
lar attention to those who have been radicalized while cruising men’s 
rights networks. This chapter examines the digital manifesto of killer 
Elliot Rodger, a Santa Barbara college student who went on a murder-
ous rampage as retribution for his sexual rejection by women. Rodger 
was part of growing community of “incels” or involuntary celibates 
who are unable to find sexual partners. His manifesto offers a dysto-
pian vision of torture and femicide carried out to extinguish sexual-
ity in the name of civilization progress. Rather than viewing this vile 
text as an aberration, this chapter argues that the network milieu from 
which the manifesto emerges evinces how white male victimhood so 
easily attaches itself to fascist principles and fantasies of mass death.
Chapter 4 addresses the body-as-form by examining how white 
men act out and resist their victimhood by brandishing firearms in 
public. Legal in all but three states and the District of Columbia, the 
practice of open carry or open carry rallies are increasingly popular 
not only among gun’s rights advocates but also with members of the 
alt-right and other antigovernment organizations. In contrast to the 
ephemeral and often anonymous communication that populates net-
worked media, these paramilitary events deploy the white male body 
as a metonymic substitute for the law. Open carry is an embodied act 
that transforms guns into prosthetic extensions of white male power 
into public space. Corporeal bodies alongside such meaningful objects 
are capable of performing, enacting, and animating desires.103 White 
male bodies in particular are afforded credibility to act on behalf of the 
law and to exercise sovereignty over public space. In the unification of 
gun and body, such violent performances figure prominently into the 
embodied politics of white masculinity in public space.
Chapter 5 explores the incoherent yet powerful script of white mas-
culine victimhood offered by President Donald J. Trump. Trump’s 
unconventional political style is matched by his reliance on unconven-
tional forms of presidential address, namely those that circumvent the 
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professional press and the general public to reach more receptive audi-
ences. As a consequence, the media ecology of Twitter and the real-
ity celebrity spectacle of the political rally are perfect vectors for both 
Trump’s melodramatic style and his rhetoric’s perverse lack of empa-
thy.104 Acclimated to the viewing norms of network media and reality 
television culture, Trump’s reliance on both forms helps normalize a 
cruel and nihilistic form of white masculinity. Examining a selection 
of President Trump’s political rallies, this chapter argues that Trump’s 
dark portraiture of contemporary American life signals to white men 
that the apocalypse is nigh: the country has been overrun by nonwhites 
and foreign enemies, violence and persecution define everyday life, the 
press and the “deep state” have overthrown legitimate government, 
language, religion, and culture have become subject to the whims of 
tyrannical leftists, and America is no longer a beloved superpower. 
This chapter suggests that his dark ruminations provide an exigence 
for cruelty and regeneration through violence. Characterizing Trump’s 
rhetoric as political sadomasochism, this chapter argues that audience 
enjoyment is structured both by a perverse desire to be subjugated and 
a pleasurable anticipation of righteous violence. Finally, the conclud-
ing chapter offers some possible ways forward by considering alter-
native rhetorics and performances of masculinity that could form the 
basis of coalition politics. This chapter considers how some challenges 
to Trump-era masculinity, such as call-outs and public emasculations, 
fail while others that encourage white men to develop emotional intel-
ligence, cultivate intimacy, and express empathy might be the antidote 
to our cultural melancholia.
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Doomsday Preppers
The Man-pocalypse
MAR TIN COLVILL considers himself a warrior. In head-to-toe military 
camouflage, automatic rifle at his side, Martin tells a National Geo-
graphic camera crew: “My name Martin means ‘warrior’ or ‘war-like’ 
individual. I try to fight for what’s right. I don’t like bullies. My great-
est fear upon a total economic societal collapse is that I won’t be able 
to protect my wife.” Displaced by the 2008 mortgage crisis, Martin and 
his wife Sarah reside in the cab of an open-road truck. But Martin is 
of interest to National Geographic not because of his adaptive post-
recessionary lifestyle, but rather because he counts himself among the 
approximately three million Americans who self-identify as “dooms-
day preppers.” Martin is, in his words, “preparing to survive the next 
great depression caused by economic collapse.” Like others who adopt 
the label, Martin spends his time cultivating food and weapon caches, 
learning self-defense, and simulating doomsday scenarios. Martin’s 
apocalyptic performances engender the hypermasculine ethos of con-
temporary doomsday culture (Doomsday Preppers, Doomsday Castle, 
Apocalypse Preppers, and Meet the Preppers) in which predominantly 
white men, such as Martin, perform their feelings of rage and vic-
timhood, deliver diatribes about the collapse of civilization, model 
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their armaments, rehearse paramilitary battles with postapocalyptic 
marauders, and exhibit their masculine know-how.
One overarching lesson of American doomsday culture is that the 
future is indefinite but that hegemonic white masculinity—aggression, 
self-reliance, stoicism, competitiveness—remains necessary. In Martin’s 
grave divinations, the recuperation of traditional manly skill sets will 
rebuild America after inevitable disaster. Like most doomsday prep-
pers, Martin is enraptured by a regression to the state of nature—a 
fantasy consummated through repetitive scenario planning and prepa-
ration for the apocalypse. Here, the world is made to disappear only to 
be returned to the viewer with an illusory sense of control and mastery 
over an uncertain future. Doomsday Preppers powerfully illustrates the 
culture of politics of melancholia at work in the contemporary crisis 
of masculinity: there was a primal moment to which we will and must 
return when our survival hinged on the strength and natural ability of 
men.
Although American television audiences are accustomed to seeing 
their world eviscerated on screen, outlived by small bands of male-
led survivors, the apocalyptic turn in popular culture gives viewers 
purportedly unmediated access to the masculinized survival rituals 
performed by ordinary Americans. National Geographic’s Doomsday 
Preppers promises to take viewers “into lives of .  .  . committed prep-
pers who have devised extensive plans, gone to great lengths, and made 
huge personal sacrifices to guarantee their very survival.” Each epi-
sode’s participants are “ordinary Americans from all walks of life” who 
are “taking whatever measures necessary to prepare and protect them-
selves from what they perceive as the fast approaching end of the world 
as we know it.” Unlike spectacular disaster films, Doomsday Preppers 
portrays the manly art of survival as a sensible ritual already practiced 
by millions of Americans. Drawing from the educational ethos of the 
Nat Geo, Doomsday Preppers invites audiences to emulate “real life” 
performances of manly survival skills against the background of an 
uncertain future.
This chapter attends to how the mainstreaming of doomsday prep-
ping figures into the contemporary rhetoric of white male victimhood. 
As a dominant form of new media, reality television has played a prom-
inent role in modeling white masculinity in precarious political and 
economic times. Reality television purports to offer unmediated access 
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to everyday-life performances through a valence of authority borrowed 
from anthropology and educational television. It is a form that affords 
its subjects an aura of authenticity or realness. Yet, reality television is 
belabored and produced under conditions of heavy mediation, includ-
ing the crafting of character types, mise-en-scene, continuity editing, 
cinematography, and dialogue to name a few. Reality television is also 
a genre with an agency all its own. Like other forms of media, it is for-
mulaic, but its premises, sets, and concepts can be easily and cheaply 
copied, recycled, and reused across cable television. For example, the 
success of Doomsday Preppers generated a series of copycat programs 
on other cable networks, including related programming that features 
extreme survival trials (Alone, Dual Survival, Man vs. Wild, Naked and 
Afraid, Survivor Man, The Alaska Experiment, and The Colony). Hence, 
reality television is, in part, responsible for the sudden cultural visibil-
ity of masculine survivalism. What is novel about reality television is 
that it imbues extreme everyday-life performances with both authen-
ticity and compelling dramatic structure. This chapter explores how 
the rhetoric of reality television delivers to the culture a manly sense of 
apocalyptic excitement.
My central argument is that seemingly “authentic” representations 
of doomsday prepping have helped reclaim white male sovereignty in 
the name of survival and resuscitated premodern archetypes of pri-
mal masculinity as befitting the laws that govern human nature and, 
consequently, the postapocalyptic future. Doomsday preppers argue 
that the feminine attributes that characterize modernity are ultimately 
unsustainable luxuries that will inevitable collapse into barbarism. 
Simulating the apocalypse, then, is an opportunity for white men to 
display masculine traits as a set of survival tools—the antidote for a 
crumbling and emasculated society. Longing to resuscitate a past that 
never existed, doomsday preppers seek to domesticate the trauma of 
white masculinity’s displacement by promising a future in which white 
men are restored to their proper place in both nature and the social 
order. In short, the apocalypse serves as the ultimately resolution to 
the so-called crisis of masculinity. Along with a series of other net-
worked platforms, reality television has ushered in the apocalyptic turn 
in white masculinity.
Once a fringe ritual among survivalists and white supremacists, 
apocalyptic manhood is now constituted through rhetoric and per-
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formances that confirm the necessity of masculine skills as modern 
society meets its demise. This chapter uses the National Geographic 
Channel’s reality program Doomsday Preppers to show how the figure 
of the doomsday prepper cultivates a militarized version of white man-
hood capable of reclaiming the future from women and racial Others. 
Through repeated displays of manly preparedness rituals in machine 
shops, gun ranges, and wilderness, Doomsday Preppers offers a rebut-
tal to the progressive case for gender and racial equality by testifying 
to the enduring primacy of white male identity. In a broader context, 
this chapter also explains how apocalyptic paranoia has contributed to 
a surge in hypermasculine mass violence in American culture where 
feelings of white male alienation translate into militaristic preparations 
for an uncertain future.
REALITY’S MANLY AFFORDANCES
Reality television often involves manly labor: zero-sum competition, 
shouting matches, gladiatorial sport, cutthroat business dealings, 
hyperindividualism, survivalism, muscle, sweat, grit, and militarism.1 
But like political melodrama, reality programming also features moral 
polarities, virtuous suffering, and intractable enemies. It is a genre that 
relies on conventions associated with femininity, including sentimen-
tality and emotional intimacy. Reality television affords a level of access 
that cultivates a sense of closeness with the participants, drawing from 
what Lynn Spigel has noted is the feminine coding of the in-home 
screen.2 With soft close-ups of emotional confessions and detailed por-
traits of domestic life, Doomsday Preppers co-opts the so-called femi-
nine intimacy of television to build rapport between participants and 
viewers. Yet, the program subtly recodes the television as masculine by 
importing the conventions of action films that hail a male spectator. 
The introduction to each episode includes action-style zoom-close-ups, 
a blockbuster soundtrack of loud drums, and dramatic glitch aesthet-
ics wherein the screen flickers and digitizes to simulate the impending 
failure of technology. The program’s action-movie aesthetics maintain 
the maleness of the big screen as it co-opts the feminine intimacy of the 
small screen. Of course, as John Corner warns, scholars should mind 
the distinctions between everyday life and screen performances; how-
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ever, reality television routinely blurs these performative boundaries, 
particularly when programs remove the host, interviewer, and other 
observers from the screen to make interactions feel realistic.3 This dis-
tinction is often too hard to maintain where the subgenre of documen-
tary reality television re-presents staged, self-conscious, and improvised 
performances as if they were all not-performed. Therefore, there is 
something about the genre that naturalizes the once-fringe rituals of 
the white male prepper as a new and repeatable version of manhood.
Staged and belabored as reality television may be, the genre is none-
theless underwritten by a grammar of authenticity and realness. For 
instance, NatGeo imports the authoritative documentary techniques of 
ethnographic filmmaking into reality television to provide “realistic” 
portraits of people as they live.4 Thus, Doomsday Preppers derives its 
sincerity from a combination of first-person interviews, camera obser-
vation of participants’ everyday life, authoritative narration, stock foot-
age of natural disasters, and expert assessments. The mixture of formats 
and techniques offers the audience multiple access points to the sub-
jects’ reality, to see not only how they live but also how the world might 
appear from their viewpoint. Mark Rademacher and I have argued that 
reality television has evolved into a powerful platform for the display 
of male labor.5 This claim builds from Laurie Ouellette and James Hay’s 
observation that reality television emphasizes neoliberal economic val-
ues such self-reliance, self-help, and small government.6 The genre’s 
focus on the labor of ordinary men provides “realistic” models for per-
forming hegemonic masculinity in uncertain circumstances.
Reality television also imparts the illusion that participants are not 
performing, that the camera is documenting organic “everyday life per-
formances.”7 This presumption of authenticity elides the fact that par-
ticipants are actors in a setting arranged like a theatrical stage. For 
instance, Ragan Fox observes how “producers use editing to construct 
tales and characters, and, in the midst of participation, reality TV per-
sonalities edit themselves.”8 Similar to Erving Goffman’s discussion of 
everyday-life performances, some reality TV participants’ behaviors are 
constructed as “real” or “authentic,” otherwise natural and unselfcon-
scious. Conversely, contrived performances are those that seem trans-
parently constructed wherein the subject is conspicuously acting for 
the camera. Those who, in Rachael Dubrofsky and Emily Ryalls’s terms, 
“perform not performing” are conferred more legitimacy within the 
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structure of reality television.9 Reality television scholars contend that 
the normalization of surveillance through reality television accounts for 
what kinds of performances count as genuine.10 While all participants 
perform, those behaviors that reveal the contrived nature of reality tele-
vision are constructed as “mere” performances.
This theorization of surveillance explains how masculine perfor-
mances on Doomsday Preppers appear authentic. In particular, schol-
ars who have examined race in reality TV argue that performances of 
white male identity are often constructed as more authentic than racial 
minorities because whiteness itself operates with unselfconsciousness. 
Like the ideal identity of reality TV participants, whiteness and mascu-
linity are enacted through effortless performances from the privileged 
subject position of being unmarked by identity.11 Similarly, I suggest 
that Doomsday Preppers builds authenticity by featuring subjects whose 
white male identity imbues their on-camera performances with the 
same “realness” afforded to them by virtue of their privileged subject 
position. In this way, reality TV projects not reality but “an imagined 
reality” that makes “narrative arguments about socio-cultural ideas.”12 
Reality television makes conjectures about what kinds of identity per-
formances are afforded the presumption of authenticity. With its lack 
of racial and gender diversity, Doomsday Preppers frames the perfor-
mance of “prepping” as an authentic and legitimate expression of white 
male fear, frustration, and rage in precarious times.
WHITE MASCULINITY AND SURVIVAL CULTURE
In April 2015 thousands (including myself) gathered in Sandy, Utah, 
for the first annual “PrepperCon,” a two-day exhibition of products and 
services to help conventioneers survive an apocalyptic event. The con-
vention featured displays of underground bunkers, dehydrated food-
stuffs, water filtration systems, biohazard suits, ham radios, armored 
vehicles, gold futures, and military-grade firearms.13 Some exhibition-
ers offered seminars on, among other things, hand-to-hand combat, 
wilderness survival skills, first aid, firearms, and the construction of 
“bug-out” bags, or emergency survival packs. The convention provides 
a snapshot of what has become the $500 million Mad Max economy 
T H E MA N - P O C A LYP S E •  35
of doomsday prepping, an emerging lucrative industry that markets 
products to Americans who are concerned about everything from nat-
ural disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks to world-ending sce-
narios such as a shift in Earth’s magnetic poles, the collapse of the 
global economy, and World War III.14 The 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hur-
ricanes Katrina and Sandy, the Japanese tsunami, and countless other 
international disasters have prompted many Americans to invest in 
emergency preparations that range from the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency’s recommended stockpile of three days of food and 
water to full-service luxury “doomsday condominiums” constructed in 
abandoned Atlas missile silos.15
The popularity of PrepperCon is one indication that survivalism is 
no longer reserved for extremists, militias, conspiracy theorists, and 
survivalists: doomsday prepping is ostensibly for everyone. “Survival-
ist” is a pejorative term once reserved for paranoid camouflage-clad 
mountain men like Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, and members of 
the John Birch Society or the sovereign citizen movement who joined 
militias, stockpiled arms and food, and espoused radical conspiracy 
theories about nefarious governmental agencies and secret communist 
plots. Contemporary survivalists, who frequently go by the less dis-
dainful moniker of “preppers,” are more economically and geographi-
cally diverse.16 While some estimate that approximately three million 
Americans can be considered full-fledge preppers, survivalism—its 
discourses, aesthetic markers, ethical precepts, ritual performances—
has become infused into American culture.17 For instance, one in seven 
Americans believes that they will experience the end of the world in 
their lifetime.18 Another study found that 41 percent of respondents 
believed that prepping was a smarter investment than saving for 
retirement.19
My attendance at PrepperCon was prompted by my desire to wit-
ness firsthand how a generally fragmented, secretive, and clandestine 
community temporarily self-organized into a public. I was particularly 
interested in how the image of doomsday prepping figured into the 
political identity of white men. Moreover, I was struck by the stark 
contrast between the apocalyptic subject matter of the event and the 
festive tone conveyed by its organizers and promoters. For instance, the 
event’s website advertises the event as follows:
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PrepperCon is the premier event for Preppers of any age or experi-
ence. Not only do we showcase the Prepper Lifestyle, but we com-
bine the best of entertainment, emergency preparedness, gun shows, 
off-grid living and survival into one incredible experience. Come see 
local and international celebrities in the Prepper World. We  bring 
live demonstrations, survival food cooking contests, fashion shows, 
disaster simulators, prizes, and a diverse lineup of amazing people. At 
PrepperCon you’ll find incredible entertainment, cutting-edge gad-
gets, training, and networking opportunities, prepping fundamentals, 
self-defense and home security, survival gear, food storage, first aid 
supplies, emergency and disaster response resources, and an unbe-
lievable experience for you, your family, and community.20
Yet, promising attendees entertainment and fun seems to be at odds 
with the community’s macabre vision of the future. At the same time, 
selling the convention as a somber event might conflict with the indus-
try’s imperative to put consumers in the buying mood. Anecdotally, I 
can attest that the organizers delivered on their promise of entertain-
ment. I learned how to forage for medicinal herbs, defend against a 
knife attack, and start a fire without matches. I talked with exhibitors 
about the kind of spectacular world-ending scenarios for which they 
believe we should all be preparing. I was implored by some venders to 
protect my “wife and kids” from dangerous marauders. At the same 
time, I was given the opportunity to meet reality television celebrities 
and 2016 Miss America pageant winner Julie Harman. Admittedly, I 
was expecting to be surrounded by camo-clad woodsmen and para-
noid survivalists—to be sure, there were many—rather than suburban 
white men with their families in tow. I expected vendors to be distrust-
ful of me as an interloper instead of demonstrating enthusiasm to get 
the word out about their product to anyone who was willing to listen. 
While the convention maintained an underlying tone of seriousness, 
its surprisingly festive atmosphere transformed the apocalypse into an 
enjoyable if not desirable experience.
Why such a festive tone? In one sense, the convention—much like 
doomsday prepping itself—staged a game of fort and da, making the 
world repetitively disappear and reappear. Upon repetition, subjects 
might transform themselves from passive to active agent in relation-
ship to world-ending trauma. In short, doomsday prepping is under-
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written by enjoyment—taming and retaming the world’s end to provide 
the subject with an illusory sense of self-mastery. In part, the popular 
image of the doomsday prepper has also reframed the apocalypse as 
an opportunity to re-envision society and domesticate those anxieties 
engendered by the simulation of the end of the world. The apocalypse 
is a blank palette—freed from the psychical strictures and material 
conditions of possibility in the present—onto which both utopian and 
dystopian ideals can be projected. It is the fantasy’s repetition that mat-
ters more than crossing the event horizon. As Matheson suggests, the 
fantasy of sovereign citizens taking up arms against the government 
is a powerful source of enjoyment as long it remains at a comfortable 
distance, since “proximity undermines the conditions for fantasy by 
revealing the Other’s desire as something alien to the subject and out-
side of its control.”21 Doomsday preppers imagine the horrific possibil-
ity that society will implode, food and water will become scarce, and 
neighbors will turn into bands of hording marauders as much as they 
imagine themselves happily thriving under such conditions. After all, 
doomsday preppers imagine themselves as the heirs of the postapoca-
lyptic world. Since the fantasy must satisfy the subject’s need for mas-
tery first and foremost, doomsday preppers make conjectures about 
the iron laws of human nature that will undoubtedly govern the posta-
pocalyptic future. In doing so, they validate their identity in the present 
and domesticate the trauma of an uncertain future.
But to whom does the future belong? This chapter suggests that 
what is at stake in the figure of the doomsday prepper is the sover-
eignty of the white masculine subject itself. Stripped of his autonomy 
by a feminized, multicultural control society, the virtues of the white 
male subject are rediscovered when the world returns to the state of 
nature. Exemplifying the death drive, doomsday prepping pursues not 
biological equilibrium but a fantastical subject free of tension. There 
are, of course, racial entailments in the white male vision of self-
mastery. Writing about the popularity of zombie apocalypse narratives, 
Eric King Watts suggests that audience enjoyment is predicated on the 
evisceration of a blackening biothreat that re-establishes the primacy of 
the white male.22 The apocalypse makes what was once fantastical seem 
plausible, and hence introduces the material prospect of reviving the 
militia and of “real” Americans taking their country back. The image 
of the doomsday prepper does cultural work on behalf of beleaguered 
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white men by celebrating a future in which they are both necessary 
and sovereign. It is not the feminized and blackened male of ornamen-
tal culture but the archetypical man of the nation’s primal past who 
rebuilds society in the future: the frontiersman, the gunslinger, the arti-
san, and the self-made man. The self-sufficient individual, the family, 
the clan or tribe: for better or worse these are the only units of society 
that will survive the next great die-off. The dissonant tone of playful-
ness engendered by the image of the doomsday prepper helps contain 
white male anxiety about the future while making the archetypes of 
white masculinity matter in the present.
First appearing in the early 1960s writings of Kurt Saxon, the term 
survivalist described an individualist Übermensch whose self-sufficiency 
and preparedness for cataclysmic events was crafted through trials in 
remote wilderness.23 The survivalist, typically a lone male, was distin-
guished by a series of lifestyle practices that included, among other 
things, homesteading, stockpiling food and guns, paramilitary train-
ing, hunting, and extended wilderness trials. While survivalists writ 
large had few if any official umbrella organizations or civic leagues, 
many populated the ranks of citizen militias, the Minutemen move-
ment, the John Birch Society, the Posse Comitatus movement, and 
the American Nazi Party.24 Overall, survivalism emerged as less of an 
organized political movement than a lifestyle politics of learning to 
exist “off the grid,” so to speak. That is not to say that Saxon’s brand 
of survivalism did not have a political ethos. Survivalism was a reac-
tionary antigovernment ideal adopted primarily by white men bracing 
for catastrophes induced by post–New Deal government bureaucracy, 
Leftist protest movements, and international Bolsheviks. Moreover, the 
looming Soviet threat, the nuclear arms race, and the federal govern-
ment’s push to create an expansive Civil Defense system confirmed the 
survivalist prophetic narrative of impending doom.25
Contemporary survivalism is most commonly associated with an 
array of white militias, hate groups, and other doomsday cults who 
gained public attention through high-profile acts of violence (Timothy 
McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski) or tragic confrontations with law enforce-
ment (Branch Davidians at Waco, Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge).26 
Militias or cults, however, are but one form of political organizing that 
arises out of the antistatist paranoid style of survival culture. It is a 
political form that is attractive to some but is easily dismissed by the 
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public and disavowed by mainstream conservatives. Yet, the emergence 
of militia movements points to the historical development of an under-
lying ideology of what James Gibson calls “warriorism,” that took root 
in the early 1980s.27 A largely masculinist worldview that encompasses 
survivalism, warriorism is a cauldron of frustration, resentment, and 
paranoia shared by individuals (white men in particular) who believe 
that they are embattled by the forces of modernity: secularization, fem-
inism, multiculturalism, globalization, and so-called entitlement cul-
ture. Warriorism arises from a perceived loss of power, suspicion of 
democratic politics, and, most of all, feelings of betrayal. It is a persona 
enraptured by apocalyptic visions, a steadfast belief that society was a 
failed experiment. The warrior channels the spirit of the pioneer or the 
frontiersman to escape modernity, going to war if necessary.28
Survivalism has a strong, often underlying appeal because it so eas-
ily attaches to the existing constructs of American liberalism: individ-
ualism, life, liberty, autonomy, freedom, and self-determination. The 
logic of survivalism is also rooted in the shared cultural mythology 
of the American frontier, the lore of white male explorers, gunfight-
ers, pioneers, homesteaders, and other self-sufficient Robinson Crusoes 
and Swiss Family Robinsons. Survivalism appropriates the philosophi-
cal god-terms of American liberalism, even finding support in frag-
ments of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the 
writings of Patrick Henry, Thomas Paine, and the early antifederalists. 
Survivalists even defend their version of radical individualism as the 
original intent of the American founders. Survivalism is not only a life-
style but also an appealing belief structure plucked from the heart of 
American liberalism. Nurtured by alienation, the ideology stretches the 
philosophical canon to, at its logical limit, reject much of its demo-
cratic foundations. Its masculine appeal is in the rejection of feminized 
society, conveyed by opposition to the “nanny state”: a feckless, over-
bearing, and controlling perversion of government.
The rhetoric of survivalism and doomsday prepping speak directly 
to white men’s perceived victimization by government policies that 
might be construed to impinge on men’s individual liberty and redis-
tribute their wealth to the less fortunate. Prepper discourse addresses 
white men’s perceived powerlessness and offers a revision of the social 
order made anew. In the face of overwhelming economic and environ-
mental challenges, survival rhetoric offers white men empowerment 
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outside the public sphere, in a retreat to an alternative space outside 
politics that is both privatized and orderly. Apocalyptic visions are 
powerful because they allow those who see themselves as oppressed 
or disenfranchised to imagine the emergence of a new social order. 
Richard Mitchell argues that survivalists are creative in that they desire 
social transformation, “not by changing institutions but through dis-
covery and reinterpretation of the cultural assumptions and intrinsic 
practice that undergird the institutional order.”29 Envisioning the col-
lapse of civilization offers an opportunity to reimagine the individual, 
the family, and the local community as the new social architecture; a 
masculine vision precluded by existing feminine modes of governance, 
and therefore, not achievable by way of reform or collective action.30
Apocalyptic discourse appeals to a diverse crowd. From the Puritan 
theology of Jonathan Edwards and Cotton Mather to the Ghost Dance 
prophecies of Wovoka and the evangelical divinations of the reverend 
Billy Graham, most American religious traditions are in some way 
structured by apocalyptic theology.31 While its secular appropriations 
connote the end of existence, “apocalypse” is the Greek word for rev-
elation, meaning the unveiling of previously unknown truth, typically 
in the end times.32 In Judeo-Christian theology, during the end of days 
a heavenly messenger will reveal to all the order of the cosmos. Evil 
will be destroyed, the righteous will be saved, and human existence 
will prove to be divinely meaningful. The postmillennial apocalyptic 
form provides assurances that the end of the world, as we know it, will 
be followed by a utopian epoch of peace. Both Barry Brummett and 
Stephen O’Leary argue that the apocalyptic is a genre of discourse that 
emerges in response to social crisis to assure audiences that there is a 
cosmic order in which good triumphs over evil.33 It is no surprise that 
the genre appeals to white men.
Though men and women alike share in apocalyptic dread, dooms-
day prepping is largely a masculinist culture. Preppers lambaste the 
effeminacy of entitlement culture, valorizing in contrast the self-made 
man of pre/industrial civilization as the only gender modality that 
guarantees survival. The rhetoric of “feminine dependency” is one of 
the key ways that conservative men performatively enact their identi-
ties. Prepper culture is consummated through masculine performances 
of self-sufficiency and paramilitary violence, including preparedness 
simulations, complete with props and costumes such as camouflage 
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and military weapons. Prepper discourse encourages the develop-
ment of masculine-coded abilities, including mechanical labor, wil-
derness training, and weapons proficiency. Preppers are animated by 
calls to remasculinize America, a discourse premised on the assump-
tion that since the 1960s, society has become increasingly feminized 
and dependent on government. Protest against the feminization of 
society advances the misconceptions that relative gains in social equal-
ity have made the nation “soft,” less animated by authority, competi-
tion, and aggression. Right-wing movements capitalize on fear of the 
“nanny state,” an overly sentimental and bureaucratic society that per-
sonifies weakness.34 Like their survivalist predecessor, the figure of the 
doomsday prepper is a composite of premodern masculine archetypes 
that fashions a heroic self-image for white men. His sudden ubiquity 
in American popular culture and public life speaks to aggrieved white 
man’s desire to reset the social order to a time when they were whole 
and necessary.
THE REAL MEN OF DOOMSDAY PREPPERS
Doomsday Preppers is an hour-long documentary-style reality televi-
sion program that chronicles individuals who devote a significant por-
tion of their life to disaster preparedness. Each program is divided 
between two to four different participants. The program relies on 
male “voice-of-God narration,” or verbal commentary that directly 
addresses the spectator, and onscreen textual prompts to provide back-
ground information on each subject.35 Though participants address 
the camera to explain their apocalyptic preparations, the interviewer 
remains silent and off-screen. Each segment begins by explaining the 
participant’s everyday rituals, followed by discussion and simulations 
of their particular vision of the apocalypse. Stock footage of mass vio-
lence and natural disasters are integrated to help audiences visualize 
global disasters. Next, episodes document the subjects’ “preps,” includ-
ing food pantries, weapons, and security. The camera follows the par-
ticipants into simulated tests of their preparedness, military training 
exercises, attacks on the participant’s home, and “bug-out” escapes to 
safe locations. The producers employ Practical Preppers, a disaster pre-
paredness firm, to grade the subject’s level of readiness. Finally, each 
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case concludes with a brief expert assessment of the likelihood of each 
apocalyptic scenario.
Since 2011 Doomsday Preppers has become the centerpiece of Nat 
Geo’s apocalyptic rebranding.36 Although Nat Geo continues to employ 
the slogan “inspiring people to care about the planet since 1888,” the 
network’s most popular programming simulates the planet’s destruc-
tion (Apocalypse 101, American Blackout, Doomsday Castle, Forecast: 
Disaster, and How to Survive the End of the World).37 Doomsday Prep-
pers has emerged as one of Nat Geo’s most successful and highly rated 
series: 1.3 million viewers watched the season 2 premier, the highest-
rated premier in the network’s history. The show is particularly pop-
ular with men (60 percent) with an average age of forty-four.38 The 
executive producers contend that 9/11, Hurricane Sandy, and the Japa-
nese tsunami account for the public’s fascination with the program.39 
Doomsday Preppers also benefits from the historic credibility of the 
National Geographic Society (NGS), its magazine and television net-
work. The NGS has also long played a role in constructing national 
manhood. Lisa Bloom argues that the NGS rose to prominence because 
its rhetoric consummated Theodore Roosevelt’s vision of the sporting 
man/adventurer who promised to recuperate the virile national man-
hood of preindustrial America.40 Doomsday Preppers returns the net-
work to NGS’s roots by simulating the importance of rugged manhood. 
I analyze masculine performances throughout the first two seasons 
wherein dominant tropes are established and elaborated. I attend to the 
interplay between dialogue, narration, simulations, mise-en-scene, and 
on-camera performances to show how apocalyptic manhood emerges 
as a sensible ideal. I organize the analysis around how the program 
constructs the performance of male labor, fatherly know-how, manly 
rituals, and feminine domesticity. Each of these elements is bolstered 
by the show’s construction of the participants as performing as they 
would even if the cameras were not present. Authenticity is constructed 
through “unconscious production of observable trustworthiness and 
earnestness of character” that develops from reality TV characters “act-
ing” natural while being observed.41 The presentation of participants 
“performing not performing” not only invites audience identification 
with their extreme fantasies but also provides an instructional model 
for enacting hegemonic masculinity. When participants play out apoc-
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alyptical scenarios, the program’s realistic veneer gives the male par-
ticipant’s “imagined realities” the presumption of realness.
THE VALUE OF MALE LABOR
Doomsday Preppers responds to the decline in masculine labor by 
showing images of men putting their skills back to work; putatively 
“real men” who toil in the real world. If, as Boylorn suggests, “real-
ity television offers a supposed lens into the everyday experiences, 
thoughts, and actions in the lives of participants,” glimpses of partici-
pants reclaiming masculine labor in their homes and workplaces pro-
vide a convincing portrait of how authentic manliness is performed.42 
In episodes that feature male-headed households, the camera dis-
plays male artifice in traditionally masculine spaces: the home garage, 
machine shop, and primitive wilderness. Male characters show off their 
working-class skills: welding, automotive repair, mechanical engineer-
ing, construction, woodwork, farming, fishing, weapons manufactur-
ing, hunting, among others. The program’s male participants show off 
their homemade gadgets and ingenious methods of cultivating self-
sufficiency. After displaying their pre/industrial skills, participants con-
duct tests that confirm the durability of their “preps.” Here, I analyze 
the various stages for manly performances, illustrating how the pro-
gram constructs (1) the male-headed household as a model for eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, (2) the garage as a laboratory of masculinity, 
and (3) the wilderness as a male proving ground.
First, the show depicts the household of the future as a site of pro-
duction where men lead and delegate physical tasks. The intimacy of 
each family home or business is essential to the program’s construction 
of authentic manliness. As Goffman notes, everyday-life performances 
always take place against a background: “furniture, décor, physical lay-
out, and other background items which supply the scenery and stage 
props for the spate of human action played out before, with, or upon 
it.”43 The working home of the postapocalyptic future creates the ideal 
context for performing manly labor. For instance, Dennis Evers (S1, 
E2) is introduced to the audience through a montage of gun-shooting, 
wood-chopping, lathe work, and welding. He tells the camera: “Every-
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one has a job and an assignment and they know how to do it. My oldest 
son Tim is in charge of hunting and security, my daughter Jenny and 
her husband Pat are in charge of fuel, Nate and Betsy deal with com-
munications, Ricky knows how to weld and helps me with the engi-
neering side of things, John is currently training to be an emergency 
responder. The importance of delegating labor when it hits the fan is 
no person can do everything, I can only be in one place at one time.”
Dennis oversees an efficient system of economic production based 
on a fantasy of complete self-sufficiency. The Evers family is depicted 
as an exemplar of a gendered division of labor closely associated with 
the preindustrial American family. Whereas the women of the family 
are shown in the pantry and kitchen, or gathering supplies, the men are 
shown manufacturing weapons, building security systems, and invent-
ing gadgets in the home garage. The camera peers over Dennis’s shoul-
der as he labors in his machine shop, capturing what appears to be the 
unrehearsed daily routine of the male prepper. The camera closes in on 
his face to capture his intense concentration and engineering acumen. 
Dennis’s machine shop is a stage, a backdrop against which he per-
forms the valuable role of men in the working household of the future.
Like all other participants, Dennis directly addresses the camera 
during interview segments only. The remainder of the program doc-
uments his everyday activities, as they would supposedly transpire 
without the camera. Hence, the audience is treated to two distinct per-
formances: the day-in-a-life and the confessional. In the former, Den-
nis shows the audience what it’s like for him to manage the household 
labor. The camera is attentive to his gestures, movements, and dialogue 
as he works in the machine shop and assesses the value of his chil-
dren’s work. As Dennis critiques his son’s bow-and-arrow design, the 
audience is invited to vicariously experience what it is like to man-
age a prepper household. The intimacy of witnessing “organic” fam-
ily encounters helps convey the relatability of the participant’s extreme 
lifestyle. The latter performance builds sincerity by providing the sub-
jects space to explain their performances. Dennis’s interview takes 
place in the machine shop, his tools the manly props of his one-man 
act. His workshop stage corroborates his monologue on the importance 
of delegating family labor. Both performances build audience identifi-
cation and attest to the subject’s sincerity. The episode concludes with 
scenes of a commonplace, everyday dinner. Like the image of the tradi-
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tional nuclear family, Dennis heads the table and evaluates the group’s 
daily chores, delegating tasks for the next morning. As the episode 
concludes, Dennis explains that to survive “we need to come together 
as a family.” This portrait of the laboring household not only sutures 
working-class labor to the success of the family but also reframes prep-
ping as a natural expression of fatherly duty.
Next, the program portrays suburban garages as laboratories of 
masculine ingenuity. Here, the program relies on masculine stereotypes 
about the inherent value of physical labor to render the participant’s 
performances authentic. Tim Ralston (S1, E3) is depicted in his two-
car garage happily testing improvised weapons and assembling “bug-
out” bags. Pat Brabble’s (S1, E3) interviews also take place in his garage, 
where a display of ammunition, tools, foodstuffs, and the American 
flag frame the shot. Brabble, too, is routinely depicted modifying 
weapons and making ammunition. Jim D (S2, E11) is shown pouring 
sweat over his perfect escape vehicle (“the behemoth”). Jim’s garage is 
arranged as an automotive laboratory where he enacts his road-warrior 
fantasy. Other participants have converted their businesses into prep-
ping factories. Riley Cook (S1, E6) is introduced through a montage 
that switches between interactions with his daughters and intense man-
ual labor at his welding business. Riley discloses:
In most aspects I’m very typical American. I have a full time job. I’m 
married and have children. We go to work and get our paycheck at 
the end of the week. We look forward to a vacation. But one of my 
primary concerns as a father and a husband is will our American 
Dream be there in the near future for our children, for ourselves?
Folded into American Dream mythology, Riley’s monologue reframes 
male labor as a fatherly responsibility. His fatherly motivations now 
self-evident, repeated images of Riley welding imply a strong connec-
tion between the laboring male body and the survival of the nuclear 
family. This motif recurs throughout the series. For example, the nar-
rator declares that Glen Rogers (S2, E7) has acquired skills such as 
making gunpowder because he “hopes this skill will protect his fam-
ily.” Another subject calling himself “Mr. Wayne” (S1, E11) is filmed in 
his workshop, where he “spends hours tinkering” making bullets and 
bombs to protect his family from a Chinese invasion. His physical skills 
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are framed as fatherly assets, well suited to the task of family survival. 
None of these activities appear extraordinary, because they are only 
extensions of appropriate everyday-life performances for working-class 
men. What might otherwise seem to be extreme preparations trans-
form into natural extensions of male identity.
Finally, the program’s male subjects perform their physical skills in 
wildlife settings. These episodes use nature as a proving ground for 
male skills, a vital backdrop for the performance of Nat Geo’s frontier 
manhood. For instance, the narrator praises Christopher Nyerges (S1, 
E1) for his botanical skills as he is filmed foraging for food among the 
local flora and fauna of Los Angeles. His performance is made more 
convincing by his willingness to eat a meal composed of found items. 
Allen and Franco (S2, E5) are portrayed as caring fathers because they 
have harmonized with nature to feed their family. Meanwhile, the pro-
gram’s experts compliment John Major (S1, E9) for teaching his chil-
dren to survive by consuming insects. Doug (S2, E13) proves himself to 
Practical Preppers by using boulders to protect his doomsday bunker. 
Michael James Patrick Douglas (S1, E5) demonstrates his fatherly cre-
dentials by taking his children on survival retreats into the Maine wil-
derness. Doug Huffman (S1, E7) teaches children at a survival school, 
using his collection of camouflage to blend in to the natural environ-
ment. Bryan Smith (S2, E8) is commended as the ultimate frontiers-
man for his display of wilderness ingenuity on his large estate. As 
Bryan declares: “I’ve hunted wild boar, I’ve wrestled alligators, and I’ve 
lived in the jungles of Costa Rica. And once I’ve had to shoot a man in 
self-defense.”
The program’s authenticity is belied by the fact that Nat Geo pro-
ducers sometimes coax participants to perform acts that conform to 
their extreme impressions of wilderness survival. One participant 
(Chris Petrovich) refused to appear on the show after the producers 
asked him to eat an iguana. Craig Compeau (S2, E14), who admit-
ted that he agreed to be on the program to promote his shelter com-
pany, complained that the producers staged their Alaskan wilderness 
hunts to give the impression that he was an extremist. These experi-
ences points to the contrived character of these “authentic” wilderness 
encounters and how the producers coach subjects to perform. Here, 
what Goffman calls “frame slippage” reveals how the producers bela-
bor “reality” to fit their preconceived assumptions.44 Slippages high-
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light how these performances are crafted to look as if the camera is not 
present. The program coaches, teases, and edits performances of mas-
culinity to craft a particular narrative. The program’s ability to convey 
that its male participants are “performing not performing” communi-
cates that doomsday prepping is a natural expression contemporary 
manhood.
FATHER KNOWS BEST
The program provides men the opportunity to perform fatherly know-
how. The concept of personal responsibility unfolds when the subjects 
address the camera in one-on-one interviews. These interviews give 
the participants an opportunity to narrate their everyday life, hence 
corroborating the performances analyzed in the previous section. The 
participants’ direct address of the camera helps confirm that their 
commitment to prepping as a fatherly duty is sincere. The interview 
contextualizes their performances as the fulfillment of their paternal 
responsibility rather than extreme behaviors coaxed by producers. 
Here, I pay attention to how the program’s male participants engage 
in show-and-tell to communicate fatherly know-how. Fathers both rit-
ualistically simulate tests of their advanced preparations and directly 
address the camera to explain the importance of fatherhood.
One recurring claim is that prepping represents a primal male 
instinct to protect the family. Jules Dervaes (S1, E3) explains, “In the 
years to come I don’t want my family to turn around and say ‘Dad: 
why didn’t you do something?’” Larry Hall (S1, E4) asserts that “when 
you become a parent, suddenly you are not the most important thing 
anymore. It makes me feel responsible to prepare.” Snake Blocker 
(S2, E9) adds, “I need to be a responsible husband .  .  . I, too, must 
be strong for the people around me.” Paul Haswell (S1, E1) concurs, “I 
think you need to be responsible for yourself and your family. To do 
anything less is a criminal act.” These examples illustrate how prep-
ping is a portrayed as a sensible commitment when it is performed as 
parental instinct. These personal confessions often give way to a series 
of aggressive declarations of paternal rights and direct questioning of 
the audience’s commitment. Pat Brabble asserts: “You should be able to 
protect your family with your handguns.” Similarly, John Major asserts, 
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“I’d protect my family by all means possible, and I don’t feel I need per-
mission from anyone to do that.” Mike Mester (S1, E6) takes a more 
aggressive approach, interrogating the viewer: “Are you going to sit 
back and wait for the cavalry? They may never come. So, what are you 
going to do about it? Why don’t you start to prepare? Because it’s your 
personal responsibility.” Barry (S1, E10), too, addresses the audience: 
“Who’s gonna take care of your family if you can’t?” Ron Hubbard (S2, 
E8) also asks emphatically, “How would YOU protect your family?! Do 
you have a plan?” The repetition of forceful declarations of the right to 
self-defense ostensibly berates the male spectator to pursue aggressive 
measures to protect loved ones. Moreover, these declarations transform 
the participants into educators whose lives are models of how parental 
responsibility can be performatively enacted.
Throughout the interview segment, “dependency” on others is con-
sidered weakness. Jules contends, “Everyone else seems to be looking 
to be dependent. Dependent on government, dependent on corpo-
rations, dependent on banks, dependent on others. But we are fight-
ing for ourselves.” Kevin O’Brien (S1, E4) agrees: “We’re all a little too 
dependent on our government, too dependent on our local grocery 
store.” Bryan Smith brags, “I was raised to not rely on anybody. Don’t 
rely on your government, don’t rely on your neighbors, you count on 
yourself first.” Tim Ralston adds, “Anyone who does not take their self-
preservation to heart is doomed for failure. I refuse to be a victim.” 
Repeated ad nauseam, dependency develops into a discursive short 
hand for naiveté, effeminacy, irresponsibility, and childlike vulnerabil-
ity. These participants use their apocalyptic expectations as a metaphor 
for what they perceive to be the end of hegemonic masculinity and, 
consequently, the necessity of its return.
Note how these male subjects attribute the coming collapse of soci-
ety to the adoption of so-called feminine traits. They describe civili-
zation as “weak” “dependent,” and “thin.” Jay Blevins calmly asserts, 
“There is a very thin fabric that holds together a civilized society.” Jason 
Day (S1, E11) also assumes that “every great nation has always come to 
an end. America is just the same way.” John Major presumes that “when 
law of the jungle reigns, that’s when every individual will be responsi-
ble for their own security.” In each of these comments, the end of the 
world is taken for granted because civilization (weak, fragile, depen-
dent) cannot contain humanity’s primal instincts (aggression, competi-
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tion, violence). Lindsay (S2, E11) makes this distinction clear when she 
explains, “back in the day everyone was prepared; they weren’t depen-
dent on others. Preppers today are like our ancestors used to be.” Her 
husband, Larry, agrees: “There is so much fragility in our system and 
it could collapse at any time.” These participants anticipate a disastrous 
end to society’s experiment with feminine values. Their certainty in 
an apocalypse event is hopeful in as much as it means that fathers will 
return to pre-eminence.
After the interview, the participants are provided space to show 
how fatherly authority is embodied. The portrait of Jay Blevins is an 
exemplary case in point. This episode begins with a medium shot of 
Jay standing in front of his family and suburban home, dressed in a 
police-issue black uniform, brandishing a menacing AR-15 assault rifle; 
his costume and props. He declares: “We’re preparing for the break-
down of social order following an economic collapse.” The episode 
depicts Jay performing a variety of masculine roles that confirm his 
fatherly authority. In one scene, Jay performs a priestly role by lead-
ing a Bible study in his living room. Next, Jay absconds to the garage, 
where he adopts a soldier persona—mimicking military-style attacks 
directly at the camera. This scene is followed by shots of Jay leading 
a neighborhood prepping organization in strategic home fortifica-
tions. He explains in fatherly terms: “I love my kids so much, I love 
my wife so much, I never want to see them hurt or to go without, so 
if a crowd were to ever come to my house, I want to defend my fam-
ily.” The “day in the life” portrait of Jay demonstrates a recurring pat-
tern marked by the camera’s sole emphasis on the priorities of the male 
head of household.
While Jay protects the suburban enclave, Brent’s (S2, E9) “dooms-
day castle” consummates a paternal fantasy of feudal domestic life. In 
the narrator’s words, Brent’s planning to “get medieval” when the world 
ends. Brent has begun construction of a fortress in the Carolina moun-
tains that he hopes to bequeath to a male heir contingent upon a series 
of tests. This particular episode emphasizes intergenerational mascu-
linity, or the imperative to pass male survival skills on to the heirs of 
postapocalyptic society. Dressed in camouflage, Brent is shown putting 
his adult children through a series of extreme challenges to prove their 
loyalty. Embracing the medieval motif, the program positions Brent as 
a “king” choosing his successor. The episode has a particular lightheart-
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edness, as many of his children possess none of their father’s physical 
skills. He berates his sons for their lack of outdoor skills and weap-
ons training, while chiding his daughters for being “more primpers 
than preppers.” The lesson is that Brent’s children must unlearn their 
civilized femininity and seek tutelage in dark age–era survivalism. As 
Brent’s children endure extreme survival trials, the audience is invited 
to see archaic masculine virtues as a repository of doomsday ingenuity.
Here, Brent’s authenticity is bolstered by how the show portrays 
the reluctant skepticism and inexperience of his children. Whereas 
Brent performs his sincerity by dressing in military fatigues, conduct-
ing survival tests, and testifying to his certainty in Armageddon, his 
family’s performances appear contrived for the sake of the program. 
That is, Brent’s children express reluctance both about Brent’s lifestyle 
and about taking part in a program that requires them to demonstrate 
survival skills they clearly do not possess. For instance, Brent pesters 
his oldest son (Brent Jr.) to prove his proficiency with an assault rifle 
despite his expressed reticence. After scoffing at his father’s demands, 
he recklessly fires the weapon, almost injuring others. Brent’s advanced 
skills, along with his displays of sincerity, contrast with his son’s con-
trived effort to play along with the show’s premise. Meanwhile, his 
daughters, Ashley, Lindsey, and Dawn-Marie, spend more time attend-
ing to their appearance than completing their chores. Yet, their reluc-
tant participation, and sometimes defiance, contributes to Brent’s 
ability to “perform not performing” by showing the difference between 
committed preppers and naïve skeptics. Through juxtaposition, his 
children’s clumsy and unenthusiastic performances illuminate Brent’s 
more sincere commitment to his postapocalyptic kingdom. The differ-
ences in their levels of sincerity create another frame slippage, where 
acts expose performance as performance. Nonetheless, frame slippage 
contributes to the authenticity of Brent’s performance by providing 
audiences with a framework for evaluating what reality television con-
structs as an authentic performance. In the process, Brent’s displays 
of hypercompetitive machismo become conflated with seriousness and 
hard work.
In other episodes, the program’s participants simulate survival ritu-
als to demonstrate the importance of fathers. This is most exempli-
fied by rugged frontiersman Michael James Patrick Douglas. Though 
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Michael tests his daughter’s preparedness in the home, he subjects his 
youngest son to a series of trials in the surrounding forest. When his 
son completes the trials, Michael explains to him: “You’re entering a 
new stage of your life. You’re no longer a little kid anymore. You’re 
turning into a young man. This is your umbilical cord. It represents 
your attachment to me and mom. But today you proved that you’re 
a survivor and that you’re ready to take the next step.” He invites 
his son to cast his preserved umbilical cord into the fire to confirm 
his induction into the cult of apocalyptic manhood. Reminiscent of 
Bly’s mythopoetic manhood, Michael and his son perform the ritual 
behaviors required to locate archaic male archetypes. This portrayal of 
ritual frames survivalism as the embodiment of the kind of indepen-
dence that accompanies adulthood. Like Michael’s son, the audience 
is encouraged to “grow up” and develop the manly skills required to 
survive. To this end, the program also valorizes primitive rites of pas-
sage, such as hunting and animal sacrifice. These rituals are premised 
on many of the participant’s insistence that the postcollapse world will 
return to a hunter-gatherer society. The inference is that men will be 
charged with the primal task of hunting game. For example, after com-
manding his son to kill one of the family’s goats, Tom Perez boasts 
to Steven M. Vanasse (S2, E4) that his child is now a man because he 
has made “his first kill.” The kill is ritualistically staged for the cam-
era. Tom’s son is compelled to kill and butcher a goat for the camera 
with little detail spared. Similar to Michael’s wilderness trials, Steven 
and Tom’s insistence that their children hunt and kill animals provides 
visual confirmation that prepping is a primal rite of passage where boys 
become men.
In summary, these episodes begin with a beleaguered father/
husband’s confession of his apocalyptic anxiety, followed by scenes 
of everyday life where participants move fluidly between masculine 
archetypes (father, husband, laborer, soldier, and priest), and conclude 
with a series of staged preparedness rituals. These performances enact 
the fears expressed in the one-on-one interviews, providing audiences 
with examples of how to translate apocalyptic fears into productive 
models of self-made manhood. Lest the audience believe their perfor-
mances are acted for the camera, the one-on-one interviews provide 
participants with the opportunity to prove their sincerity.
52 •  C H A P T E R 1
STAND BY YOUR MAN
Female participants typically move from reluctant to sincere perfor-
mances of support for men. To this extent, women are relegated to 
menial tasks. Whereas young men are subjected to specific rites of pas-
sage that fortify their skills, young women must be trained to accept 
their roles. Men are responsible for ensuring that women are prepared 
to support their fathers and husbands. For instance, Jason Day (S1, E10) 
is shown routinely forcing his daughters to conduct gas mask drills, 
John Major enlists his daughters in preparing the house for a terrorist 
attack, and Braxton Southwick (S2, E1), involves his daughters in regu-
lar escape simulations to their rural cabin. In one of the most extreme 
cases, Johnny O (S2, E2) conditions his wife and sister-in-law to prepare 
for an attack on their home, calling his efforts “not really tests we run 
as much as its games we play.” Though women are involved in the prep-
ping, the episodes tend to foreground men’s need for ritual. Episodes fea-
turing women portray their preparedness training as either fulfillments 
of wifely duties or manifestations of obsessive-compulsive disorders. 
Often expressing initial skepticism, wives and daughters are encouraged 
to recant and acquiesce to the importance of disaster preparedness.
This transformation invites the incredulous female viewer to be 
more open-minded to the manly arts of preparedness. In these epi-
sodes, women often begin by complaining that prepping is a waste of 
time; however, they conclude with concessions to their husband’s wis-
dom. Tim Ralston observes his wife’s initial resistance yet insists that 
she finally ceded to his wisdom. He explains, “In the beginning my wife 
was not on the same page as I was,” but “the more information I gave 
to her it opened her eyes to the potential threats that are out there.” 
Mr. Wayne brags, “Because of the popularity of your series, my wife 
has come around and supports what I do.” Although Bob Kay’s (S2, 
E6) wife routinely questions his extreme spending on preparedness, 
their episode concludes with his insistence that “she does appreciate 
that being prepared is important.” In some cases, the narrator declares 
their support. For instance, the voice-over declares that Jason Day’s 
wife, Tanya, “supports his passion but it’s meant some adjustments.” 
Jason, like Bradford Franks (S1, E7) and Bob Kay, puts his wife through 
extreme simulations despite her visible discomfort. In other episodes, 
reluctant wives seem to freely confess their ultimate support of their 
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husband’s efforts. Franco’s wife admits that she is otherwise helpless; 
therefore, “I’m glad I have a husband that’s doing that for us.” After 
some resistance, Snake Blocker’s wife, Sarah, admits, “I’ve realized the 
importance of being prepared.” Despite some hesitation, Jeremy’s (S1, 
E8) wife, Kelly, divulges that “as long as I’ve got my son in lap and my 
husband in the driver seat that’s all I need.” The series depicts men as 
natural teachers who must help women understand the importance of 
preparedness.
To the extent that women are active participants, it is either in ful-
fillment of traditionally feminine domesticity or as an obsessive exten-
sion of motherly instincts. Because women are constructed as the 
domestic caretakers of the postapocalyptic home, their roles are heav-
ily circumscribed. In a segment featuring Colleen Bishop (S1, E2), the 
voice-over explains that she is “a Utah housewife who believes a cat-
astrophic economic collapse will cause food shortages and unleash 
panic across the country. But can she use her passion for cooking and 
her stockpiles of food to survive doomsday?” Although the episode ref-
erences a variety of other skills she has developed, a large portion is 
devoted to her pantry skills. Meanwhile, her husband is depicted per-
forming his fighting skills and elaborate plans for home security. In 
Kathy Harrison’s (S1, E2) case, the narrator observes that “on her pic-
turesque farm you are more likely to find herbs than guns,” suggesting 
that female preppers prioritize feminine care labor over masculine vio-
lence. Women are often interviewed in front of pantries and kitchens, 
whereas men are more likely to be pictured in front of the household 
gun collection.
In other episodes, female prepping is portrayed as a hysterical 
manifestation of feminine instincts. Janet Spencer (S1, E9) is shown 
frantically stockpiling food while her husband is out of the house. 
Meanwhile, Donna Nash (S1, E4) is shown hoarding medical supplies 
and obsessively scrubbing her house for germs in preparation for a 
pandemic. Likewise, Laura Kunzie (S1, E10) is depicted irritating her 
family with quarantine drills and rants about germs. Other female 
motivations for prepping extend to the irrational, as only women 
express supernatural beliefs and prophetic visions. Amanda Bobbin 
(S2, E11) suggests that she takes direction from a ghost named Greta, 
and Dianne Rogers (S1, E7) preps because of a recurring apocalyptic 
nightmare that she believes to be a premonition. Thus, the program 
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ostensibly contrasts male rationality with female hysteria. Men are 
sensibly concerned with the family’s safety; women are obsessive and 
overbearing. In these segments, Doomsday Preppers relies on the arche-
type of the hysterical woman that is common throughout reality tele-
vision. Hysteria is a cultural construction that disciplines women who 
diverge from normative performances of gender identity.45 As Michaela 
Meyer, Amy Fallah, and Megan Wood explain, hysterical women in 
reality TV are constructed as irrational, out of control, and mentally 
distressed. They argue, “This framing is distinctly gendered, as mad-
ness is metaphorically and symbolically represented as feminine, even 
when experienced by men.”46 Attributing women’s transgressive behav-
ior to madness is a way of dismissing and, ultimately, disciplining their 
behavior. This theorization of hysteria also accounts for why male prep-
pers are constructed as sincere, whereas women have irrational obses-
sions with cleanliness. The recurring lesson is that “men who surrender 
to their desires and passions become geniuses; women become subjects 
of their own self-destruction, eliciting at best pity and sympathy.”47
Many of Doomsday Preppers’ female participants are portrayed as 
obsessive germophobes. The narrator introduces Donna Nash’s seg-
ment thus: “Like many suburban moms, Donna likes to keep a clean 
house but it’s not because she’s expecting company.” The camera cuts 
to scenes of Donna repeatedly disinfecting her kitchen counters and 
vacuuming her pristine carpet. Ostensibly, Donna should be attend-
ing to her normal motherly duties instead of stockpiling disaster kits 
and forcing her children to endure quarantine drills. Similarly, Laura 
Kunzie simulates a quarantine in which she forces her visibly reluc-
tant son to shower outside, stay in a barricaded bedroom, and remain 
home from school. The producer’s selection of female germophobes 
contributes to a portrait of women who prepare as overly concerned, 
smothering, and compulsive. Though male prepping is portrayed as 
a natural extension of manly duty, female prepping is a transgressive 
gender performance.
In other cases, the program reduces women to survival accessories 
or resourceful accompaniments for the single male survivalist. In Brian 
Murdoch’s case (S2, E3), the narrator tells viewers that “the one prep he 
needed most of all was a wife” and that “he believes that his new bride 
Tatania will be the perfect prepper wife.” The episode depicts Tatania’s 
arrival in the US from Colombia, followed by her difficult adjustment 
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to prepping. Brian puts Tatania through an apocalyptic simulation to 
assess her weaknesses. Despite her obvious discomfort, she submits to 
Brian’s wishes. He laments, “Tatiana’s got a little learning to do, but 
soon we’ll be married and I know we’ll be happier.” In Jeff Flaningham’s 
segment (S2, E13), the audience is witness to the prepper’s travails in 
online dating. Jeff brings a date back to his decommissioned missile 
silo, but is ultimately unsuccessful in securing his ideal prepping part-
ner. Though more lighthearted, Jeff ’s dates are presented as auditions 
for a part in his apocalyptic drama more than a genuine search for 
romance. The quasi-romantic valence of these episodes reduces women 
to little more than their domestic labor value.
There are exceptions. Three episodes feature single women with 
varying commitments to prepping. Although a counterpoint to the 
hypermasculine image of survivalism, these episodes ultimately con-
firm that the apocalypse will make women’s independence extraor-
dinarily difficult. Meagan Hurwitt (S1, E1) is constructed as a “young 
independent urban woman” who “loves cocktails with friends” but 
also as someone who must abandon her frivolous lifestyle, includ-
ing fashion and nightlife, to survive. The episode contrasts carefree 
images of Meagan swinging on a homemade stripper pole with shots 
of weapons training and fitness regimens. Meagan’s survival as a sin-
gle woman hinges on her ability to adapt masculine skill sets. But, in 
the postapocalyptic world, women’s independence is a liability. Mar-
garet Ling (S2, E7) corroborates this perspective when she asserts that 
“women are the most likely to be victimized.” These examples could 
be read as expressions of women’s empowerment; however, in the con-
text of the program, where a vast majority of the women acquiesce to 
their natural roles of the feminine, these participants appear anoma-
lous. Moreover, their independence is presented as much more of a 
challenge than an asset.
ARE YOU PREPARED?
This chapter suggests that the apocalyptic turn in masculine repre-
sentations purports to offer the ultimate fortification against threats 
to hegemonic masculinity. While in one sense the apocalyptic turn 
is responsive to the decline in traditionally masculine professions, in 
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another it is the by-product of an accumulation of (perceived) white 
male injuries wherein all challenges to men are framed as assaults on 
gender entitlement. Apocalyptic manhood constructs imminent disas-
ters as solutions to immanent crisis, or seemingly permanent answers 
to the recurring crisis of the male self that persist without resolution. 
Performances of apocalyptic manhood are an illusory attempt to fix 
the meaning of masculinity against a background of disorientation. 
Doomsday Preppers offers a vision of the future survived by white men 
who embody rugged national virility. Apocalyptic manhood requires 
labor, ultimately consummated through ritual performances that visi-
bly demonstrate the male subject’s preparedness to return to pre/indus-
trial America. Doomsday culture is underwritten by the notion that 
the recuperation of manhood will be found in the inevitable demise of 
civilization. Apocalyptic manhood is the fantasy that beneath moder-
nity exists an essential, timeless, and sustainable version of manhood. 
The looming threat of the world’s end produces not only anxiety but 
also opportunity.
Previously, as Kimmel writes, men had to “wander through anthro-
pological literature like postmodern tourists” to find premodern arche-
types of authentic manhood.48 But in doomsday culture, old archetypes 
are “lived” and imbued with the qualities of everyday-life perfor-
mances. Audiences are invited, temporarily, to welcome the apoca-
lypse as a social vision of masculine necessity. Yet, the vision of the end 
in doomsday culture is an inadequate and dangerous response to the 
“masculinity crisis.” Seeking relief in imminent destruction does little 
to ameliorate the anomic crisis of the male self. There is no permanent 
or sustainable version of manhood that escapes the slippery instability 
of the subject in late modernity. The salve of a future without women 
challenging male primacy elides the inherent instability of hegemonic 
masculinity itself. The myth that there is a pre-performative gender 
identity found, ironically, in the rituals of the self-made man masks the 
fluidity of masculinity.
There are also broader political implications that require urgent 
attention. Unfortunately, men act on the fantasies cultivated in pop-
ular media. As examined in later chapters, hypermasculine warriors 
inevitably come out from behind their screens and enact their iden-
tity through aggressive performances, from adopting the paramilitary 
aesthetics of the open carry movement to the Wild West mentality of 
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the Bundy clan at their armed siege of the Malheur National Wildlife 
Refuge in Oregon. The proliferation of white men enacting their war-
rior fantasies through spectacular acts of mass violence points to the 
real dangers of this millennial turn in masculinity. For instance, on 
November 30, 2015, Robert Dear killed a police officer and two civilians 
at a Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood clinic. During his arraign-
ment he declared himself a “warrior for the babies.” Sandy Hook 
shooter Adam Lanza was immersed in survivalist culture, his family 
stockpiling food and arms in preparation for catastrophe. And Charles-
ton shooter Dylann Roof legitimized his actions as a hypermasculine 
response to the sexual threat posed by people of color. Roof is a chill-
ing embodiment of apocalyptic manhood. He announced his intention 
to induce a racialized doomsday event that would restore white men to 
their proper place in the race/gender hierarchy. This chapter punctu-
ates the argument that the public fascination with the hypermasculine 
doomsday prepper fans the flames of white masculine victimhood. It is 
imperative to produce alternative models of masculinity that approach 
the performative nature of manhood as an opportunity to eradicate 
racial and gendered violence rather than anathema to the imminent 
destruction of liberal society.
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The Red Pill
The New Men’s Rights Rhetoric
LIkE REALIT Y TELE VIS ION,  networked media also afford new expres-
sions of white masculinity. Amplified by new digital platforms and 
online social networks, the crisis of white masculinity is no longer rel-
egated to the forgotten silos and distant outposts that once constrained 
the scope and intensity of men’s rights activism. News aggregators, 
blogs, personal websites, amateur video platforms, social media appli-
cations, and digital communities now comprise a network of what were 
once isolated communities of men’s rights proponents, misogynists, 
white supremacists, and far-right extremists. More importantly, a net-
work provides users with multiple access points and nodes that might 
plug an individual user into an entire web of harmonized content. 
Levine reminds us that a network affords connectivity, circulation, and 
accessibility to ideas and content that were previously unlinked. Each 
node is a gateway to other nodes, and thus each point in the network is 
capable of attracting, enabling, and ensnaring a larger demographic of 
users. It is for this reason that some have suggested that contemporary 
men’s rights activism is often a “gateway drug” to white supremacy.1 In 
their recent book on alt-right meme culture, Heather Suzanne Woods 
and Leslie Hahner observe that the technical infrastructure, design fea-
tures, and community standards that support sites such as Reddit and 
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4chan sustain the rapid and unregulated dissemination of racist, sex-
ist, and homophobic content. They note that “Reddit influences pub-
lic culture via its technological and ideological capacities, namely, the 
ability to fashion content and disseminate it rapidly across a multi-
tude of sites. One of the affordances of networked publicity on sites 
such as Reddit and 4chan is that information moves quickly across 
each sites’ nodes—oftentimes more quickly than on other media chan-
nels.”2 Reddit provides a central hub for sharing, upvoting/downvot-
ing, and linking content so that stories, videos, and memes can traffic 
across a wide number of overlapping networks. The ability to rapidly 
disseminate information and organize collective action enables digi-
tal networks to influence public culture in ways that differ from social 
movements of the past.3 The loose collection of digital communities 
that identify as the alt-right have managed to not only organize politi-
cal rallies IRL (“in real life”) but also push their reactionary views into 
the mainstream.
Hence, this chapter concerns the men’s rights networks that have 
drawn a significant following, converted and radicalized countless fol-
lowers, and enabled cross-pollination between reactionary communi-
ties as well as the social discord they engender. In a network, men’s 
rights rhetorics organizes disconnected ideas into a coherent pat-
tern or, in this case, a kind of metanarrative that governs the rhetoric 
arising from each node. This metanarrative speaks to men as victim-
heroes of their cultural antagonism with feminism and their inevitable 
triumph over seemingly intractable enemies. The network assimilates 
new nodes and imposes implicit rules that make each disparate ele-
ment speak to a larger overall thematic designed to disrupt and sup-
plant competing feminine networks and institutions. Networked men’s 
rights media has crafted a powerful framework through which users 
and audiences are to make sense of their social reality. The network is 
compulsively repetitive in that it constantly cajoles its user to think of 
themselves as dupes of feminist programming but also as burgeoning 
vanguards of a new masculine consciousness. In other words, the net-
work enlists its users and audiences to think in and through a narrative 
of victimization and redemption. This is made possible by the cross-
pollination of reactionary ideas, from which has emerged a new narra-
tive for men’s rights advocates that is underwritten by an amalgam of 
melancholia, apocalyptic thought, white male victimhood, evolution-
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ary psychology, and revolutionary vanguardism. This chapter seeks 
to unravel the strands that connect different and sometimes contra-
dictory elements of men’s rights activism in networked media and to 
evince how new rhetorical forms have amplified and woven together a 
reactionary figure capable of fulfilling a narrative in which white men 
turn the tables on feminism. This victim-hero transforms their suffer-
ing into a political project to quite literally reprogram reality to restore 
white men to their previous grandeur.
THE MEN WHO SIT AT SCREENS
In a post entitled “Men Who Sit at the Screens,” regular Voice for Men 
contributor and men’s rights advocate Peter Wright argues that the 
contemporary men’s rights movement is at the forefront of a burgeon-
ing transformation in the mythic and narrative structures that anchor 
Western civilization.4 The end of feminine civilization, he wagers, is 
at hand. Drawing from Joseph Campbell’s Jungian-inspired Masks of 
God, Wright argues that men’s awakening in networked media—from 
the frenetic pace of their contributions to the magnitude of their ire—
precipitates a monumental shift in the architecture of our collective 
consciousness. By sheer motion alone, these men are knitting a new 
social fabric and building a kind of collective organism that veers from 
feminist mythmaking toward a new narrative structure characterized 
by masculine techno-rationalism. The “men who sit at screens,” Wright 
explains,
writers, computer folk, scientists, the intelligence and security ser-
vices etc [sic]—are, in many ways, a certain breed of men—with, 
loosely speaking, more brain, less muscle, more introvert, less extra-
vert etc. . . . And many of us grow to be this way as we get older! It 
is men-who-sit-at-screens who will knit together the men’s move-
ment. There will be men’s activists who will dash hither and thither 
around cyberspace harassing the enemy and gathering up informa-
tion to feed to webmasters and authors. There will be webmasters 
and authors sifting, analysing and re-arranging information to create 
feeds and ideas to push into the more mainstream media. There will 
be mainstream media activists who repackage the information for a 
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much wider audience. There will be computer folk who will help the 
men’s movement to grow inside cyberspace. And there will also be 
men-who-sit-at-screens in many other walks of life who will do their 
bit to further the men’s movement and its aims.5
According to Wright, networked media has birthed a new man, one 
whose muscles and intellect have been grafted onto the very fibers 
and networks that control the flow of information in the internet age. 
Metaphorically speaking, these newly radicalized men operate as the 
movement’s guerrilla warriors—planting booby traps and improvised 
explosive devices throughout the web, engaging in reconnaissance, 
and, above all, flanking and sabotaging their enemies. Clandestine 
and mobile, they tactically traverse networked media, casting doubt 
on the dominant narratives offered up by feminists and progressives. 
Although their individual influence may be minimal, their collective 
voice percolates up and seeps into the culture, now nesting comfortably 
within the Overton window. Newsfeeds and algorithms amplify their 
voices while Silicon Valley web designers encode white men’s identi-
ties into their platforms, thus propelling the movement’s ideas into the 
mainstream for legitimate consideration.
According to Wright, the “men who sit at screens” are powerful 
because they understand the mythical relationship between storytell-
ing and consciousness. In other words, Wright’s theory is grounded 
in the assumption that social change is the result of paradigmatic 
shifts in the grand narratives that structure cultural values and beliefs. 
Echoing the theoretical underpinnings of the narrative paradigm, he 
claimed that “men and women are after all story creatures, and it’s by 
this mode we can tell ourselves into existence beyond the restrictive 
stories that currently dominate the discussion on gender.”6 Observing 
that the secular techno-rationality of internet culture has the capac-
ity to supplant religious doctrine, he explained that “what we need is 
a New Testament on men’s issues, one that will succeed the tired old 
story of male servitude to a quasi-aristocratic class of women. This 
process begins by understanding that the persuasiveness of stories will 
always trump clinical facts—despite their veracity.”7 Here we find a 
theory of agency that governs the men’s rights rhetoric in networked 
media. As a multitude owing allegiance neither to existing political 
institutions nor to facts, this nomadic movement swarms internet 
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platforms, redirects flows of web traffic, and plants seeds of doubt in 
the common sense of a networked public sphere.8 They will, in his 
words, “grow into a massive organism” which “no other group will 
survive its wrath should it engender it.”9 Much like doomsday prep-
pers, this message is apocalyptic—anticipating a cataclysmic reckon-
ing between feminine institutions and male consciousness. Although 
they tout masculine rationality, they seek not debate on their oppo-
nent’s terrain but instead to win hegemony by rewriting the narra-
tive paradigms (as well as the computer codes) that govern common 
sense itself. The idea is to graft their narrative onto networked media 
so that men might reprogram their consciousness and, thus, reality 
itself. In one sense, this perspective is not dissimilar from Walter Fish-
er’s approach to the narrative paradigm in which argumentative ratio-
nality is consistently outmaneuvered by the probability, coherence, 
and fidelity of storytelling.10 Working from this paradigm, they offer a 
new mythology in which men’s triumph over all other social groups is 
inevitable, philosophically defensible, and of course, necessary.
In another sense, for men’s rights advocates the objective is to 
impose a new form (narrative) onto networked media that is power-
ful enough to surpass the veracity of other rhetorical forms such as 
deliberation, debate, and dialogue. Since each user has a role to play in 
both seeding narratives throughout networked media and playing their 
part in this cosmic drama, stories afford users agency where they may 
have previously felt powerlessness. Moreover, men’s rights activists are 
not concerned with simply promulgating any type of narrative. Here, 
the rhetorical work of genre is also imperative. Men’s rights rhetoric 
in networked media traffics in the conventions of melodrama, evinced 
by men’s preoccupation with moral polarities, pain and suffering, 
heightened emotionality, innocent victims (men) triumphing over evil 
(women). The new men’s rights rhetoric appropriates the feminine con-
ventions of melodrama to raise the consciousness of men with a com-
pelling agonistic narrative that attempts to turn the tables on women.
Yet, anyone who has perused or studied men’s rights in networked 
media can testify that the seeming continuity offered by such a broad 
label often belies the factionalism between and sometimes within 
the various user communities that, at a minimum, nominally iden-
tify themselves with the cause. Beyond appeals to victimhood, for the 
casual observer there is sometimes little that seems to thread these 
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communities together. For instance, Elam’s A Voice for Men mobilizes 
around legal and political reform on issues such as false rape accusa-
tions, the domestic abuse of men, anti-male bias in the family courts, 
and various other forms of misandry. By contrast, the next chapter out-
lines how “incel” websites such as www.loveshy.com, www.PUAHate.
com, and r/incel provide a support community for men to vent about 
women’s cruelty and express fatalism in the face of pseudoscientific 
beliefs concerning the immutable laws of attraction (i.e., “the black 
pill”). At the other end of the spectrum, male pickup artists on websites 
such as www.rooshv.com and r/TheRedPill organize male empower-
ment through the use of evolutionary psychology and cultural myth-
making to manipulate and take advantage of women. Still, other groups 
such as Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) argue that the only 
pathway to male empowerment is found by separating from women 
entirely and channeling men’s energies into building wealth and mak-
ing scientific discoveries. Other groups who identify with “Red Pill 
psychology” see men’s rights activism as a somewhat perverse form of 
consciousness-raising and that through various practices of blogging, 
creating memes, and trolling they can awaken the “blue pilled” masses 
to their subjugation by women. As these descriptions demonstrate, 
men’s rights activism in networked media greatly diverges in terms of 
its assumptions, goals, and tactics.
Yet, networks afford connectivity between nodes, hubs, and spokes 
that were previously disparate and isolated. Hence the so-called mano-
sphere is diffuse and expansive: a seemingly endless web composed of 
nodes, links, videos, memes, archived pages, and active threads that 
ceaselessly direct the user elsewhere to consume (and ideally pro-
duce) more content. In this way, the structure of the network tends to 
harmonize disparate threads of men’s rights activism. As Levine con-
tends, a network “provides a way to understand how many other for-
mal elements—including wholes, rhythms, and hierarchies—link up in 
larger formations.”11 The network allows disparate strands of men’s right 
discourse to function in concert and to circulate, cross-pollinate, and 
synchronize their symbolic activity. Hence, what unites all these dis-
tinct threads of men’s rights activism is their alignment and parsimony 
within the larger overarching structure: a network that intones, repeats, 
and synthesizes different and sometimes contradictory discourse into a 
cohesive yet neurotic project in which everything is connected.
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Although it is difficult to say where the mansophere begins or ends, 
because men’s rights rhetoric exists within a network, it is possible 
to provisionally generalize about a common set of principles, forms, 
and genres of discourse that seem to govern it. If we widen our view, 
Wright’s archetype of the “men who sit at screens” offers some perspec-
tive on what ultimately unites these disparate fragments of men’s rights 
rhetoric in cyberspace. Wright concludes his essay by noting that fac-
tionalism is in no way a liability to the overall goals of men’s empow-
erment. From his perspective, mere participation in any discussion of 
men’s empowerment throughout networked media necessarily embeds 
them within the networks, algorithms, and codes that underwrite the 
changing mythology. He explains that
it does not matter whether they are on the left or on the right, and if 
they are fighting like dogs. The truth of the matter is this—whether 
they like it or not. If they are “men,” and they also sit at screens 
and they also keep reading about the same kind of stuff, then they 
really, and truly, and very deeply have a great deal in common—far 
more so than they usually recognise. And the reason that they usu-
ally do not recognise this commonality is largely due to the fact that 
they do not see themselves as “men”! But, one day, they will! And, 
at some point in the future, the psychological force that they create 
will dwarf all others. And so, all in all, the future seems quite rosy for 
men-who-sit-at-screens.12
Wright sees a larger picture in which men’s rights activism inevitably 
brings participants to the same end point; that is, the structure of con-
sciousness referenced by advocates of taking the Red Pill. Regardless of 
their boutique complaints, as the story goes, these innocent men will 
inevitably awaken to the reality of their oppression, find their place in 
the epic struggle between good and evil, and, based on their new con-
sciousness, organize against women based on their shared interests as 
“men.” This narrative represents a hybrid between melodrama and the 
feminist rhetoric of consciousness-raising (which consisted of small, 
leaderless groups who mutually encouraged individuals to share their 
personal feelings, experiences, and problems that are unique to their 
status as women).13 By mapping the commonalities in form and genre—
as well as their ad nauseam repetition within an expansive network—
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the chapter illustrates how men’s rights activism in networked media 
draws its style from the appropriation of feminine forms.
Of course, Wright’s theory of bottom-up consciousness is rooted in 
a fairly naïve if not magical reading of social and psychological theo-
ries of social change. However, I believe that he is correct that there 
are overarching forms and genres within the men’s rights network that 
unite, tame, and organize such wildly divergent content. While the sub-
stance somewhat varies, many of the most visited men’s rights websites 
make space for discussions of men’s innocence and personal suffer-
ing and, then, connect that suffering to larger structural forces at work 
to keep men subjugated by women and separated from one another. 
Communities are connected by a kind of rhythmic repetition of the 
same narrative form. Virtual democracy creates the networks that 
afford connectivity between different nodes that are preoccupied with 
white masculine victimhood, including men’s rights activists, militia 
movements, survivalists, white nationalists, and other groups. They 
not only recruit new adherents but coordinate individual threads into 
patterned responses to public controversies, in some cases even aug-
menting the national discourse.14 This claim is based not simply on the 
demographics of usage but rather on the assumption that new modes 
of civic participation are frequently reinvented to replicate old modes 
of domination.15 Hence, the democratizing function of networked 
media is often occluded by those in positions of power and privilege. 
Recent work by digital scholars such as Safiya Umoja Noble on the rac-
ism and sexism of algorithms illustrates the degree to which structural 
oppressions are literally encoded into virtual platforms.16 In this case, 
men’s rights advocates speak with such an amplified voice because the 
individual nodes with the network harmonize their message with the 
same general narrative pattern.
The existence of white men within networks—or their desire to 
see themselves as embedded in networks—evinces an ancillary effect 
of new media technologies: paranoia. As Tung-Hui Hu suggests, we 
can understand virtual networks as paranoid structures because they 
invite users to envision all information and activity as somehow con-
nected. The resultant network fever represents that “desire to connect 
all networks, indeed, the desire to connect every piece of information 
to another piece. And to construct a system of knowledge where every-
thing is connected is, as psychoanalysis tells us, the sign of paranoia.”17 
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It is for this reason that men’s rights networks are structurally predis-
posed to understand the basic practices of socialization as a kind of 
grand conspiratorial design that ultimately disguises an intentional and 
well-coordinated campaign of ideological indoctrination. As users cir-
culate across networks, the information and experiences they encoun-
ter invite them to interpret disparate grievances as experiences with 
a diffuse yet well-orchestrated and totalizing system of oppression. 
White men who produce and consume networked media might cir-
culate across various channels or linger at particular nodes; yet, their 
embeddedness within networked logics organizes content so as to fit a 
particular paranoid pattern that makes possible unseen and even out-
rageous connections between individual nodes.
The metanarrative that structures adherence within this network 
is composed of four major components: (1) the innocent (white male) 
masses have been narcotized and live under an illusory, simulated real-
ity characterized by the unthinking acceptance of progressive narra-
tives (i.e., “the blue pill”); (2) under the canopy of this false reality, 
men are incapable of perceiving the ways in which they are victim-
ized by women and kept a part from one another; (3) participation 
in the manosphere shocks (and raises) the conscience of the user, 
thereby unveiling to them the “desert of the Real” or the “true” and 
bleak material conditions that constitute their existence (“the red pill”); 
and, finally, (4) the subject who once accepted society’s programming 
is reborn in cyberspace, where they can join a mythical multitude or 
collective body of liberated men who will overthrow the evil autocratic 
rule of feminism. The narrative promises men that in the new world 
they will be invulnerable to women and capable of channeling their 
energies into achieving new civilizational heights. Women will return 
to their subservient roles in the kitchen and the bedroom. Only men 
who embrace the Red Pill will be the beneficiaries of this new order. 
Similar to the rhetorical style of the Second Wave feminists, this type 
of story provides “affirmation of the affective, or the validity of per-
sonal experience, of the necessity for self-exposure and self-criticism, 
and the goal of autonomous, individual decision-making.”18 That this 
form would come to predominate the style of men’s rights activism is 
not entirely surprising given the movement’s early cooperation with 
feminist organizations. Male liberation retained some of the stylistic 
elements of consciousness-raising yet began placing such a premium 
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on the male mystique that it became a tool for preserving men’s struc-
tural advantages. So although there is a clear homology between these 
two forms of discourse, the men’s rights movement’s appropriation of a 
feminist style ultimately transforms rhetoric about men’s suffering into 
a mythology of reverse discrimination and innocent victimhood.
This common narrative praises the death of the “blue pilled” male 
and the rebirth of a new mythic male consciousness that is ready to 
enlist in the struggle against victimhood and emasculation. Yet, the 
achievements of men’s liberation come at a significant cost—for men in 
particular. While men’s subjugation seems to be a given, this narrative 
portrait of the new male is also invested in his own self-subjugation in 
line with the imperatives of late capitalism. The male self becomes a 
project of constant self-improvement. Freed from women’s control—
and in some cases women entirely—this new man will be free to invest 
his productive energies in generating wealth and advancing civiliza-
tional progress. It is here that we see the concept of men’s liberation 
captured by the death drive and made to generate surplus repression in 
the name of capital. In Kellner and Pierce’s words, this liberated sub-
ject is “free” to sublimate his erotic energies “toward greed, violence, 
aggression, and emotional satiation that re-produces the repressive 
social order.”19 In other words, the Red Pill narrative ultimately asks its 
audience to invest in the very mechanisms of the social repression that 
keep men alienated from one another and preoccupied with trauma. 
While it stokes fantasies of independence, wealth, and sexual gratifica-
tion on demand, networked masculinity is also dehumanizing, deeply 
cynical, and devoid of all emotional bonds.
FORM AND GENRE IN THE MANOSPHERE
As discussed in the introductory chapter, form predicates not only the 
kind of content that populates men’s networked media but also the 
kinds of thoughts, behaviors, and emotions that users are expected to 
mimic. Like form, genres also emerge as recognizable patterns of dis-
course in the public imaginary whose recurring commonalities con-
dition audience expectations. Hence, I am concerned with the shared 
internal dynamic that structures men’s rights rhetoric even where the 
content seems to be in tension. In this sense, the narrative form of 
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networked men’s rights rhetoric courts particular audience expecta-
tions and investments through patterned repetitions of an overarch-
ing drama. The narrative structure of men’s rights rhetoric foregrounds 
how individual men’s participation in networked media is tied to the 
fulfillment of a larger paradigm shift that will agitate and unsettle men 
to resist their oppression by women. This narrative pivots on whether 
adherents can successfully shock the conscience of their ideal audi-
ence. On a more granular level, men’s rights rhetoric privileges per-
sonal melodrama wherein one awakens to the reality of their suffering 
and finds their place in an epic struggle between good and evil.
To understand the narrative structure of networked men’s rights 
rhetoric, the remainder of this chapter will address each of the four 
elements that compose the melodrama of the Red Pill awakening. This 
story begins with an illusory reality imposed by women that structures 
male adherence to a false consciousness. Next, the narrative transi-
tions to rising action when subjugated men are availed of the Real and 
concludes with liberated men assimilating into a collective resistance 
that will restore the traditional gender order. Like political melodrama, 
the Red Pill features men, in Anker’s words, “as both the feminized, 
virginal victim and the aggressive, masculinized hero in the story of 
freedom.”20 To embrace the Red Pill is also to turn one’s self into a proj-
ect: learning and practicing the art and science of “gaming” women for 
sex, recoding one’s mind to be invulnerable to women, and expelling 
women’s power and influence from one’s life. Patterning one’s life after 
this narrative purports to channel desire into a lifestyle politics that 
is devoid of Eros and preoccupied with the will-to-power. Although 
there are hundreds if not thousands of men’s rights blogs, websites, 
and subreddits, I select representative examples from popular portals 
such as A Voice for Men, Men Going Their Own Way, Return of Kings, 
and The Rational Male as well as subreddits such as r/TheRedPill 
and r/MensRights to substantiate my claims about the structure and 
function of the movement’s narrative. To be sure, there are a variety 
of other websites, platforms, portals, and digital practices (meming, 
shitposting, trolling) that one could examine to explain the internal 
dynamics of men’s rights rhetoric in networked media. For heuristic 
reasons, I confine my examination to the recursive narrative elements 
that are expressed and enacted on the most widely accessible and traf-
ficked nodes of the manosphere.
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Networked men’s rights rhetoric begins with the premise that there 
exists something that resembles the Lacanian concept of the Real: a 
material reality that is external to discourse and independent of our 
perceptions. While Lacan argued that our access to the Real is never 
unmediated even though it influences reality (hence, we necessarily 
fail to represent the Real within the Symbolic), Red Pill advocates opt 
for a more theatrical and pseudoscientific impression of the concept in 
which it is possible—though exceedingly difficult—to pierce the veil 
between the simulation of reality and the Real. To build this aspect 
of their narrative, they borrow their theory of consciousness from the 
1999 film The Matrix. In that film, the protagonist (Neo) is forced to 
make a choice between living in a reality simulated by artificial intel-
ligence (represented by a Blue Pill) or the actual conditions that exist 
outside the simulation—an apocalyptic hellscape where machines har-
vest human beings for energy (the Red Pill). For men’s rights advo-
cates, the Blue Pill signifies the illusory reality of both men and women 
who are unaware that their perceptions of the world are mediated by 
a cruel feminist ideology. For instance, the r/TheRedPill welcome page 
for newcomers argues that “men who are still growing up—from the 
80s, 90s, and even the last decade, they’re starting to realize that what 
their parents taught them, what television and chick flicks taught them, 
what church and sunday [sic] school taught them . . . it’s all wrong.”21 A 
similar post on www.marriedmansexlife.com argues, “You’ve been fed 
the Blue Pill from birth and you’ve never had a proper chance to win at 
love because you’ve been told the lie about how the game is played.”22 
In other words, the Blue Pill signifies the narcotized state of contem-
porary men, their unthinking adherence to feminine dominance—not 
merely in dating and relationships, but in all aspects of personal, social, 
and political life. “Grasping the truth about women and sex is one 
thing,” as one Reddit user suggests; “there are many, many Blue Pills in 
life, and nobody’s going to make a discussion group for each and every 
one.”23 Blue Pill men, as it were, go along with their social conditioning 
and capitulate to the rules of an invisible infrastructure that is exploit-
ative of men’s courtesy, worshipfulness, and backbreaking labor.
Red Pill theory also suggests that women’s biological programming 
has been overridden by feminism and that its emphasis on empow-
erment actually conceals its underlying motive to exploit men. The 
theory suggests that women ultimately desire to be dominated and con-
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fined to their traditionally assigned role as wives and mothers. Leaning 
heavily on evolutionary psychology, Red Pill forums and websites offer 
advice and tips on male sexual strategy in society organized around 
men catering to women. Some Red Pill proponents advocate pursuing 
women from foreign countries in regions such as Southeast Asia and 
Eastern Europe because they believe that such women are more sub-
missive, sexually available, and adherent to traditional gender norms.24 
At the same time, the Red Pill offers a cynical social philosophy in 
which feminism is toxic, rape and sexual discrimination are myths, and 
men’s victimization is to women’s advantage. The Red Pill represents 
more than just an opportunity for men to improve their sex lives; it is a 
misogynist political worldview that offers women no quarter.
A vast majority of men remain indoctrinated by the Blue Pill; yet, 
like Neo, the men who make their way to the Red Pill narrative do so 
because they harbor suspicions that the system is rigged against them; 
that the norms of courtship implicitly favor women; that women do 
not have to work as hard as men for the same privileges; that feminism 
is not about equality but domination; and that society is indifferent 
to men’s suffering. Part of what might attract and awaken a potential 
adherent is a traumatic experience, typically humiliating encounters 
with women. A commentator on The Rational Male blog surmised 
that “the most common way men find the Red Pill community is via 
an experience like this. Unfortunately, it often requires a significant 
life trauma to shake the sleeping awake, but having your outlook on 
intersexual dynamics challenged is the only way most men will ever 
be open to anything contradictory.”25 For the Red Pill community, the 
traumatic encounter represents a glitch in the Matrix, so to speak, a 
crack in the seams in which the system avails exploited men of its total-
ity. They argue that the shock of seeing the system at work opens Blue-
Pilled or so-called beta males to a previously unperceived reality.26 As 
one Reddit user puts it, “part of the reason we enjoy the Jerry Springer 
Show type posts where we see the naked behavior of women exposed 
for all to view it [sic] that it SHOCKS our system in such a way as to 
become enlightened .  .  . What is needed to wake up the beta is some 
‘glitch’ in the Blue Pill Matrix where the mythology that says ‘Women 
can do no wrong’ is exposed as pure brainwashing, a pure mythology.”27 
Later in the same thread, another user argues that rational argument is 
pointless because it neither shocks nor uplifts the audience. Defending 
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the use of extremes and hyperbole, the user writes that “whenever we 
tried to exercise the moderate position, men never got the message. It 
didn’t stick, because it failed to vindicate and uplift. It only demanded 
more mental resources that our visitors had to spare. Remember, we 
are emotional creatures first and rational creatures second. We can-
not think effectively when we are wounded. The men that we have 
the potential to help come here because they are hurting.”28 Here we 
see how moderation is cast as a co-optive tactic that works within the 
framework of the Blue Pill, a perspective that largely negates men’s pain 
and suffering. The Red Pill, however, retains a powerful charge because 
it vindicates men’s feelings while explicitly alienating its opponents. 
Although Red Pill advocates offer a therapeutic response to loss, its 
imagined subject would nonetheless retain its melancholic attachment 
to his wounds as an engine for the constant remaking and improve-
ment of the self.
By shocking its audience, the Red Pill both consummates male 
identity and intentionally repulses skeptics, casual observers, and half-
hearted supporters (what adherents dismissively call the “Purple Pill”). 
One contributor concludes by explaining how they have built a net-
worked community in which “the Red Pill [is] too toxic for the unini-
tiated to inhabit.”29 Moreover, the user’s comments suggest that men 
cannot see themselves as being capable of exercising agency outside 
of their Blue Pill programming until their feelings are vindicated and 
their wounds are tended. Unfortunately, Red Pill theory posits that 
betas ostensibly suffer from false consciousness: they identify with an 
oppressor class with whom they have no interest in common. Absent 
some form of shock or trauma, dissonant assault on their senses, or 
tough love, betas will remain incapable of perceiving and naming 
their exploitation. The so-called toxic climate of the manosphere is, by 
design, directed at affirming the in-group’s experience and expelling 
their tormentors from their networks. This part of the narrative gives 
concrete form to the audience’s inchoate sense of alienation. They suf-
fer because they have been conditioned to accept their programming; 
and while that suffering may be personal, it is connected to a set of 
broader sociopolitical arrangements. Suffering, however, is an oppor-
tunity for self-improvement. The narrative acknowledges that men are 
emotional and, consequently, require personal affirmation to see that 
their suffering is at once productive and not their fault. There are much 
bigger forces at work.
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At the same time, the narrative also acknowledges that men must 
be willing to swallow some hard truths before they are availed of the 
true state of the human condition. Taking the Red Pill is presented as 
a journey from which there is no return. As one men’s website puts 
it, “The Red Pill is the truth .  .  . you can’t unlearn the truth. Some 
of it is going to sting .  .  . Your life will change forever as you see the 
true nature of how men and women interact and everything will look 
almost scripted. The good news is that once you know the tune, the 
dance is easy to do.”30 Using a metaphor from Alice in Wonderland, a 
blogger on the Return of Kings suggests that “Taking the red pill often 
leads us to realizations we’d rather not have to face as awakened men 
continuing our journey down the rabbit hole of reality. Rather than 
running away from those unpleasant truths about women and the 
world, we face them. This is the essence of science and masculinity—
openness to new ideas and ruthless scrutiny of old ideas, leaving emo-
tional considerations aside.”31 The Red Pill is also characterized as a 
form of debunking that “shows us that The System is ruthless, it will 
do anything to keep the wheel spinning.”32 Taking the Red Pill signifies 
an individual willingness to be awakened to this bleak reality—a kind 
of arresting shock to the conscience that precedes men’s enlistment in 
collective resistance.
But to what truth are men to awaken? A Voice for Men’s Tom Giv-
ens explains the harsh reality of men’s existence under feminism:
How did feminism become the vehicle for this destructive principle, 
and was it always so? The answer is yes, it was always so, since female 
supremacy and social “deconstruction” is at the very heart of femi-
nism. In point of fact, Feminist writers openly stated their plan to 
“deconstruct” (Orwellian doublespeak for “destroy”) society in the 
60’s and 70’s. They also openly advocated for Gendercide (some femi-
nist musicians still do), the internment of men for purposes of slav-
ery and breeding, and other means of “smashing the Patriarchy” and 
installing women in the seats of power.33
Across the manosphere, the ubiquity of this kind of bombastic claim 
helps suture threads about “game,” dating, and seduction to the broader 
sociopolitical agenda of the men’s rights movement. In short, the Red 
Pill politicizes men’s personal woes. Advocates suggest that the Red Pill 
is merely a counterpoint to feminism that offers men a pathway to both 
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personal self-improvement and political affirmation. Proponents assert 
the necessity of Red Pill theory because it is the only unabashedly 
male-affirming discourse in a culture without positive representations 
of men. And though the Red Pill may be difficult to swallow, it puta-
tively avails men of the lie of their own social conditioning and pre-
pares them to turn the tables on women. Although difficult to accept, 
proponents argue that men who choose the Red Pill have little to lose 
in the prevailing climate of misandry. For instance, the website Illitable 
Men characterizes the Red Pill as “cutting through all the bullshit fed 
to men to keep them docile,” and “fill[ing] that void” where “boys and 
men alike are led astray.”34 It is here that we can observe how the Red 
Pill narrative becomes patterned after the rhetoric of contemporary 
feminism. However, the narrative borrows the language of feminism 
without drawing equivalences because, after all, men’s rights putatively 
asks for equality where feminism seeks domination.
Once one is thoroughly enmeshed in the Red Pill network, there 
a variety of pathways they can follow—all of which, in one way or 
another, contribute to the burgeoning transformation in cultural 
mythology. For men on sites such Voice for Men and r/MenRights, tak-
ing the Red Pill channels the user’s rage into concrete political action.35 
For example, Elam compares the new men’s rights activism to the 1960s 
civil rights movement:
Social change doesn’t happen because a majority wants it. Social 
change happens because a minority of people recognize an injustice 
and make noise until it starts getting fixed, if they have the truth on 
their side. This was true with the civil rights movement, it certainly 
wasn’t every African American in the United States that was hitting 
the streets and protesting in the ’60s. It was enough to burn Watts 
and Detroit and there was enough to get on cameras and get people’s 
attention and refuse to back down from water cannons and police 
dogs and all other manner of brutality and oppression to get them to 
shut up. But they got the message through and things have begun to 
change quite a bit.36
Again, this statement illustrates how men’s rights activists seek to craft 
an image of their struggle as consonant with other historic movements 
for gender and racial justice. This line of argument suggests that white 
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men too have faced brutal oppression, and, consequently, that violent 
resistance is not only a likely outcome but a reasonable one at that. In 
accordance with the conventions of melodrama, men are both femi-
nized victims and masculinized heroes. He portrays men as a valorous 
minority group, heroically standing up for truth and justice even in the 
face of harsh retribution from the state. The narrative puts men’s mis-
placed anger to good use, rising to a crescendo of justified rebellion.
Elam’s version of the Red Pill speaks to some very specific social 
harms and policies at which his followers may direct their animus. A 
Voice for Men is less interested in the politics of dating than in other 
nodal points in the men’s rights network, dedicating significantly more 
space to topics such as male suicide, inequality in family courts, and 
false rape accusations. While the site advances its own form of cultural 
mythology, A Voice for Men completes the Red Pill’s narrative with a 
concrete message of radical social reform, “to provide education and 
encouragement to men and boys; to lift them above the din of misan-
dry, to reject the unhealthy demands of gynocentrism in all its forms, 
and to promote their mental, physical and financial well-being without 
compromise or apology.”37 Elam’s version of the Red Pill is structured 
less around mythology—though that does play a role—than around 
creating social change and overcoming victimization through petition-
ing, direct action protests, education, and civil disobedience.
For those drawn to the Red Pill by their frustration with dating and 
relationships, the narrative ends with men re-establishing the rules 
of the “game” and recapturing sexual and relational dominance from 
women. The Red Pill subreddit introduces newly conscious devotees to 
a tactical war against a competing sexual strategy: feminism. The site 
reads, “it [feminism] puts women into the best position they can find, 
to select mates, to determine when they want to switch mates, to locate 
the best dna [sic] possible, and to garner the most resources they can 
individually achieve. The Red Pill is men’s sexual strategy.”38 The dis-
cussion threads largely direct their user’s rage into personal rather than 
political transformation. Here, the anger and toxicity woven through-
out the site is designed to repel the uninitiated and to create the con-
ditions for users to unlearn feminist doctrine and come to accept the 
immutable laws of sexual attraction. Drawing an analogy to the five 
stages of grief (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance), 
one moderator explains, “If we really want to understand what gets 
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written here, in its proper context, we need to understand that most 
‘Red Pill Theory’ posts will belong to one of these five stages. Each stage 
has value, because to reach a later one, you must go through the ear-
lier ones. And, as in grieving, the progress through is seldom linear, 
smooth, uniform, and one-directional.”39 One of the discussion rules 
prohibits “concern trolling,” or user responses that try to moderate 
anger or express trepidation about a conversation’s tone. In part, this 
rule is designed to allow users to experience each stage in the process, 
no matter how painful or misguided. The suffering of overwhelmed 
victims is required to inevitably reach the final stage of acceptance. 
The Red Pill narrative posits that anger is a necessary part of the pro-
cess of personal empowerment. As one user summarizes, “anger isn’t 
just expected, it’s encouraged—not because we want this to be the 
final stage in waking up, but because there’s simply no other place that 
men are welcome with this rage. The anger will subside, and out of it: 
hopefully a constructive philosophy towards a better us and a better 
future.”40
Ultimately, this version of the Red Pill narrative is more therapeu-
tic than political. Through self-care, self-improvement, consciousness-
raising, and taking responsibility for one’s own happiness, adherents 
can find, in one user’s words, “unbridled power & [sic] enlighten-
ment.”41 This version sees the self rather than society as a project—
though certainly proponents would argue that society would be better 
off as well. Exchanging the putatively self-serving feminist myths of 
romantic love for the cold reality of evolutionary psychology, the 
objective of the Red Pill is for men to rebuild their psyches and bod-
ies in accordance with the rules of the game. The community consid-
ers “game” to be amoral or a neutral tool of pursuing happiness based 
not on ideology but on empirical observations of human nature. The 
community’s construction of the instincts seems to privilege the id’s 
drive for immediate gratification. That is to say that in the name of put-
ting men in touch with their baser instincts, the Red Pill plays its part 
in the capitalist project of repressive desublimation. “Game” does not 
represent the liberation of Eros but instead a conduit to a better and 
more productive version of the self. Sex desacralized can be thought 
of as simply another consumable—a form of gratification pursued 
with speed and in quantity. At the stage of acceptance, followers have 
learned how to be emotionally detached with women, to approach sex 
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and relationships as practices governed by instincts, and to act only in 
their enlightened self-interest. As such, the Red Pill narrative stokes 
fantasies of total self-mastery, power, wealth, and invulnerability to 
women.
A more exemplary vision of surplus repression can be found in 
the uptake of the Red Pill offered by Men Going Their Own Way. 
MGTOW is a separatist offshoot of the larger Red Pill community that 
focuses on achieving emotional, physical, and financial independence 
from women. Those who identify with this label seek to extract them-
selves from all relationships with women as a strategy for living “in 
nations dominated by feminist laws and institutions.”42 For this com-
munity, consciousness-raising entails a radical embrace of personal 
self-interests over the needs and interests of women. Using hashtags 
such as #icethemout and #walkaway, MGTOW forums are populated 
with the personal narratives of men attempting to sever their relation-
ships with women. While there are some overlapping themes shared 
in common with incel groups, MGTOW do not ascribe to the fatalistic 
notion that success or failure is predetermined by genetic advantages 
and disadvantages. In their version of the narrative, men’s purpose is 
to conquer the instincts by channeling their libidinal energies into self-
improvement and technological discoveries. They also prompt their 
audience to dispense with feminist doctrines that keep men distracted 
from their ultimate purpose. Their version of the Red Pill narrative, 
then, concludes with men “walking away” from women altogether and 
channeling their energies into productive pursuits of historical con-
sequence. Sex is to be pursued only as a release or for the purpose of 
reproduction, not as an end in and of itself.
The group places a premium of “male sovereignty,” or the com-
plete ownership of the self. According to their central hub, MGTOW 
is “a statement of self-ownership, where the modern man preserves 
and protects his own sovereignty above all else.”43 They claim a noble 
ancestry of great men who had forsaken women for the common good 
of civilizational advancement. They assert that the movement reaches 
“way back to Schopenhauer, Tesla, Beethoven, Galileo, or even Jesus 
Christ—if you’re up to arguing that. MGTOW is not as old as fire, but 
it’s as old as a man’s first discovery of it.”44 The group not only attempts 
to redefine success away from sex, marriage, and children, but also sug-
gests that the pursuit of these goals is antithetical to scientific progress. 
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The site argues that “marriage and children are not the highest pin-
nacle of success for Men .  .  . For millennia, men have accomplished 
and contributed far greater miracles of science, discovery and human 
endeavor.”45 The MGTOW history page is populated with antimar-
riage quotes from famous male scientists and inventors, such as Nikola 
Tesla, Wilbur Wright, Isaac Newton, and Galileo. They contend that 
women take for granted, and therefore should not be entitled to, the 
great inventions, scientific discoveries, and risks ventured by men. For 
example, the site explains that “Men are no longer revered or respected 
on a most basic level for their contributions and past sacrifices, and 
are now reduced to ‘idiots’ for that. The recent cultural explosion of 
MGTOW should have long been expected in the face of this kind of 
nonsense which is force-fed to the sheeple [sic] who will buy it by the 
trough. Men Going Their Own Way have now learned and adapted.”46 
The sovereign man, then, refuses to alienate himself from his labor by 
sharing its benefits with women. In other words, “he shows his value by 
removing himself entirely.”47
Although some nodes in the Red Pill network explain MGTOW 
as simply a phase in the process of unlearning feminist coding, many 
MGTOW advocates see abandoning the pursuit and accommodation of 
women as the final step. Like many other Red Pill communities, they 
ascribe to the theory that women are evolutionarily programmed to 
engage in “hypergamy,” meaning that they are always looking for ways 
to mate with a man of higher status than their current relationship.48 
While users on r/TheRedPill seek to use this theory to their advantage 
in sexual strategy, MGTOW contend that any encounter with women 
puts a man’s earning potential, self-worth, and sovereignty at risk. For 
some, even sex without commitment or a relationship might under-
mine men’s ability to nurture their careers, improve their happiness, 
and build their personal wealth. This conclusion to the Red Pill nar-
rative invites the audience to invest their libidinal energies in produc-
tive pursuits that are necessary for personal success and fulfillment in 
capitalist society. MGTOW rhetoric implicitly endorses a form of social 
organization that is premised on sublimating the pleasure principle 
into the performance principle by repressing erotic energies and chan-
neling them into alienated labor. In Marcuse’s words, the performance 
principle is “the violent and exploitative productivity which made 
man into an instrument of labor.”49 While they promise authenticity 
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and happiness, neither outcome exists independently of capitalism. In 
this regard, MGTOW imagines a future in which men can be hyperpro-
ductive precisely because they are the sole instrument of civilizational 
progress. Ironically, liberated men are then “free” to pursue constant 
self-improvement in the name of happiness and independence. This 
is not to deny that men who ascribe to MGTOW express feelings of 
empowerment, but instead to argue that the community’s definition of 
empowerment is nonetheless invested in the alienated labor that sus-
tains advanced industrial capitalism and the compulsive repetition that 
underwrites the death drive. In other words, MGTOW seek an escape 
from women’s domination by investing in the illusory liberatory prom-
ise of the Protestant work ethic.
RED PILL MEN, BLUE PILL WORLD
Ultimately, what unites all these various strands of the Red Pill narra-
tive is a formal structure that moves unidirectionally from false con-
sciousness to enlightenment; from victimhood to empowerment. All 
agree that most men live in an illusory reality that disadvantages them 
in everything from their pursuit of sex and relationships to how they 
navigating structurally biased political institutions. Moreover, they 
argue that Blue-Pilled men are incapable of seeing that they share no 
interest in common with their oppressor. Introduction to Red Pill the-
ory avails men of the brutal condition of their existence, which in turn 
engenders rage and indignation. The narrative concludes with prom-
ises of wholeness: a sexual strategy that guarantees power and invul-
nerability, a political platform that returns us to a time in which men 
were valued, or a collective project of technological innovation and 
personal prosperity. As a network composed of diverse content, the 
Red Pill is elastic enough to capture and aggregate the felt intensities 
of a wide demographic of men. As such, a white male subject looking 
for a place, purpose, or affirmation of their identity can choose which 
specific iteration of the same narrative speaks directly to their experi-
ence. In this way, the manosphere unites men of diverse ages and polit-
ical affiliations in a millennial project of remaking society. At the same 
time, the underlying appeal of these sites cannot be read outside of the 
politics of white male victimhood. While the Red Pill makes few race-
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specific appeals, the narrative does speak to an imagined audience that 
feels marginalized despite their entitlements, desires a collective iden-
tity that privileges masculinity over all other categories, and ascribes 
to political beliefs that skew toward the conservative and/or libertarian 
side of the spectrum.
This chapter demonstrates that audience enjoyment of the Red Pill 
narrative is predicated on a network that repeats one metanarrative 
that translates victimhood into a both a sense of mastery and a leg-
ible political platform. Put another way, both the form and narrative 
structure of the manosphere mirrors itself after the emotional and cog-
nitive states ideally experienced by the converted: powerlessness, sad-
ness, and rage followed by confidence, conviction, and self-possession. 
Audiences are invited to traverse the stages of consciousness and, in 
doing so, to enact their agency in such a way as to make the narrative 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The narrative leads its audience through a 
cathartic experience of consciousness-raising that validates their per-
sonal experience and connects like-minded men in a collective proj-
ect of empowerment. The Red Pill retains a powerful charge because it 
invites individuals to write themselves into the story, to consummate 
their identity by joining the collective organism of the movement—
the “men who sit at screen.” In doing so, masculinity is reborn when 
it enters networked media. Yet, however therapeutic the message may 
seem, the Red Pill expresses a melancholic attachment to trauma as the 
underlying engine of personal and political transformation.
In sum, the Red Pill appropriates consciousness-raising, victim-
hood, and melodrama as instruments of male power. Despite the Red 
Pill’s promise of enlightenment and redemption, adherents may not end 
up any better off. In the context of late capitalism, self-improvement 
projects align with the broader social and economic forces that invite 
us to invest in being more productive subjects. Even our personal trag-
edies are fodder for continual self-improvement. Like other “ideologi-
cal manipulation(s) of human suffering,” the Red Pill externalizes the 
suffering and loss that constitute the melancholic subject.50 The Red 
Pill is no different from other projects that capitalize on human suffer-
ing and loneliness with magical promises of power and enlightenment. 
Its various iterations invite men to view sex as a commodity, to pursue 
lost objects with futility, to channel libidinal energies into wealth cre-
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ation and scientific innovation, and to return to the archetypes of the 
self-made man. All these iterations of masculinity reduce intimate rela-
tionships to transactions that are subject to the ruthless laws of both 
nature and the marketplace. Red Pill masculinity promises something 
that it cannot deliver: to make the subject whole. Its fantasies of invul-
nerability and sovereignty merely underwrite a compulsive return to 
an imagined period in the past in which men’s biological superiority 
was not usurped by feminine programming. In this cross-section of the 
manosphere, sex and intimacy are folded into the imperatives of late 
capitalism to turn the self into a project of constant self-improvement, 
to divest from relationships and interpersonal solidarity, and to wor-
ship power and dominance. Unfortunately, the Red Pill has little to say 
about this bleak reality.
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Incel Rebellion
Fascism and Male Autarky
O N MAY 23,  2014,  Santa Barbara college student Elliot Rodger mur-
dered seven and injured fourteen people before taking his own life in 
Isla Vista, California. Before his murderous rampage, Rodger uploaded 
a video to YouTube entitled “Elliot Rodger’s Retribution,” in which he 
sketched his plan to punish women who spurned his sexual advances 
and so-called alpha males he despised for their ability to readily find 
sexual partners. Rodger also emailed an autobiographical manifesto 
to friends and family titled “My Twisted World: The Elliot Rodger 
Story,” in which he expressed his sexual frustration and violent hatred 
of women and racial minorities. Rodger’s account of his life mirrors 
that of a growing online community of involuntary celibates (“incels”), 
composed largely of white men who express difficulty finding sexual 
partners and blame women and people of color for a state of national 
degeneracy. To some who populate incel websites, Rodger is considered 
a martyr for crafting a template for paramilitary resistance to women’s 
sexual liberation and racial cuckolding. In response to Rodger’s violent 
rampage, a blogger for the incel website www.loveshy.com wrote:
What happened is punishment for evil and violence of feminists 
and liberals. Any of you supporting atrocities like women’s suffrage, 
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immodest clothing, child support/alimony, no ban on adultery, 
ban on prostitution and a lack of female premarital chastity, all the 
things that drove this young man to be unable to find a girlfriend, 
are disgusting, horrible people and you created a culture where this 
is possible.1
Rodger’s “retribution” resonated with some white men’s indignation 
that progressive movements toward gender equality have tilted the 
scales against men in every arena of public life.
In light of the previous chapter’s examination of the Red Pill, it is 
perhaps not surprising that supporters echoed Rodger’s claim that he 
was not culpable for his actions because feminism and sexual libera-
tion struck the first blow. For instance, a poster on the r/TheRedPill 
responded to the attack: “Even without fixing modern women, legal-
ized prostitution could easily prevent at least some of these killing 
sprees. The people of modern culture are stupid beyond help: they 
refuse to understand that if you kick a nice dog enough times, it will 
become a mean dog. No dog is entitled to even one bone, they say.”2 
Other Reddit users praised Rodger’s manifesto as a “good read” and 
“a Greek tragedy for the 21st century” that proved that “all women 
look for in a man in his face, is he hot or not.”3 Another contribu-
tor to a thread on r/unpopularopinion casually sympathized that “ER 
[Rodger] was an intelligent guy and his way of expressing himself was 
quite interesting. It is even evident in his YT [YouTube] video—the 
way his [sic] speaks.” Other users went further by blaming the victims, 
writing that “females dont [sic] seek out intelligence as then he would 
not have went [sic] on a killing spree.” While such toxic discourse 
could easily be dismissed as the idle words of anonymous internet 
trolls or bitter sexless men blowing off steam, the harsh invectives 
emanating from online incel communities have been cited by some 
as justifications for real-life violence. In April 2018, Alek Minassian 
killed ten and injured fourteen (mostly women) with a rental car in 
Toronto.4 In a Facebook post prior to his murderous rampage, Minas-
sian cited Rodger as a source of inspiration: “The Incel Rebellion has 
already begun! We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys! All hail 
the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!”5 In January 2019, Christo-
pher Cleary was arrested for posting on his Facebook page that he 
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was “planning on shooting up a public place soon and being the next 
mass shooter cause I’m ready to die and all the girls [that] turned me 
down is going to make it right by killing as many girls as I see.”6 Such 
fantasies of spectacular mass violence characterize the once-obscure 
“incel” as they begin to garner public attention, bringing with him an 
amalgam of perverse doctrines that circulate throughout men’s net-
worked media.
Rodger and his predecessors are the by-product of network cir-
cuitries that seamlessly shuttle users through subreddit threads, news 
aggregators, blogs, and social media sites that on the whole paint a 
bleak portrait of reality for distressed young men. The men’s rights 
network connects young men’s personal travails to larger structural 
and natural forces—culminating in a perverse mixture of evolution-
ary psychology, scientific racism and sexism, and nihilism. Rodger 
himself was a contributor to numerous incel conversations on sites 
such as PUAHate.com, ForeverAlone.com, and miscellaneous forums 
on BodyBuilding.com.7 For instance, in April 2013, Rodger posted on 
PUAHate that “feminism must be destroyed. Humanity is devolving 
into primitive animals.”8 Elsewhere he posted, “that’s the problem with 
women. They are attracted to the worst kinds of men. They all have 
some sort of mental illness.”9 In the threads in which he participated, 
users exchanged ill-informed and pseudoscientific viewpoints on phys-
ical attraction and women’s psychology. The participants blamed femi-
nism for their sexual frustration and loneliness—waxing nostalgic for 
a time in the past in which “beta males” were guaranteed marriage and, 
consequently, a stake in society. Users even expressed violent fantasies 
of enslavement and mass murder of women. Here we see that same 
themes that populate “My Twisted World”: inborn dignity, male enti-
tlement to sexually available women, fascistic fantasies of control and 
invulnerability.
Rodger’s manifesto, and the violent misogyny that he put into prac-
tice, reflect how networked men’s rights discourse seduces and recruits 
aggrieved men. “My Twisted World” offers yet another fantasy of 
power and invulnerability that rehearses the loss that is central to the 
melancholic subject. The impossibility of Rodger’s preposterous fanta-
sies speaks to some other investments and sense of enjoyment at work 
in his chilling vision of his “perfect” society. Incels argue that women 
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should not be allowed to make choices concerning their bodies, love, 
sex, careers, and reproduction. According to incel websites, feminism 
disrupted natural laws governing courtship, the family, and sexual 
reproduction by giving women the power to make decisions about who 
to date, when (if at all) to marry and have children, and whether to 
pursue a career or other personal aspirations. As a consequence, this 
so-called unnatural order reserves sex and relationships for a privi-
leged few (alphas) and an unfulfilling life of sexual rejection for most 
(incels). Adopting this tragic frame, Rodger and his supporters con-
tend that white men’s so-called persecution legitimizes spectacular acts 
of violent resistance against the evils of feminism. Incels are animated 
by narratives of white masculine victimhood and share a strong affin-
ity with other men’s rights organizations and members of the alt-right 
movement. As expected, then, they express virulent misogyny, decry 
the violation of their birthright entitlements, and fantasize about tor-
ture and mass murder.10
To be sure, Rodger’s manifesto is a nauseating rumination on white 
male persecution. His 100,000-word poisonous diatribe sutures birth-
right nationalism and white male victimhood to what I will character-
ize as an implicitly fascistic ideology that entails a large-scale industrial 
project of sexual repression, and ultimately, femicide. Like other incels, 
Rodger extrapolates from his experience of sexual rejection an ill-
informed theory of human nature underwritten by primal cruelty and 
a lay political ideology that seems vaguely informed by hypermascu-
line interpretations of Frederick Nietzsche’s will-to-power as well as 
fascism’s affinity for male autarky. This text emphasizes chaos and dis-
order alongside a deployment of tropes such as antimodernism and 
regeneration through violence. Perhaps not surprisingly, the manifesto 
is incoherent—vacillating between affection for women and fantasies 
of torture and femicide; self-pity and self-aggrandizement; fatalism and 
magical agentalism. Of course, contemporary white masculinity is stra-
tegically incoherent, and therefore able to disavow its hegemony via 
unintelligible claims of marginalization. Thus, while Rodger enjoyed 
a life of opulence and material privilege in the affluent community of 
Santa Barbara, he represented himself as a victim of both women and 
men whom he deemed inferior. Upon the eve of his violent rampage, 
Rodger wrote, “I am the true victim in all of this. I am the good guy. 
Humanity struck at me first by condemning me to experience so much 
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suffering. I didn’t ask for this. I didn’t want this. I didn’t start this war 
. . . I wasn’t the one who struck first . . . But I will finish it by striking 
back. I will punish everyone. And it will be beautiful. Finally, at long 
last, I can show the world my true worth.”11
Although there are an unfortunate number of mass shooters and 
other white terrorists whom one could examine to understand the 
interplay of masculinity, violence, and victimhood, Rodger’s manifesto 
perhaps best illustrates the relationship between white male victim-
hood and the compulsive repetition of the death drive. At its heart, the 
manifesto expresses a fantasy of control that is predicated on recover-
ing a lost object. Rodger’s toxic manifesto adds new layers to the pub-
lic fantasy of male persecution by, quite ironically, appropriating from 
Second Wave feminism the framework of the “personal as political.”12 
Rodger’s intimate though prosaic confessions of a powerless life—
composed of recollections of perceived slights and petty injustices—
reframes white men’s quotidian experiences of human vulnerability as 
systemic structural oppression. “My Twisted World” proscribes spec-
tacular, even unprecedented acts of gender violence, to return men to a 
position of unquestioned authority and privilege. The text constructs a 
dystopian society founded upon the uniform industrially orchestrated 
mass subjugation of women and the eradication of the life instinct. The 
text wallows in sadism to counteract women’s sexual agency and writes 
women out of the arc of progressive human equality.
Rodger’s manifesto demands our attention not because it provides 
insights into the psychology of misogynist mass murder, but because 
it spells out conclusions that one can draw from their encounter with 
the manosphere. The text is inseparable from the network circuitries 
that cross-pollinate men’s rights with white supremacy, scientific rac-
ism and sexism, fascism, homophobia, and other violent ideologies. 
“My Twisted World” also remains enmeshed, analyzed, praised, and 
rebuked within the same networks from which its content was, in part, 
derived. Thus, the manifesto is evidence of how networked thought 
processes have made possible new and dangerous forms of white male 
subjectivity. The logics of the manifesto both reflect and concretize the 
toxic miasma of networked ideas that attempt to constitute a unified 
and invulnerable white cisgender heterosexual male subject. It is both 
the product of networked men’s rights rhetoric and a notable fragment 
that remains entangled in those very networks.
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Despite his preposterous demands for women’s enslavement, 
racial eugenics, and autocratic omnipotence, I do not wish to gawk 
at what one could suggest is an extreme aberration of contemporary 
white masculinity. The text is remarkable not as a result of its incred-
ible divergence from but because of its terrifying alignment with the 
broader corpus of men’s rights rhetoric. Certainly, the ever-growing 
number of white male terrorists—Alek Minassian, Adam Lanza, James 
Holmes, Dylann Roof, Robert Lewis Dear, and Nikolas Cruz to name 
a few—suggests that manifestos such as Rodger’s evince a rhetorical 
pattern of white masculine self-radicalization that constitutes the logi-
cal limit, perhaps even the event horizon of the politics of white male 
victimhood. Drawing from Kenneth Burke’s approach to Adolf Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf in Burke’s essay “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” I am not 
inclined to deprive such a ghoulish text of its necessary critical judg-
ment. In other words, to dismiss this text is to deny us crucial insights 
concerning the rhetorical appeal of its dystopian vision. As Burke 
writes, “There are other ways of burning books than on the pyre—and 
the favorite method of the hasty reviewer is to deprive [themselves] 
and [their] readers by inattention.”13 It was Burke’s hope that we might 
better understand “what kind of ‘medicine’ this medicine-man has 
concocted” if we are to “forestall the concocting of similar medicine in 
America.”14 We are at a point in which fascism, demagoguery, and radi-
cal populism continue to gain traction—and of which the rhetoric of 
white male victimhood has become a defining feature.15 The ideals that 
can be extrapolated from Rodger’s somewhat mundane life story can 
be characterized as fascistic, particularly his fantasies of eugenics, auto-
cratic male rule, and biopolitical control of women and racial minori-
ties in the name of civilizational progress.
In this chapter, I identify the patterned fascistic discourse that 
underlies white male victimhood.16 This pattern begins with a fantasy 
of persecution brought on by an unnatural political and social order—
frequently underwritten by a toxic feminism—that denies white men’s 
“inborn dignity” and birthright entitlement to cultural and material 
capital, including access to social status, wealth, and sex.17 Second, 
having been unjustly displaced, the white male victim disavows that 
hegemonic masculinity nonetheless structures the existing social and 
political order and calls for its restoration on a civilizational scale. 
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Even personal slights and the mundane struggles of everyday life can 
be interpreted as a form of systemic structural oppression—as if the 
vulnerability of human existence itself were somehow an experience 
of white male precarity. Third, any positive differential in enjoyment, 
privilege, or cultural capital that is experienced individually by women 
or people of color becomes evidence of a generalized deformed state 
of the human condition. This enables white men to politicize personal 
travails and scapegoat women and people of color for any perceived 
slight, however inconsequential. Finally, in rejecting the modernist 
notion that powers and privileges should be shared throughout the 
polity, white male victims align themselves with a fascistic politics that 
denies the humanity of those who have violated their inborn dignity. 
Confronted with the demands of historically marginalized groups to be 
afforded their humanity by universalizing democratic principles, frag-
ile white masculinity turns toward apocalyptic fantasies of death and 
omnipotence to extinguish their cries.
Examining Rodger’s digital manifesto, this chapter offers two pri-
mary insights into the relationship between white masculine victim-
hood and an underlying fascistic imperative that structures the new 
men’s rights activism. First, Rodger’s manifesto illustrates that white 
masculinity is organized around a fantasy of regeneration through 
violence; of male virility restored through a fascist doctrine of mili-
tarism and permanent revolution. Second, the manifesto reveals how 
white masculinity and fascistic ideologies are sutured together through 
evocative imagery of death, the macabre and the apocalyptic to negate 
the demands politics of women, queers, and people of color to be rec-
ognized as human. In short, theorizations of masculinity and con-
temporary fascism would benefit from an account of the sex/gender 
investments it engenders; namely, in a politics animated by domina-
tion, control, and death.
FASCISM AND MASCULINITY
A fascist politic is underwritten by a defense of a traditional concept of 
virile masculinity and staunch antimodernism. For instance, as Sandro 
Bellassai argues of Italian fascism, adherents emphasized the hierarchal 
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relationship between the sexes and the natural imperative of women’s 
subjugation.18 German and Italian fascists’ campaigns against urban-
ization were, in essence, directed at negating modernity’s liberation of 
women’s sexuality. Fascism in the West promulgates an exaggerated 
and even repellant vision of masculinity that liberates the bourgeois 
man from prohibitions against violence and grotesque idealizations of 
virility while aestheticizing the white male body as the reproductive 
engine of the race-nation.19 In fascist discourse, the white male body is 
identified with order and progress. The “European species” is exalted as 
physically beautiful and morally superior to the feminine (which here 
references both the immutable inferiority of women and the sexual and 
racial inferiority of men of color).
Fascism is also organized around fantasies of control, domination, 
militarism, and the will-to-power. Daniel Woodley argues that “fascist 
propaganda is replete with references to virility, fertility, male invul-
nerability and superhuman power, suggesting an asymmetric differ-
entiation between a masculine ‘totality’ and a feminine ‘lack.’”20 In as 
much as femininity represents a loss of power similar to the threat of 
castration, the fascist man is caught in a queer and uncanny relation-
ship to the feminine. That is to say that while fascism idealizes wom-
en’s fertility as a political imperative, it also identifies itself with the 
homosocial fantasy of male autarky in which men are both invulner-
able to and independent of women. According to Barbara Spackman, 
fascism is largely a male event whose homoerotic charge promotes 
a “cognitive and ideological apartheid around homosexuality.”21 Yet, 
while fascism implicitly advances a dark, even gothic sense of queer 
world-making, homosexual desire must be sublimated in the interest 
of a virtuous masculinity capable of biological reproduction (and we 
see in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy the brutal repression and exter-
mination of GLBTQ individuals). All desire, for that matter, must be 
sublimated to the will of the national good; a task which, according to 
Marcuse, is made easier by both the atomization of industrial produc-
tion and the surplus repression generated under late capitalism.22 One 
only need observe the chiseled male sculptures commissioned by Mus-
solini to understand the perversely queer futurity of male autarky.23
Fascism shares a strong affinity with feelings of victimhood and 
powerlessness.24 Hence, as Kimmel argues, the “forgotten man” is fre-
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quently evoked as a warrant for a more expansive and reactionary 
political agenda that seeks to “restore, to retrieve, to reclaim something 
that is perceived to have been lost.”25 This political agenda is structured 
around profound felt intensities, that the “system” is somehow rigged 
against men and, thus, they have been denied the jobs, opportunities, 
enfranchisement, family tranquility, freedom, status, and sexual satis-
faction to which they are entitled. In short, the forgotten man is angry, 
or at least he is told to feel that way. Of grave concern, anger is an emo-
tion easily attached to reactionary political commitments. Underwrit-
ten by narratives of victimization, American neofascists direct much of 
their bile toward feminism and the liberal values and institutions that 
support gender equality.26
In this chapter, I focus on incels as a growing male community 
underwritten by fascist principles as well as a community where the 
sexual mandate of fascism is most clearly articulated. Last year Reddit 
removed the r/incel portal (which had approximately 40,000 users) 
because its content violated the site’s updated policy against posts 
advocating or expressing support for violence.27 Of course, there are 
many others including loveshy.com, incel.me, and PUAHate.com. 
As evidenced from Rodger’s manifesto, incel communities trade in 
fantasies of domination, control, and sexual violence.28 While some 
of the community’s discourse is sometimes therapeutic and at other 
times pitiful, it is, by and large, saturated with sadism, nihilism, and 
cruelty. Fantasies run the gamut from banning public displays of 
affection, to killing women and sexually active alpha males (whom 
they refer to as “Chads”), to interning women in camps for procre-
ative purposes and abolishing sex altogether. The message is: if they 
cannot have sex no one can. These fantasies implicitly take up Mar-
cuse’s concept of surplus repression as if it were a dystopian blueprint 
for establishing a sexual dictatorship—seeking to extinguish Eros and 
conquer the pleasure principle in the name of civilizational progress. 
And even as it negates homosexual desires, incel discourse cruises a 
queerly apocalyptic dystopia of male homosociality that is devoid of 
pleasure, of sexuality, and of course, women. Incel rhetoric intensifies 
the death drive of late capitalism by investing energy in toil, domi-
nation, and subjugation as an ironic form of liberation from sexual 
repression.
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READING RODGER’S MANIFESTO
Rodger’s manifesto is an excruciatingly detailed autobiographical 
account of his life, beginning with his earliest childhood memories. 
The text is subdivided into years; each a more ominous account of 
the factors that he believed contributed to his victimization, includ-
ing details about his parent’s divorce, bullying at school, rejection by 
girls, and alienation from his friends and family. Perhaps the most 
important meridian in the text is between a period of his life he clas-
sifies as “childhood innocence” and the onset of puberty and sexual 
development. He writes wistfully about pre-adolescence as “a time 
of discovery, excitement, and fun. I had just entered this new world, 
and I knew nothing of the pain it would bring me later on. I enjoyed 
life with innocent bliss.” He continues, “I was enjoying life in a world 
that I loved. I was happy, and completely oblivious of the fact that my 
future on this world would only turn to darkness and misery because 
of girls.”29 The text’s somewhat Christian division between grace and 
Fall identifies women with a secular form of original sin and Rodger 
with piety and Edenic innocence. While Rodger ruminates on the 
development of sexual urges and their lack of satisfaction, he frames 
sexuality (and women for that matter) as a flaw in human develop-
ment that negates both pleasure and civilizational progress. In this 
traumatic narrative, it is this imagined period of presexual childhood 
innocence to which he would ultimately have us return. That is, in 
his dystopian vision of a future without sexuality—dispensing with 
the pleasure principle altogether—humanity would be free to channel 
their energies into discovery and progress. Perhaps the more impor-
tant purpose for Rodger is to identify himself with innocence and 
progress in order to cast himself as either blameless or righteous in 
exacting revenge against his external tormentors. And while it might 
seem quite contradictory, his innocence is also corroborated by his 
appeals to an inborn dignity or birthright privilege to material and 
cultural capital.
Although the manifesto is extreme, it nonetheless carries out a famil-
iar pattern of victimization, disavowal, purification, and re-established 
order. While much of the manifesto might remind readers of Burke’s 
observations about guilt, victimage, and scapegoating, this chapter nar-
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rows the focus to the unique contours of white male victimhood; its 
recursive attachment to trauma and its related need to project death 
and repression onto others.30 First, the manifesto evinces a specific pat-
tern of white male self-radicalization that begins with recasting one’s 
personal suffering as a structural manifestation of a corrupt and unnat-
ural political order. Here, the subject ambivalently desires his own per-
secution, as it is the rationale for a return to the imagined moment 
when he was whole. Second, personal suffering becomes political suf-
fering, and therefore serves as a diagnostic of a larger failure in the 
existing social order. This perhaps explains why the manuscript is 
extraordinarily tedious in documenting even the most trivial of slights 
and challenges. Rodger’s account for each petty insult, confrontation, 
and dispute in his life mobilizes tedium as evidence of systematic pat-
tern of victimization. As such, the manuscript is a ledger of petty per-
sonal slights reframed as political persecution. Yet, Rodger expressed 
an ambivalent desire for his own victimization, as its existence served 
as a warrant for regeneration through violence. Note the enthusiasm 
he expresses in his recounting of the most egregious of violations. In 
his recounting of rejection, he recalls, “I was giddy with ecstatic, hate-
fueled excitement. I wished I could spray boiling oil at the foul beasts. 
They deserved to die horrible, painful deaths just for the crime of 
enjoying a better life than me.”31 The text expresses a perverse desire for 
meaningful suffering; the greater the ego is bruised, the greater enjoy-
ment of retribution.
In politicizing personal suffering, the manuscript introduces a vile 
political order that wages war on men like himself. He begins his mani-
festo by stating:
Humanity . . . All of my suffering on this world has been at the hands 
of humanity, particularly women. It has made me realize just how 
brutal and twisted humanity is as a species. All I ever wanted was to 
fit in and live a happy life amongst humanity, but I was cast out and 
rejected, forced to endure an existence of loneliness and insignifi-
cance, all because the females of the human species were incapable of 
seeing the value in me. This is the story of how I, Elliot Rodger, came 
to be. This is the story of my entire life. It is a dark story of sadness, 
anger, and hatred. It is a story of a war against cruel injustice.32
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Note that the context for his suffering is extraordinarily broad. For 
Rodger, these are species-level forces at work. As his suffering is “at 
the hands of humanity, women in particular”—as opposed to specific 
actors (family, friends, acquaintances)—the drama of his life can be 
cast as tragic and fatalistic. His use of the passive voice to explain how 
he “came to be” cedes agency to mysterious forces much larger than 
himself, thus exonerating his actions. It is an introduction to a melo-
drama in which the righteous suffering of innocent victims transforms 
them into avenging heroes.
Moreover, as the argument unfolds, his suffering evinces a kind of 
biological determinism to explain his actions as responses to forces 
outside his control. That is to say that Rodger’s melodrama takes place 
within the brutal scene of the Hobbesian state of nature that is cruel, 
competitive, and chaotic. Oddly, Rodger constructs his identity in 
opposition to humanity, which, as discussed below, transforms into an 
expression of megalomania. To the point made here, this separation 
between humanity and his “war against cruel injustice” is grounded in 
his sense of inborn dignity. While he claims to be the victim of human-
ity, he also argues that he is vastly superior to the rest of the human 
race. After establishing this fact, he is able to name all small and seem-
ingly unconnected assaults on his ego as part of the systematic war 
against him. Hence, he claims that “in this magnificent story, I will dis-
close every single detail about my life, every single significant experi-
ence that I have pulled from my superior memory, as well as how those 
experiences have shaped my views of the world. This tragedy did not 
have to happen.”33 Hence, his account of the rather boring details of his 
childhood and adolescence are supposed to reveal something more sig-
nificant about the supposed nature of women and the unique quality of 
Rodger’s character. Rodger’s reference to his “superior memory” sug-
gests that the manifesto is told by the omniscient and objective voice 
of a neutral outside observer. This reference authorizes him to connect 
unrelated events so that they might tell a coherent and linear story in 
which an objective voice gives greater meaning to personal struggles. 
And although the notion that this tragedy could have been avoided 
contradicts his assertions about human nature, this contention directs 
the audience’s attention to the actions of others who supposedly pro-
voked his violent rampage.
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Rodger’s inborn dignity would not be of such significance were 
there not enemies who had systematically denied Rodger his birthright: 
women and alpha males (particularly men of color). Thus, the next 
step in his narrative was to disavow that white masculinity affords men 
such as himself extraordinary social and material privileges. Instead, he 
contends that society is governed by the whims of cruel women and 
the select few alpha males whom they allow to experience sexual inti-
macy. For Rodger, women’s cruelty is owed to women’s connectedness 
to the natural world. Drawing from the long-standing cultural associa-
tion between femininity and nature, Rodger constructs his feminized 
enemy as animalistic, primal, elemental, chaotic, and instinctual.34 As he 
explains, “The world truly is a brutal place, where a man must fight a bit-
ter struggle against all other men to reach the top. Humans are nothing 
but vicious beasts in the jungle.”35 Rodger, however, considered himself 
above the fray of primal instinct as a consequence of his superior Euro-
pean ancestry. Hence, his status as a refined “gentlemen” provides a stark 
contrast to the unrepressed expression of primal desires exemplified by 
women, alpha males, and racialized Others. In countering women’s cru-
elty, Rodger described himself as not only a victim but a cultured man 
of civilization, noting, “I am the perfect, magnificent gentleman, worthy 
of having a beautiful girlfriend, making the world see how unreasonable 
it is that I’ve had to struggle all my life to get a girlfriend.”36
However, much like the cultural mythology of the frontiersman, it 
is the burden of the Euro-American gentleman to subdue nature and 
contend with the chaotic forces of the natural world.37 Thus, despite 
his Asian ancestry, Rodger identifies with what he characterizes as his 
royal European blood in contradistinction to hypersexualized men of 
color. He contends:
How could an inferior, ugly black boy be able to get a white girl and 
not me? I am beautiful, and I half white myself. I am descended from 
British aristocracy. He is descended from slaves. I deserve it more. I 
tried not to believe his foul words, but they were already said, and it 
was hard to erase from my mind. If this is actually true, if this ugly 
black filth was able to have sex with a blonde white girl at the age of 
thirteen while I’ve had to suffer virginity all my life, then this just 
proves how ridiculous the female.38
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For Rodger, women, being of nature, gravitate toward the savage and 
inferior masculinity of men of color and so-called alphas. He writes, 
“That is why they are attracted to barbaric, wild, beast-like men. They 
are beasts themselves. Beasts should not be able to have any rights 
in a civilized society. If their wickedness is not contained, the whole 
of humanity will be held back from advancement to a more civilized 
state.”39 The stakes of his struggle are no less than the advancement of 
humanity, achievable by the repression of the instincts and the subju-
gation of femininity. For Rodger, it is the duty of “gentlemen” such as 
himself to lead the return to civilized virtue, by violence if necessary.
By positioning himself as a gentleman, Rodger recalls a Victorian-
era masculinity characterized by restraint of the passions, self-mastery 
and self-denial.40 Moreover, he recasts the hypersexuality of the alpha 
male as a sign of effeminacy, much in the way that the Euro-America 
legitimized violence against American Indians and Black slaves.41 At 
the same time, women and people of color are also strong, cunning, 
and physically threatening. It should come as no surprise, then, that 
Rodger later goes on to both defend racial eugenics and rail against 
miscegenation and the threat of Black and Latino sexuality. The mani-
festo contends that it is the gentleman’s imperative to subdue the brutal 
forces of the natural world, even if that requires that they temporar-
ily lift their prohibition against violence. The text thus contrasts Rod-
ger’s purported attainment of civilized virtue against the degeneracy of 
women and people of color. Rodger also inverts existing social hierar-
chies to characterize women and people of color as the perpetrators of 
violence against incels.
Building from this inversion, the manifesto illustrates a third fea-
ture of white male victimhood in which recognizing the humanity of 
women and people of color necessarily comes at the expense of white 
men’s dignity. In the rhetoric of white male victimhood, all social 
gains are portrayed as zero-sum. Yet Rodger contends that liberalism 
pretends that this is not the case and, therefore, ignores the bound-
ary conditions of the state of nature. In other words, the notion that 
women are rights-bearing subjects with bodily autonomy contravenes 
higher natural and divine principles that mandate their subjugation in 
the name of the family and civilizational progress. Although such a 
vile text makes no claim to ideological consistency, Rodger’s defense 
of repression and women’s subjugation in the name of civilization is 
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quite contradictory. On the one hand, he seems to believe that men 
such as himself are entitled to sex by virtue of the natural order. He 
routinely pauses in his personal accounts to ask questions like “Why 
do they give their love and sex to other men, but not me, even though I 
deserve them more?”42 and “Other men are able to have such a life . . . 
so why not me? I deserve it!”43 Rodger freely admits his desires. On the 
other hand, the same natural order that underwrites Rodger’s entitle-
ment also grounds the cruelty of women and the degeneracy of infe-
rior men. For instance, he writes that “if women had the freedom to 
choose which men to mate with, like they do today, they would breed 
with stupid, degenerate men, which would only produce stupid, degen-
erate offspring. This in turn would hinder the advancement of human-
ity.”44 To work through this contradiction, albeit unsuccessfully, Rodger 
ostensibly charges modernity with abandoning its pursuit of repres-
sion and, therefore, allowing nature to conquer culture. As an exten-
sion of modern individualism, women’s sexual freedom precludes the 
masculine imperative to make nature conform to order. While nature 
anoints men rulers of their dominion, it does so under the condition 
that nature also be subdued in the name of civilization. Hence, Rodger 
reads women’s sexual freedom as a chaotic harbinger of death and 
oppression or, in his words, “a plague that must be quarantined.”45
But Rodger’s claim to inborn dignity is rooted in neither nature nor 
modernity but in the dark spiritual recesses of the fascist imagination. 
That is to say that Rodger imagines the existence of a parallel natu-
ral order that has to date been precluded by the corrupt rise of liber-
alism, an ideology which holds the possibility that women should be 
seen as rights-bearing subjects. Here, modernity has veered away from 
the virtues of order and hierarchy, to which Rodger owes the totality 
of civilizational progress. Thus, toward the end his manuscript, Rod-
ger sketches a dystopian fantasy of totalitarian control and the rigid 
subjugation of the natural instincts. Here he expresses devotion to a 
divinely ordained natural order, though his beliefs cannot be character-
ized as Judeo-Christian. Instead, Rodger’s devotion is directed toward a 
spiritual sense of the will-to-power in which the civilized Übermensch 
embodies the characteristics of a god. He claims “I am like a god, and 
my purpose is to exact ultimate Retribution on all of the impurities I 
see in the world.”46 His references to transcendence and purification 
legitimize and give divine mandate to violence in the process of per-
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fecting the natural order. Modernity is constructed as the enemy of civ-
ilizational progress, as it grants license to women and people of color to 
love and have sex with whomever they wish. Thus, hierarchy and order 
must be imposed to correct for the unnatural order conjured by the 
defenders of liberalism.
In searching for these hidden divine laws, Rodger’s expressions of 
megalomania help reframe his impotence as omnipotence. Put differ-
ently, Rodger imagines a new social order that turns the tables in rec-
ognition that the rights of others are an affront to the spirit of white 
masculinity. The fantasy is apocalyptic and entails the punishment of 
the wicked with extraordinary cruelty in order to consummate a new 
millennial order. His victimization is thus not a consequence of his 
inferiority or weakness, but instead the failure of a cruel and hedo-
nistic world to recognize his likeness to God. He suggests that his vic-
timization proves his superiority. In one passage I wish to quote at 
length, Rodger observes that his rejection from society legitimizes his 
megalomania:
I am not part of the human race. Humanity has rejected me. The 
females of the human species have never wanted to mate with me, 
so how could I possibly consider myself part of humanity? Human-
ity has never accepted me among them, and now I know why. I am 
more than human. I am superior to them all. I am Elliot Rodger . . . 
Magnificent, glorious, supreme, eminent .  .  . Divine! I am the clos-
est thing there is to a living god. Humanity is a disgusting, depraved, 
and evil species. It is my purpose to punish them all. I will purify the 
world of everything that is wrong with it. On the Day of Retribu-
tion, I will truly be a powerful god, punishing everyone I deem to be 
impure and depraved.47
As this passage conveys, the manifesto is saturated with delusions 
of grandeur and expressions of entitlement, mythic superiority, des-
tiny, and greatness. More importantly, violence against those who 
would deny his pre-eminence served as a necessary and inevitable 
correction to an unjust social order. Imagining himself as God posi-
tions women and alpha males as wicked and thus deserved of punish-
ment. He frames his retribution as an act of purification. As such, the 
text implicitly adopts features of the jeremiad, composed as a bitter 
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invective against society’s morals followed by a prophecy of impend-
ing doom.48 As shown here, the more apocalyptic features of the text 
offers men such as Rodger a fantasy in which victimized white men are 
returned to their proper place atop the social hierarchy. At the same 
time, his fantasies of omnipotence and predestination also free Rodger 
from responsibility, ethics, and morality.
Rodger also couches his omnipotence in secular fantasies of wealth 
and social status. The manifesto goes on to argue that riches, fame, and 
sex were owed to him by virtue of birth. Throughout his life, Rodger 
claimed to have been draw to books and movies about people who rose 
to power after being treated unfairly. He recalled spending thousands 
of dollars playing the lottery in the hope that winning would trans-
form him into an alpha male. He was drawn to the magical thinking 
of self-help books such as The Secret and played the lottery obsessively 
in order to fulfill his supposed destiny to be rich and powerful. He 
believed that a collection of cars and mansions would solve his prob-
lems.49 Hence, his manifesto is latent with regal fantasies of control and 
power over those subjects who denied him that to which was entitled. 
He wrote that “I would use my powers to rule the world and set every-
thing right” and “I deserve it, I am magnificent, no matter how much 
the world treated me otherwise.” He continued, “I am the image of 
beauty and supremacy. I kept saying it over and over again, as if it was 
a mantra.”50 Moreover, he suggests, “I wanted to believe that I had the 
POWER to invoke this into my reality. I have craved power and signifi-
cance all my life, and I will stop at nothing to find ways of attaining it.”51 
Rodger understood wealth and power as birthrights; therefore, he pos-
sessed an inalienable right to attain them. Moreover, wealth and power 
are constructed as spiritual forces rewarded to the deserving.
But, if we take his account of life at his word, Rodger did little of 
anything to achieve that which he felt was his birthright. He wanted 
the attention of young women yet only expressed contempt, misog-
yny, and disrespect. Throughout the text he shows neither empathy nor 
emotional reciprocity, let alone feelings of friendship and comradery 
with women. He expressed a desire to be rich and powerful but com-
municated nothing but disdain for his studies and hard work—both of 
which he felt were beneath his station. In short, he did little to make 
himself attractive other than make superficial investments in illusions 
of success: cars, clothing, and get-rich-quick schemes.
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It is curious that Rodger frames his revenge in such grandiose 
terms. Why imagine himself as God? Revisiting past traumas, this time 
as a god, undoubtedly helped domesticate the pain associated with 
remembrance. In narrative form, his traumatic memories are recast as 
meaningful suffering. Aside from the enjoyment of total control, this 
fantasy constitutes an attempt to reclaim the power he believed had 
been unfairly wielded against him by his tormentors. In planning his 
“Day of Retribution” he explains that “the tables will indeed turn . . . I 
will be a god, and they will all be animals that I can slaughter. They are 
animals . . . They behave like animals, and I will slaughter them like the 
animals they are.”52 The metaphor of “turning the tables” to describe 
such profane acts of violence belies the fact that white men not only 
continue to benefit from accrued structural advantages but also are the 
predominant perpetrators of sexual violence against women. Here we 
see how the mixture of inborn dignity, victimization, and scapegoating 
foments gendered fantasies of destruction and retribution. His writ-
ing ennobled the suffering and violence of white men as part of his 
metamorphosis.
Finally, the manifesto concludes with a dystopian vision of the 
future governed by eugenics and the industrially organized repres-
sion of the instincts. The incel community is fond of popular misin-
terpretations of evolutionary psychology to explain women’s sexual 
behavior. Before the thread was deactivated, participants in r/incel 
devoted significant attention to genetic and evolutionary predisposi-
tions, including an obsession with chin size as the distinction between 
”Chads” (alphas) and “incels” among a number of other pseudosci-
entific laws of attraction.53 While some theories are more outlandish 
than others, all seem to agree that genetics, and more importantly 
race, explain their sexual woes. Hence, the real injustice for Rodger 
was that he believed himself to be morally and genetically superior to 
nonwhite men who seemed to have no trouble finding love. In one of 
his many tirades against miscegenation, Rodger directs specific rage 
at dark-skinned men dating blonde white women. Despite his own 
racial lineage, Rodger recounts a moment in which he was humiliated 
by African American teenager. He goes on to make similar remarks 
about Latino and Asian men as well. Rodger summons the myth of the 
Black rapist and the deep culture ambivalence about Black male sex-
uality to legitimize his righteous indignation. For Rodger, Black and 
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Latino sexuality are animalistic and primal; far less refined than that 
of a white gentleman such as himself. Rodger suggests that white men 
have been cuckolded; emasculated and sexually humiliated by Black 
men sleeping with white women. Naturally, eugenic racism, a touch-
stone of European fascism, provided Rodger with additional warrants 
for his turn to violence. More importantly, his thoughts on eugen-
ics, race, and sexuality led him toward a chilling vision of a repressive 
white male autocracy.
The manifesto concludes with elaborate torture fantasies—both 
concrete plans for this “day of retribution” as well as abstractions of 
a society governed by extraordinary cruelty toward women. His fan-
tasies involved mass organized violence against so-called hedonistic 
scum, concentration camps populated with female chattel, and the 
abolition of sex.54 I do not wish to wade through the details of how he 
believed such a “perfect civilization” could be enacted. Suffice it to say 
that the dissonance between his gleeful tone and his portrait of wom-
en’s enslavement is a pre-eminent example of the kind of misogyny 
that underwrites sexual violence against women. Of greater rhetori-
cal significance, however, are the reasons he provides for his dystopian 
investments. One characteristic of apocalyptic manhood is the impulse 
to destroy even the most beloved institutions, organizations, and social 
goods or conventions in response to the demands that other groups be 
permitted to also partake in their enjoyment. This impulse can be sum-
marized by the colloquial phrase “burn it all down!” White masculinity 
is underwritten by a desire to save a beloved object from being tainted 
by the presence of women, queers, and people of color. In other words, 
if I cannot have an object of desire (or, more specifically, I cannot have 
it all to myself), then no one shall. It is fitting, then, that Rodger would 
conclude his manifesto with just such a demand: that the pleasure 
principle be abolished. Although Rodger admits his desire for sex, he 
nonetheless explains, “Sex is by far the most evil concept in existence. 
The fact that life itself exists through sex just proves that life is flawed. 
The act of sex gives human beings a tremendous amount of pleasure. 
Pleasure they don’t deserve. No one deserves to experience so much 
pleasure, especially since some humans get to experience it while some 
are denied it.”55 In short, he concludes, “If I cannot have it, I will do 
everything I can to DESTROY IT.”56 Characteristic of the death drive, 
Rodger takes enjoyment in the destruction of both the very object of 
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his desire and the death of the life instinct. The text exemplifies white 
masculinity’s perverse fascination with death and chaos. Here, death 
offers the absence of tension within the subject, a relief in finality, and 
the ironic inversion “kill to save.”
Rodger’s fascination with death and omnipotence ultimately con-
summates the fascist dream of male autarky. After women’s enslave-
ment, Rodger speculates that “future generations of men would be 
oblivious to these remaining women’s existence, and that is for the 
best. If a man grows up without knowing of the existence of women, 
there will be no desire for sex. Sexuality will completely cease to exist. 
Love will cease to exist.”57 Rodger imagines fascism as a pathway to 
perfect and total repression of the drives. Both men’s and women’s bod-
ies are recast in terms of their pure use-value—husks or envelopes for 
the advancement of civilization. This is a world devoid of any social 
affinity that might bind together the body politic; a dark world with-
out intimacy and a singular allegiance to progress; a world without art, 
creativity, and personal expression. The subject of this fascist imagi-
nary has fully conquered their nature only to be freed to invest in their 
own toil and domination. If we return to Marcuse’s insights about the 
slow eradication of Eros that is demanded in the name of civilization, 
we find that Rodger merely takes the repressive hypothesis to its logical 
conclusion in totalitarianism.
Fascism’s response to expressions of the drives is to glorify the 
total conquest of those libidinal energies that cannot be harnessed 
by the repressive apparatus. For Rodger, such a task would be noth-
ing short of historic. He concludes, “In such a pure world, the man’s 
mind can develop to greater heights than ever before. Future genera-
tions will live their lives free of having to worry about the barbarity of 
sex and women, which will enable them to expand their intelligence 
and advance the human race to a state of perfect civilization.”58 While 
the scenario he presents is preposterous and superlatively violent, it 
exemplifies how white masculine victimhood so easily attaches itself to 
fascist principles. Once one accepts the premise that they are entitled 
to privileges by virtue of birth, and that they have been ordained by 
God and nature to rule, and further, that the advancement of inferior 
social classes unfairly threatens their privilege, talk of hierarchy, order, 
and retribution are not far behind. Elliot Rodger’s manifesto is not an 
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aberration but the politics of white male victimhood extended to its 
logical conclusion.
THE MALE DEATH CULT
Margaret Atwood, author of The Handmaid’s Tale, surmises that “men 
are afraid that women will laugh at them. Women are afraid that men 
will kill them.”59 While spectacular and fantastical, Rodger’s manifesto 
is far less of an outlier than it might be comforting to believe. Expres-
sions of victimhood and the demand for compensation for injustices, 
however slight, resonate with a misogynistic culture in which vio-
lence against women is prevalent. Rodger concludes his story with 
a frightening vision of something resembling Atwood’s Handmaid’s 
Tale in which women are enslaved for reproduction and all nonproc-
reative sex is abolished. In what Rodger calls his “perfect ideology,” 
women’s bodies would be reduced to husks, envelopes, and mere ves-
sels for men’s procreative needs. But this quite far from science fiction 
when you consider that, as Luce Irigaray suggests, women’s bodies in 
a patriarchal culture do not belong to themselves.60 There is only one 
sex, she writes, and that is male. Woman is ceaselessly reduced to an 
exchange commodity, an object trafficked between men, but never a 
subject in and of itself. To that extent, Rodger’s vision builds a futur-
istic totalitarian infrastructure organized around ideas and ambitions 
that exist in the now. He describes women as a “plague” that must be 
eradicated or as “animals” that need to be slaughtered for the com-
mon good. Dispensing with sexuality, the ultimate act of repression, 
he fantasizes about a world of unending progress predicated on wom-
en’s suffering.
Rodger’s fantasy, then, is of endless toil and domination—a fantasy 
in which advanced industrial society has conquered the pleasure prin-
ciple and rendered all nonproductive human capacities and instincts 
obsolete. This utopia is more George Orwell’s 1984 than Aldous Hux-
ley’s Brave New World. Like the totalitarian dreams that precede him, 
Rodger’s fantasy is of civilizational perfection achieved by means of 
industrial mass murder. Female sexuality is the only impediment to 
the perfection of Rodger’s fascist Übermensch: a hyperproductive male 
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body fully dedicated to the repression of the drives. Yet, this is a politics 
animated by the drives. As Marcuse writes, “The education for consent 
to death introduces an element of surrender into life from the begin-
ning—surrender and submission. It stifles ‘utopian’ efforts. The powers 
that be have a deep affinity to death, death is a token of unfreedom, of 
defeat.”61 In this tortured manuscript, death is the animating force of a 
productive society—even reproduction falls under its purview. Here 
the dictates are merely explicit: the life of men is to be underwritten by 
the death of women.
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Sun’s Out, Guns Out
Open Carry and the White Male Body
THE FACEBOOk PAGE  for Open Carry Virginia features a banner pho-
tograph of founder Ed Levine in the midst of running daily errands 
at his local Lowe’s Home Improvement store. Levine is smiling while 
giving the camera an enthusiastic “thumbs up.”1 A holstered handgun 
rests on his right hip in plain sight of the camera. His blue and yel-
low T-shirt reads “Sun’s Out, Guns Out.” The photo conveys a fairly 
lighthearted sentiment toward guns while indexing a kind of perverse 
enjoyment of introducing a deadly weapon into a peaceful civilian con-
text. And while brandishing a handgun in public is not against Virginia 
law, the gleeful image with its accompanying tongue-in-cheek slogan 
suggests that firearms should be not only a routine feature of public 
life but a source of pleasure for those who choose to carry them. To be 
sure, this is not beyond the pale of contemporary gun advocacy. While 
the epidemic of mass shootings might compel some gun activists to 
adopt a more somber tone, Levine’s bravado is the preferred style of 
the open carry movement. A loose collective of gun owners who are 
committed to an unbridled interpretation of the Second Amendment, 
the open carry movement seeks to normalize the public display of 
guns, including both handguns and assault rifles, in the name of public 
safety, personal protection, and above all, liberty.2 Recently, members 
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of the open carry movement have staged protests by carrying assault 
rifles while shopping at Starbucks, Chipotle, Target, among other busi-
nesses that express opposition to the public display of firearms. Some 
groups have protested at the site of mass shootings to counteract calls 
for gun reform.3 A group in Kentucky even protested a children’s lem-
onade stand raising money for Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense.4 
Central to their case is the mythology of “the good guy with a gun”—a 
figure not unlike the minuteman fighting British tyranny or the Wild 
West cowboy protecting homesteaders from American Indians—who 
dispenses with criminals and terrorists that wish to do others harm. 
Although they generally express support for law enforcement, open 
carriers see themselves as a necessary supplement to the directives of 
law and order. They generally oppose any gun control measures and 
believe that gun ownership, particularly gun visibility, is an essential 
bulwark against the tyranny of “big government.”
“Sun’s out, guns out” is hardly the official slogan of the open carry 
movement; yet, this playful rhyme provides an interesting summation 
of the movement’s underlying cultural politics and its connection to 
new forms of men’s rights activism. In one sense, the phrase illustrates 
the movement’s emphasis on illumination and visibility—that guns 
must be seen in the right kind of (sun)light to serve their purpose. 
In another sense, the phrase highlights the long-standing and inter-
changeable relationship between guns and white masculinity. Typically 
printed on summer beachwear, the slogan playfully refers to displaying 
one’s arms (“guns”) in public. That “guns” could just as easily refer to 
large biceps as it could a revolver or semiautomatic rifle suggests that 
firearms are woven into the fabric of masculinity. Hence, this chap-
ter shifts focus away from the affordances of new media and virtual 
men’s rights networks to those of the white male body itself and the 
weapons that extend its power. Here I am concerned with how white 
men come to embody the virulent arguments and angry dispositions 
that also populate men’s rights networks—virtual or otherwise. Unlike 
the protest movements of marginalized communities, open carry con-
cerns the deployment not of unruly bodies but of law-engendering 
bodies.5 Gun protests represent condensations of themes that circulate 
throughout contemporary men’s rights rhetoric, primarily the notion 
that white men have been displaced and subjugated by an oppressive 
feminine state apparatus. The gun is a technology of the body that rein-
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vests the white male subject with the efficacy, sovereignty, and able-
bodiedness that was allegedly confiscated by the oppressive state. The 
gun also affords that white male body to enjoy its own subjectivity—to 
rehearse loss and subjugation but this time as an active rather than pas-
sive agent. Open carry imports the disposition of men’s rights activism 
into public space—casting a shroud of death over anyone who wishes 
to challenge white male authority.
Guns are virtually synonymous with the white male body. There 
is no shortage of gun metaphors one can draw from to index sex acts 
that privilege the male anatomy.6 Consider lurid masculinist meta-
phors such as “banging” to refer to sexual intercourse, “blowing” for 
oral sex, “shooting a load” for ejaculation, and “firing blanks” to refer 
to male infertility. Guns are also symbolically interchangeable with 
body parts (“firearms,” “handgun”) or help operationalize the anatomy 
(“trigger finger,” “dead eye”). “Sun’s out, guns out,” then, implores gun 
owners to flex their muscles in public and to show off their physical 
prowess to criminals and law-abiders alike. The phrase gestures at the 
phallocentrism that underwrites American gun culture and that con-
veys male dominance, power, and sexual primacy. As C. Richard King 
argues, “guns provide a language for talking about sex, offering a set of 
culture metaphors, similar to those made available by other symbolic 
domains, such as sports or animals, the inscribe power and conscribe 
pleasure. For several hundred years, firearms have provided a fecund 
sexual vocabulary, noteworthy for its flexibility and productivity, which 
describes bodies, acts, and relationships.”7 Hence, it is no coincidence 
that white masculine archetypes tend to be virile gunslingers: cowboys, 
frontier lawmen, militia men, hunters, and soldiers, to name a few. The 
phallocentrism of gun culture is not premised on the demographics of 
gun ownership alone but instead on the symbolic and substitution log-
ics that render guns co-extensive of white male power. As surrogates, 
the display of guns in public helps organize worshipfulness, adherence, 
and obedience to white male authority. This chapter argues that guns 
are a technology of the white male body, a prosthetic that affords its 
user the ability to project power over others.
In another sense, the gun itself is a conduit to the fantasy of white 
masculine redemption. Gun are not only prosthetics, then, but medi-
ums for traversing the fantasy of redemptive violence. The unification 
of gun and body constitutes an embodied rhetoric that engenders the 
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unification of incorporeal signifiers, symbols, and ideas in a concrete 
material form.8
Although women and people of color also engage in open carry, 
guns and gun aesthetics in American culture are as much raced as 
they are gendered. In addition to phallocentrism, here we might also 
consider how the racist association between Blackness and criminal-
ity renders African American participation in open carry inherently 
violent and threatening to white communities. The history of gun 
ownership in America demonstrates that the Second Amendment is 
intertwined with the history of white supremacy. In part, the Second 
Amendment was conceived in the interests of the slave-owning class 
who sought to enlist voluntary militias to disarm and return escaped 
slaves.9 Throughout Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era, the Ku Klux 
Klan terrorized and confiscated weapons from freed slaves, creating a 
virtual white monopoly on gun ownership throughout the South. For 
the many Black communities terrorized by the KKK and the police, 
gun ownership was a life or death imperative. It is for this reason that 
Bobby Seale, Huey Newton, and the Black Panther Party would later 
embrace open carry as a militant symbol of community self-defense.10 
At any rate, within the rhetoric of firearms, advocacy of the “good guy 
with a gun” is implicitly white.
Nowhere is this racial disparity more transparent than in how law 
enforcement responds to legal gun possession in public. In 2014 a Black 
man named John Crawford was shot and killed in an Ohio Walmart for 
carrying a toy rifle that he was about to purchase. In that same year, 
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was shot and killed for brandishing a toy 
gun that police say they mistook for a pistol. In 2016 Philando Cas-
tile was shot by police on a routine traffic stop after disclosing that 
he was in possession of a legally concealed firearm. In all these cases, 
the officers were not charged with a crime. By contrast, in 2017 two 
white men (Jason Craig Baker and Brandon Vreeland) staged an open 
carry protest in the lobby of the Dearborn, Michigan, Police Depart-
ment, masked with balaclavas and armed with body armor and assault 
rifles. The two were subdued without a shot fired. At the 2016 open 
carry protests in Dallas and at the Republican National Convention 
in Cleveland, the police showed remarkable patience and deference 
to groups of white men dressed in paramilitary gear and brandishing 
deadly assault rifles. These contrasting anecdotes suggest not only that 
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white gun owners assume less risk when carrying firearms in public 
but that for white communities “the bad guy with a gun” is implicitly 
Black. This assumption is remarkable given that since 1982 an over-
whelming majority of mass shooters have been white and male.11 Yet, 
carrying guns in public is predominantly the prerogative of white men, 
who occupy a privileged position in relation to the law. White men are 
not only permitted exception from the rule of law but are ostensibly 
delegated the sovereign power to make decisions about who lives and 
dies in the name of both liberty and public safety.
With the gendered and racial politics in clear view, this chapter 
explores how the public display of guns figures into the rhetoric of 
white male victimhood and recuperative logics of white male power. 
I argue that the open carry movement extends the argument of men’s 
rights networks and reasserts white male sovereignty over public space 
by manufacturing shocking image events that prompt spectators to 
respect and fear white men’s phallic power.12 Rather than focus on the 
verbal arguments offered in favor of open carry, this chapter is con-
cerned with the gendered and racialized embodiments of gun cul-
ture. Thus, I attend to guns in public as signifiers of white male power. 
Through an exploration of the embodied dimensions of American 
gun culture, I identify three ways in which the open carry movement 
enacts a men’s rights politic and courts manly investment in victim-
hood. First, the public display of guns consummates the fantasy of an 
oppressive state and therefore manufactures the conditions that call 
forth aggrieved white men to reclaim the polity. The result is a hyper-
militarized public that favors the de facto authority of white men. Sec-
ond, the phallic symbolism of guns offers proof that white masculinity 
retains its potency and, therefore, compensates for white men’s sym-
bolic castration by the “nanny state.” Finally, displaying guns recovers 
the symbolic efficiency of white masculine archetypes (cowboy, solider, 
militia)—all of which conflate white masculine authority with law and 
order. Ultimately, gun displays threaten those who might challenge 
white masculinity by restructuring public space to keep white men safe 
while making public life precarious for women and people of color. 
Moreover, guns constitute part of a persecution fantasy wherein civil 
norms, progressivism, and big government have collapsed and there-
fore necessitate the building of a new social order organized around 
the resurrection of white masculine sovereignty.
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GUNS AND EMBODIMENT
Despite the recent wave of gun reform protests, open carry is only pro-
hibited in three states (California, Florida, and Illinois) and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Two states (New York and South Carolina) narrow 
the right to long guns, while three states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
and New Jersey) permit only handguns. There are no federal laws that 
prohibit the open carry of firearms, and while there are some permit- 
and place-based exemptions (schools, public transportation, state-
owned businesses, and places that serve alcohol), in most cases the 
right to open carry is generally not infringed.13 Moreover, the lobbying 
efforts of the National Rifle Association ostensibly preclude the pas-
sage of state or national gun reform despite popular support for policies 
such as universal background checks.14 With the general trend toward 
gun law liberalization, it is remarkable that gun advocacy has become 
more aggressive and vitriolic over the past decade. In part, the NRA 
has manufactured a narrative in which any form of gun control can 
be construed as a surreptitious effort to disarm the public and pave 
the pathway to tyranny. This narrative was particularly salient during 
the Obama administration, particularly within the radical fringes of the 
Tea Party movement.15 Some extreme gun advocates took up conspiracy 
theories that explained mass shootings as pseudo-events manufactured 
by the Obama administration and the liberal media to justify disarm-
ing the public. Following the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School on February 18, 2018, trending pro-gun posts on Reddit 
and YouTube suggested that vocal student support for gun reform was 
the work of paid crisis actors—an elaborate hoax orchestrated by the 
left.16 While gun advocates remain convinced that gun confiscation is 
just around the corner, the evidence seems to suggest otherwise.
If it is true that Second Amendment rights are not in jeopardy, it is 
worth asking what needs are addressed or, more specifically, what fan-
tasy is consummated by the narrative of an oppressive state hell-bent 
on gun confiscation? What new configurations of white masculinity 
are made possible by an investment in both gun possession and gun 
confiscation?
Linda Collins answers this question by illustrating how supporters 
of an unbridled Second Amendment organize around a demand poli-
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tics that cannot and must not be fulfilled if the subject is to purchase a 
marginalized subject position.17 It is the demand itself (and hence, its 
denial) that is foundational to the group’s identity. Using Lundberg’s 
theorization of the demand, Collins argues that gun advocates need a 
narrative of victimization in order to enjoy their subjectivity.18 Much 
like a hypochondriac, the enjoyment in Second Amendment rhetoric is 
in the lodging of the complaint.19 Open carry is a way to revisit loss but 
this time change one’s disposition from passive to active.
Unbridled Second Amendment defenders also see gun ownership 
as an immutable identity category (much like race), and hence view any 
restrictions as an affront to an aggrieved class. Some gun owners believe 
they are more vulnerable than other marginalized groups because anti-
discrimination law offers them no special protections or civil remedies, 
unlike racial and sexual minorities. Collins illustrates how, underwrit-
ten by the compulsive repetition of the death drive, open carry advo-
cates take a stake in their own marginalization, for it offers them the 
ability to procure their subjectivity as an aggrieved class. Their por-
trait of an oppressive government that is brutally indifferent to liberty 
and the cause of the gun owner is necessary to prolong the enjoyment 
entailed in displaying firearms in public. At the same time, the oppres-
sive state must also be feckless and weak (feminine) if the well-armed 
citizenry is to succeed. Ultimately, however, open carry constitutes an 
identity movement that, while open to almost anyone, has particular 
resonance with white men because it offers them an antistatist identity 
politic without reference to whiteness. The gun functions metonymi-
cally, and thus can be read as a stand-in for white identity without ever 
having to reference whiteness or maleness as the key identity categories 
that are actually at stake. As guns are already synonymous with white 
male power and white male history, a politics organized around gun 
possession becomes an easy route to an aggrieved identity without hav-
ing to utter “white power” or “men’s rights.”
While the myth of a well-armed public fighting a tyrannical gov-
ernment discloses the affective investments in gun ownership as an 
identity category, much of the rhetorical work of American gun culture 
is visual and embodied. As Barry Brummett writes, “It is the style and 
the mass of people displaying or performing that style who make up the 
gun culture. The style and mass provides a core of signification, a set 
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of signs and practices with symbolic gravity that draws toward the core 
of an imaginary community and certain subject positions.”20 While 
the technical features (caliber, firepower, accuracy, magazine capacity) 
and utilitarian attributes (fighting tyranny, hunting, self-protection) 
of guns matter a great deal to those who carry them, open carry is 
primarily concerned with how the aesthetic quality of guns and gun 
culture convey the gravity of their cause. In other words, public gun 
displays provide proof that “the people” called into being by the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Preamble to the US Constitution—not 
government—are sovereign. The publicly brandished firearm begs an 
oppressive state to show its ugliness and, thus, creates the very con-
ditions that necessitate gun ownership in the first place.21 For exam-
ple, consider the provocative slogan adopted by the Texas open carry 
movement: “Come and Take It.”22
Guns embody the argument and disposition of the new men’s rights 
rhetoric. In other words, carrying guns transforms the body into a syn-
ecdoche for the aggrieved white male subject. By embodiment, then, I 
mean the way by which expressions take material form and give con-
crete presence to abstract principles, many of which are hard to articu-
late because they exceed the capacity of language. As Sonja Modesti 
writes, embodiment is “the radically material condition of humanity 
that necessarily entails both the body and consciousness, objectivity, 
and subjectivity.”23 Thus, we find in the materiality of guns the poten-
tial not only to open up the capacities of the body to assert control 
over others but also to symbolically convey the demand politics of the 
white male subject. The gun, in assemblage with the white male body, 
overflows with the iconicity of justified violence. In popular mythol-
ogy, guns won the nation’s independence, defeated tyranny abroad, and 
“civilized” the continent.24 At the same time, gun advocates often por-
tray guns as innocent, or at the very least, neutral (i.e., “guns don’t kill 
people, people kill people”). In the hands of white men, guns are vir-
tually synonymous with power and authority, law and order, freedom 
and liberty. The gun transforms the white male body into an instru-
ment or extension of the law.
Yet, this performance is delicate and contingent. Although the 
open carriers wish to convey to the public the more heroic virtues of 
guns, the sight of firearms also cites a history of terror and mass death. 
Since 1968 more Americans have died in gun-related incidents than all 
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American soldiers lost in combat since 1776.25 Even as some open carri-
ers seek to resignify guns outside the context of crime and mass shoot-
ings, where the supporter might read virtue, the skeptic may only see 
the threatening capacity to render a death sentence. My task here is not 
to evaluate the relative safety or efficacy of guns but instead to illustrate 
how the visibility of guns organizes public life around the imperatives 
of the white male body. To unpack how the public display of guns fig-
ures into the politics of white masculine victimhood, I attend to the 
embodied entailments of guns and gun culture that privilege white 
men’s authority to make decisions about who lives and who dies. Gun 
visibility operates as a series of signs that reference both white men’s 
aggrievements and their virtually monopoly on institutional power. 
Hence, the remainder of this chapter unfolds by attending to visual 
enactments of white male power embodied in the practice of open 
carry. Each set of images and image events reveals the racialized and 
gendered entanglements of displaying guns in public. Seeking defer-
ence to their authority, open carry shows spectators what society looks 
like when it is structured according to the prerogatives of white male 
sovereignty. Here I draw from Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples’s 
concept of the image event, a visually stunning occurrence staged for 
popular consumption in a culture of screens. Image events are those 
moments that interrupt, disrupt, or otherwise stand out among a 
media ecology that is saturated in images. As such, open carry shocks 
and visually commands the spectator’s attention, particularly where 
the intent of the carrier is unclear. Guns cast a silhouette of death 
over public life by prioritizing violence as the precondition of a civil 
existence.26 Given the gun’s metonymic relationship with white male 
identity, open carry functions as a theater for white men’s concerns, 
priorities, and grievances. Using the aforementioned three proposi-
tions about the relationship between gun culture and white masculin-
ity, I engage a series of images from open carry rallies to unpack the 
embodied capacities of the armed white male body.
THE OPPRESSIVE STATE
The open carry movement is underwritten by tension between two 
conflicting impulses. On the one hand, the movement organizes 
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against a tyrannical government that is determined to disarm the citi-
zenry. It is under these conditions that gun owners forge an opposi-
tional and marginalized identity. On the other hand, the movement 
is fervently patriotic and expresses reverence for the military and law 
enforcement—the very instruments of the oppressive state against 
which they have mobilized. Thus, open carriers must confront the 
oppressive state without overtly usurping white male authority. One 
way in which the movement addresses this tension is to cast the state as 
emasculated by women and cuckolded by inferior men. Even the mas-
culinity of the NRA is not immune from scrutiny. For instance, a post 
on the Nevada open carry blog suggests that “All you [the NRA] know 
is compromise and loss. So like a cuckold husband who feels ‘empow-
ered’ watching another man sleep with his wife, the NRA is a willing 
accomplice to the gun control agenda.”27 The movement then separates 
itself from this compromised masculinity by reclaiming American 
men’s revolutionary roots in the form of the voluntary militia.28
Visually, this tensions plays out through the movement’s well-
choreographed interactions with law enforcement. While open carri-
ers often show deference to law enforcement, they also supplant their 
authority by showing off superior firepower and preparation for violent 
contingencies. Some open carriers coordinate their activities as a unit, 
dressing in similar paramilitary gear (including camouflage and body 
armor), and carry loaded AR-15s AK-47s, and G3s. In many cases their 
armaments and equipment far surpass that of local police.29 While 
open carriers often interact amicably with police, going out of their 
way to shake hands and converse about weapons, they also upstage law 
enforcement with a disproportionate display of firepower. As represen-
tatives of the state working under its constraints and regulations, the 
police are made to look meek, fat, and powerless when contrasted with 
their virile and heavily armed counterparts. I contend that open carry 
distinguishes itself from the compromised and constrained masculin-
ity of the state without getting too proximate to the fantasy of insurrec-
tional violence. Rather than confront the state with open warfare, open 
carry relies on the menacing aesthetics of assault rifles and paramili-
tary uniforms to embarrass and humiliate the state, suggesting that it 
is incapable of adequately protecting its own citizens. In doing so, they 
also lay claim to a seemingly more authentic version of white mascu-
linity, consummated through the visual threat of armed insurrection.
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Here, I want to pause on two images of the West Ohio Minutemen 
engaging with police at the 2016 Republican National Convention in 
Cleveland. According to the group, the purpose of their gathering was 
unrelated to Donald Trump or the Republican platform, but instead 
was motivated by the imperatives of community protection.30 Cit-
ing shootings of police officers in Baton Rouge and Dallas, the Cleve-
land police union unsuccessfully petitioned Governor John Kasich to 
temporarily suspend open carry leading up to the RNC.31 The police’s 
public opposition to open carry provided an ideal context for the Min-
utemen to align themselves against an oppressive yet feckless state 
apparatus. As such, the optics of the event featured an ineffectual, fear-
ful, and emasculated police force upstaged by a hypermasculine patri-
otic militia. In the first image (figure 1), six Minutemen surround a lone 
officer standing next to a police cruiser. Each man carries a military-
style assault rifle slung over his shoulder and resting on his chest. The 
men cast a stern gaze at the police officer. The man at the center of the 
frame and closest to the police offer appears to tilt his right shoulder 
slightly forward, his right hand covering the trigger of his rifle, so as 
to give the officer a clear view. His left hand freely lingers near his hol-
stered side arm, and his eyes remain fixed on the officer’s face, observ-
ing his reaction. By contrast, the officer appears to be smiling. His eyes 
are downcast, and his sun glasses are pulled back to provide an unen-
cumbered view of the rifle. While his posture seems relaxed, his right 
hand rests on his holstered sidearm. His left arm rests on something 
obscured by a man in the foreground. The officer is noticeably less 
physically fit than the Minutemen, with extra weight around his stom-
ach and waist. His official black police uniform sharply contrasts with 
the group’s paramilitary aesthetic.
This image captures a power reversal at work between the state 
and the people. Within the frame, the officer is outnumbered and out-
gunned by the Minutemen. His authority and capability to keep public 
order is called into question by the presence of a self-deputized armed 
citizenry. The men embody an alternative to civilian law enforcement 
that is more capable of keeping the public safe. The Minutemen appear 
to be more unconstrained, militaristic and tribal. Their overwhelming 
numbers suggest that distrust of government and civilian law enforce-
ment is warranted. That is to say that the Minutemen present them-
selves to be more serious and vigilant than the police when it comes to 
Fig 1
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the task of maintaining public safety. Yet, these intimidating men also 
threaten the existing institutions charged with maintaining law and 
order. With the officer encircled, the group commands his gaze toward 
their powerful armaments. Likewise, the event invites the spectator to 
observe the contrast between each weapon at the center of the image. 
The Minuteman boastfully presents his large, high-caliber automatic 
rifle for the officer’s closer inspection. In response, the officer reaches 
for his small sidearm all the while seeming to admire his counterpart’s 
superior firepower. The two are sizing each other up.
While making an embodied argument in favor of an armed citi-
zenry over a feckless civilian government, the protestor’s actions also 
emasculate the state. As an emissary of an oppressive government, the 
officer cannot help but admire and express deference to a superior and 
more intimidating form of masculine power. Emboldened by their 
phallic weapons, the militia are able to visually impose their will on 
the officer. Rather than draw his weapon, the officer’s keeps it holstered 
and smiles. This image invites a comparison between different forms 
of white masculinity: one constrained by the rules of civilian govern-
ment, the other unbridled and primal. Confronted by hypermasculine 
challengers, the officer’s admiring gaze admits the inadequacy and inef-
FIGURE 1. Ohio Minutemen gathering at the 2016 RNC. Photo courtesy of Peter Larson.
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ficacy of civilian authority. Here the sovereign power of the militia man 
supplants the authority of the state to govern the public. The protestor’s 
actions force a series of contrasts between hard and soft bodies; long 
and small guns; authentic and phony authority. As an image event that 
embodies the movement’s core principles, such an interaction between 
open carriers and the police calls into question the state’s monopoly on 
masculine authority—but not masculine authority writ large. The com-
promised masculinity of the state is subverted by the primal masculin-
ity of the tribe or militia. These image events humiliate police, as they 
are not permitted to carry such overwhelming firepower. Such interac-
tions visually illustrate the impotence of the state against the portrait of 
the self-sufficient and well-armed individualist. In short, the protestors’ 
gun displays exclaim “ours is bigger than yours!” In this moment, it is 
the state that should fear the militia, not the other way around.
In other instances, open carriers go out of their way to show respect 
for law enforcement. In one sense, shaking hands with police offi-
cers communicates the group’s peaceful intentions—that they, too, 
are “good guys with guns.” While the open carrier visually upstages 
the police, he also keeps himself at a safe proximity from the fantasy 
of armed insurrection. In other words, visual armed insurrection is 
enacted as an ersatz substitute for the visceral pleasure of violence.
In another sense, politely greeting police while heavily armed con-
cretizes the connection between the law and white male authority. As 
stated earlier, there is a pronounced racial disparity in police treatment 
of guns in public. Moreover, the same conservative news outlets that 
praise open carry when it is conducted by predominantly white citizens 
also express fear and outrage at the sight of Black liberation organiza-
tions doing so in the name of civil rights and self-defense.32 Although 
the state must be cast as oppressive for gun owners to lay claim to their 
victimhood status, images of handshakes neither undermine such 
claims nor are a sign of capitulation to the state. Instead, the perfor-
mance of amity between white police officers and white open carriers 
codifies white sovereignty over public space. In these exchanges, it is 
the prerogative of white men to police the public, regardless of state 
sanction. Moreover, the authority of the police is provisionally granted 
by the (white male) citizenry rather than by the state.
Another striking performance (figure 2) at the 2016 RNC illustrates 
how open carriers visually enact white authority over public space. 
118 •  C H A P T E R 4
In this image, a Minuteman halts as he crosses the street to shake the 
hand of a police officer. The Minuteman is accompanied by several of 
his compatriots, all of them dressed in camouflage with rifles strapped 
to their chests. One man leans his right arm forward, where it is met 
by the police officer’s embrace. The Minuteman appears to be directly 
addressing the officer—his facial expressions conveying solemnity 
and earnestness. Although his back is to the camera, the officer’s arm 
extends his body forward to meet the Minuteman’s gesture of respect. 
Two of the Minuteman’s companions watch the officer closely and ten-
tatively, seeming to gauge his reception of the greeting. Another officer, 
partially visible in the left foreground on the photograph, is smiling 
as he appears to engage in conversation with one of the Minutemen 
bringing up the rear of the group. A lone flag flies at half-mast in the 
background, completing a portrait of reverence for the sacrifices of the 
police and the military.
One interpretation is that the Minutemen are performing defer-
ence to the authority of the law. This interpretation might privilege a 
strategic narrative in which the Minutemen must convey their respect 
for police in order to demonstrate that they are not a threat to public 
safety. Another interpretation, the one I wish to argue for here, is that 
the act conveys only the provisional authority of the police granted 
by the people rather than the state. The authority that remains static 
in this image is that of the larger identity category that subsumes and 
accounts for the character of each party: whiteness. Here, the white 
male citizen and the white police officer—both armed yet represent-
ing different visions of the polity—find common ground in the pub-
lic streets. The handshake demonstrates precisely the operation of 
whiteness in public—a series of informal though structural advantages 
accorded to white people that un-races and normalizes white identity.33 
As a result, white people are unburdened of having to consider whether 
their identity—particularly when carrying a deadly weapon—will be 
a factor in how others treat them. As this image illustrates, the abil-
ity to approach and make physical contact with a police officer while 
being heavily armed with a militia in tow is a superlative embodiment 
of white privilege. That such a gesture would be read by police as an 
expression of respect rather than a threat of bodily harm speaks to how 
whiteness and white privilege are implicitly aligned with law and order. 
Here, two groups of white authorities share in the privilege of policing 
Fig 2
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the public. Their amity quite literally halts traffic and invites others to 
take notice. The Minutemen’s ability to carry assault rifles with the tacit 
support of law enforcement and without being considered a threat to 
public safety suggests that whiteness and the law are virtually synony-
mous. Their handshake extends and entrusts the official capacity of law 
enforcement to the white armed citizenry. By returning the gesture of 
respect, the police symbolically devolve the tacit power of the law to an 
extralegal, unbridled, and unregulated militia.
Ultimately, friendly encounters with police are a necessary coun-
terpart to direct confrontation. That is, open carriers must remind the 
police that they serve the people without subverting authority in gen-
eral and white authority in particular. They must generate an optics 
of an oppressive state without ceding the agency of the armed mili-
tia. Either way, these image events constitute a spectacle of white male 
authority in which the compromised masculinity of the state is sup-
planted by the authentic manhood of the rugged individual. Ultimately, 
these choreographed interactions between the police and gun owners 
function as a form of ritual purification of white masculinity. In other 
words, the protests symbolically purge the emasculating force of the 
liberal “nanny state” from public life. In forming a revolutionary mili-
tia to fight the tyranny, open carriers revive the imagined masculinity 
of the nation’s founders. In seizing the public eye, they renew and con-
FIGURE 2. Ohio Minutemen greeting police at the 2016 RNC. Photo courtesy of kyle Grillot.
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cretize the imagined relationship between white masculinity and the 
law. The movement presents the public with a hegemonic portrait of “a 
good guy with a gun”: a self-deputized white man.
PHALLIC PANIC
It is perhaps painfully obvious to observe that guns and gun culture 
are phallocentric; however, connecting this observation to white men’s 
attachment to trauma evinces how displaying guns in public procures 
for white men a sense of order in what otherwise seems to be a cha-
otic social and economic context. Hence, brandishing big guns might 
be read as a response to castration anxiety. The threat of castration 
ceaselessly returns trauma to the male subject, operating as an exi-
gence for the continual restaging of male subjectivity. Castration com-
pels men to disavow their oedipal desires and assimilate into the law 
of the figural father. What is at stake, Silverman surmises, “is a psychic 
disintegration—the disintegration, that is, of a bound and armored ego, 
predicated upon the illusion of coherence and control.”34 Phallocen-
trism, then, is a form of symbolic prosthesis that both staves off the 
threat of castration and extends male power, domination, and control. 
Displaying guns, then, demands that spectators attend to the power 
of phallus and, in doing so, observe that white masculinity—though 
wounded—has not lost its potency. Put differently, guns are white male 
power by another name. Their naked display of male toughness and 
aggression reorganizes public life in ways that privilege white male 
needs—psychic or otherwise. In King’s words, guns “center on men: 
pursuit, predation, precision, dominance, aggression, toughness, con-
quest, and immediacy.”35 Thus, guns in public normalize a social order 
underwritten by the tacit threat of white masculine violence. Open 
carry is a practice that (re)masculinizes the public sphere.
Here I focus attention on the symbolic entailment of open carry 
in mundane commercial spaces. While public rallies are politically 
organized spectacles that confront the state, open carriers also seek to 
normalize guns by introducing them into everyday situations, often 
targeting restaurants, groceries, sporting goods and department stores 
who have expressed opposition to customers brandishing firearms in 
their establishment. Although open carriers argue that people’s fear 
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of guns (hoplophobia) should not negate their right to carry, police 
are often flooded with 911 calls from customers and employees who 
have no way of distinguishing a “good guy with a gun” from a mass 
shooter.36 Aside from terrifying citizens as they eat or shop, the dis-
playing of guns symbolically extends white male power into every-
day spaces. Perhaps because of its informality, this is perhaps a more 
shocking display of guns than the coordinated public performances 
that are characteristic of open carry rallies.
The movement’s choice of commercial spaces as a staging ground is 
not solely premised on business opposition to open carry, but instead 
can be read as an anxious response to the transformations in the gen-
dered division of labor within the commercial sphere—a primary con-
cern for men’s rights activists. The so-called he-cession describes a 
conservative media phenomenon that promoted the notion that white 
men have been the most disproportionately affected by the lingering 
effects of the 2008 recession.37 As the narrative is told, white men’s dis-
location in the marketplace was amplified by both more women enter-
ing the workforce and affirmative action programs that put men at a 
significant disadvantage. Meanwhile, workplace sexual harassment 
policies have men wondering whether that innocent joke they told to 
their female co-worker will get them fired. Kimmel’s interviews with 
“angry white men” reveal the extent to which many feel emasculated 
by their dead-end, unskilled service industry jobs.38 While white men’s 
pain and frustration are real, given the overwhelming data that white 
men are still objectively well-off in the workforce compared with oth-
ers, the narrative of masculine precarity is suspect. But, there are seem-
ingly other emasculating forces at work. The increase in dual-career 
households has men sharing in domestic duties once coded as femi-
nine, including child care, cooking, and shopping. I have argued else-
where that as men have taken on a greater share of feminine home 
care labor, popular culture has helped ease their transition by recod-
ing some aspects of women’s work as manly.39 For example, men have 
been authorized to think of shopping as hunting, competition, games-
manship, and/or an expression of shrewd masculine know-how.40 As 
a source of economic and gender anxiety, the consumer marketplace 
is where white men are most vocal about their feelings of vulnerabil-
ity. Thus, the militarization and masculinization of commercial space 
enables white men to reassert power over forces that feel beyond their 
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control. I read this form of open carry as an expression of phallocen-
trism that addresses white men’s vulnerability by reasserting the pri-
macy of men’s power (the phallus) in spaces coded as feminine.
For instance, Figure 3 features Texas open carry activist Kory Wat-
kins shopping at his local Kroger grocery store. Watkins was a libertar-
ian candidate for the Texas governorship and the leader of Open Carry 
Tarrant County, a splinter group of the Texas open carry movement 
that is opposed to gun licenses and background checks. Watkins is 
known for carrying rifles and handguns into local businesses and chain 
department stores as a form of gun advocacy. This image was featured 
on Watkins’s Facebook page and circulated online after Moms Demand 
Gun Action started a petition for Kroger to prohibit firearms in their 
stores.41 In this image, the gun takes the scene hostage by introducing 
an implicit threat of violence. Much like those of his militia counter-
parts, Watkins’s large weapon recasts the relative peace and securing 
of commercial life as a tentatively thin veneer under which lurks the 
constant threat of criminal violence. Yet, Watkins presents himself not 
as part of voluntary militia but as an ordinary civilian conducting his 
daily errands. He is dressed casually in khaki shorts, a blue polo shirt, 
and a white fedora. With the exception of his rifle, the image is fairly 
ordinary and would otherwise attract little attention. Watkins merely 
pushes his cart of groceries through the aisles of his local grocery store. 
The introduction of the gun is discordant and thus renders the mun-
dane and everyday as spectacular and menacing. The feminine realm 
of shopping and consumer culture is reframed as a masculine theater 
of justified violence—a space that could not peacefully exist on its own 
without the civilizing influence of the gun.42
It is perhaps unlikely that any individual will need an assault rifle 
at the grocery store; however, the efficacy of guns is beside the point. 
Instead, the image politics exemplified in this photo illustrate how the 
brandishing of guns both genders public space and organizes men’s 
relationship to feminized space. An important aspect of the “good guy 
with a gun” myth is that when presented with danger, ordinary men 
might transform into masculine superheroes. This myth particularly 
resonates in spaces where white men lack primacy and agency. The 
fantasies stoked by gun culture suggest that the low-skilled service 
industry worker and the emasculated organizational man alike can be 
redeemed through the judicious use of violence. To enter the putatively 
Fig 3
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feminine realm of shopping armed with a long gun reasserts the pri-
macy of the phallus in all aspects of public and commercial life. More-
over, the presence of guns demonstrates how men may be permitted to 
enter feminized spaces without losing their claim to manhood. Here, 
the gun functions as a proxy for physical endowment that corroborates 
the subject’s virility and power. The gun penetrates and rules over a 
space whose purveyors wrongly assumed that male violence would no 
longer be necessary to enforce civility among the populous. The act 
implies that, one way or another, the commercial sphere will be sub-
jected to masculine control—the only question is whether his inten-
tions are benign or not. By suggesting that guns are appropriate in the 
context of even the most mundane of daily chores, this discordant per-
formance confirms that there is no space or place beyond white men’s 
rule.
What is more, the act addresses white men’s intense feelings of inse-
curity in the commercial sphere by projecting a fantasy of invulnerabil-
ity. His rifle casually slung over his shoulder, hand gently resting on the 
trigger, Watkins’s confident gaze back toward the camera communi-
cates a sense of calm self-assuredness. This image is a stark contrast to 
the anxiety expressed by white men concerning outsourcing, diversity, 
immigrant labor, and the like. Where economic precarity might dis-
place some men from the workforce or relegate them to feminine care 
labor, the gun reminds the spectator that men’s power and strength 
FIGURE 3. kory Watkins open carrying at kroger grocery store. Facebook.
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remain necessary for peace and security. To accomplish this objec-
tive, the publicly exposed gun violates and coerces the spectator into 
a relationship of involuntary voyeurism, wherein they are expected 
to admire and respect the signifiers of men’s power. The gun’s inter-
changeable and metonymic relationship with white masculinity makes 
an emphatic statement about the irreplaceability of white men in any 
context in which the gun is presented. Men need not feel castrated or 
emasculates by economic forces that have somewhat minimized white 
male primacy in the market. Open carry domesticates those fears by 
offering white men an illusory portrait of control and self-mastery.
Finally, Watkins’s actions expand the parameters of white mascu-
linity’s police function beyond the official security apparatus. Unlike 
the Ohio Minutemen, Watkins is dressed as a civilian performing daily 
routines. He is not, by contrast, acting in the capacity of a soldier, 
police officer, or voluntary militia. But the presence of guns elevates 
those daily routines to civic duties. Thus, Watkins’s portrayal of gun 
ownership is less formal but nonetheless important. This iteration of 
open carry expands the definition of civic duty to include securitiza-
tion in the absence of formal institutions. It is the individual (the sov-
ereign citizen) who must take up the roles once ceded by the people to 
government authority. Read in this context, open carry invites spec-
tators to think of the relative security of civic and commercial life as 
dependent on the threat of judicious white male violence. The provi-
sional freedom and security of civilian spaces seems to only thinly veil 
the more chaotic and violent aspects of human nature. Moreover, if 
the state security apparatus represents tyranny, policing the public falls 
squarely on the shoulders of the individual. Put simply, this iteration 
of open carry asks the viewer to think of public and commercial life 
as inherently dangerous. There is no aspect of daily life that men with 
guns cannot make more secure. Watkins presents himself as fulfilling 
white men’s unique civic duty.
In sum, this civilian portrait of open carry normalizes the threat of 
white masculine violence. Displaying guns in peaceful civilian contexts 
coerces spectators to accept the inevitability of white male rule and 
extorts respect or fear of white men’s power. For white men, the phallic 
symbolic economy of gun culture domesticates those threats and chal-
lenges that might otherwise invalidate their primacy in all aspects of 
social and commercial life. In short, the embodied argument presented 
O P E N C A R RY A N D T H E W H I T E MA L E B O DY •  125
to the viewer is that the tentative peace we enjoy as civilians is always 
already underwritten by the phallus. The “good guy with a gun” myth 
suggests that participation in gun culture is also an escape from the 
emasculating forces of service work and mindless consumerism. Open 
carry transforms mundane care labor such as shopping into an occa-
sion for emasculated men to become action heroes. As a substitute for 
lack, the gun offers white men a sense of mastery against disorienting 
social and economic changes.
PLAYING COWBOY
During the Republican primary campaign leading up to the 2017 spe-
cial election, Trump-backed senatorial candidate Luther Strange ran a 
series of campaign ads that accused his opponent Roy Moore of being 
“soft” in his support of the Second Amendment.43 Not to be outdone, 
Moore responded to this thinly veiled attack on his manhood by expos-
ing his .32 revolver at a September 25, 2017, campaign rally. Rebuk-
ing his opponent’s claims, Moore held up his handgun and declared 
“I believe in the Second Amendment.”44 Lest his constituents believe 
him to be flaccid, Moore bolstered his masculine authority by dress-
ing as a cowboy, complete with a white cowboy hat, leather vest, and 
American flag lapel pin. Later, Moore arrived on horseback to cast his 
ballot on Election Day. Although Moore was unsuccessful in his bid 
for the Senate (narrowly defeated by Democrat Doug Jones), his cam-
paign stunt attracted national attention by challenging de facto taboos 
against displaying firearms in public. This event is notable, as Moore 
extended the open carry cause beyond the practices I outlined earlier, 
including normalization, militarization, and reverent memorialization 
of the volunteer militia. Instead, Moore made open carry a test of fit-
ness for public office. Rapidly circulating throughout American media 
culture, this moment was a spectacular demonstration of virility and 
white male authority, an asymmetrical escalation in a masculine power 
struggle over the levers of institutional power. Moore crafted an image 
of himself as a cowboy—a good guy with a gun—whose right to rule is 
aligned with a triumphant history of civilizing the American frontier.
Despite his loss, Moore’s arresting public display illustrates a third 
and final aspect of white masculine gun culture: guns allow men to 
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recover the symbolic efficiency of white masculine archetypes. It was 
not enough that Moore dressed in Western gear, rode horses, and 
expressed his love for the Second Amendment. These are merely affec-
tations that on their own, at best, constitute a costume rather than 
embody a way of life. Similarly, Western lore suggests that the cowboy 
is less defined by ranching and cattle drives than he is by the ability to 
bring law and order to a wild, rugged frontier. In frontier mythology, 
it was the gun that allowed them to dispense justice, keep the peace, 
and clear the land of hostile Indians.45 Much like the militia man, the 
cowboy archetype is defined by proficiency in the use of firearms. From 
the early accounts of cowboy adventures in dime novels to John Ford’s 
American westerns, it is the cowboy’s gun that symbolized his status as 
the keeper of the law.46 In short, the archetype lacks veracity without its 
relation to the aesthetics of gun culture. As such, Moore’s status as the 
“law and order” candidate was not consummated until he presented 
his gun to his constituents. Escaping its modern trappings, the aesthet-
ics of guns visually reroutes white masculinity through its nostalgic 
past, giving some men access to a period of time in which masculinity’s 
hegemonic attributes were virtually unassailable. This version of white 
masculinity is seemingly heroic, lawful, and beyond question. As such, 
Moore’s loss fits the narrative of white masculine victimhood wherein 
the progressive modern world no longer values the vital and enduring 
contributions of white men. At the same time, Moore’s cowboy revival 
cultivated reverence for a time in which America was “great.” When 
asked by reporters about what period in American history he believed 
the nation was great, Moore replied, “I think it was great at the time 
when families were united—even though we had slavery—they cared 
for one another . . . Our families were strong, our country had a direc-
tion.”47 Moore also made this argument by adopting the gunfighter 
aesthetics of nineteenth-century gun culture mythology. For Moore, 
America was great when families were headed by strong patriarchs and 
the nation’s success was underwritten by slavery and imperial conquest.
Moore does not present the weapon in a threatening manner; he 
merely holds up the gun and presents it to the crowd. In part, the 
whiteness of American gun culture makes it possible for Moore to 
brandish a pistol during a stump speech and not be viewed as a risk 
to public safety. The gun, then, serves as a condensed form of visual 
testimony that speaks not merely to his commitment to gun owner-
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ship but rather to his fitness for public office. It is the gun that links 
Moore to a history of “law and order” discourse and resurrects the val-
ues and ideals of an age in which America was “great.” More point-
edly, the gun operates as a sign that cites the historical power of white 
men as a warrant for white male sovereignty in the present. The gun 
accomplishes this by tracing a pathway through American collective 
memory to those imagined moments in which gun violence seemed 
justified and necessary for national progress. Of course, these memo-
ries are largely drawn from the American western, a genre that roman-
ticizes the settlement of the frontier and exonerates white men of their 
culpability for the genocide of American Indians.48 As a part of a cow-
boy performance, the gun references only those historical moments at 
which frontier violence was justified, or, more likely, those moments of 
historical violence that the dominant culture imagined to be justified. 
The image thus summons those selective and/or contrived memories of 
western expansion that authorize the use of power in the present.49 The 
gun is a form of proof that testifies to Moore’s likeness to this simula-
crum of American frontier heroism.
Although the gun is the primary signifier in this staged perfor-
mance, the cowboy hat and vest also do important rhetorical work. 
For a public figure from the Deep South, Moore’s likeness is to that of 
a generic frontier lawman from the American West. It is significant 
that Moore was not dressed as the white vigilante of the Deep South: 
the antebellum voluntary militiamen who hunted escaped slaves or the 
Jim Crow era’s hooded KKK lynch mob that terrorized free Black com-
munities. In that context, the gun would necessarily reference a differ-
ent history of systemic racial violence. While he romanticized slavery, 
his campaign rhetoric did not explicitly resemble that of racial dema-
gogues such as George Wallace or David Duke. Moore’s racism can 
be characterized as much more of an insidious “dog whistle,” implicit, 
subtle, and read between the lines.50 As such, his self-presentation as a 
cowboy of the Wild West references a generic history of justified vio-
lence that, while implicitly white, does not need to explicitly reference 
race. In other words, the western gunslinger offers its emulators a kind 
of plausible deniability where race and violence are concerned. Per-
forming as a cowboy enabled Moore to forge an oppositional identity 
without referencing whiteness or masculinity. The nostalgia and patri-
otic mythology surrounding the cowboy myth allowed Moore to draw 
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from the past without owning the traumatic violence and military con-
quest that accompanied nineteenth-century nation-building.
Though opening a new front in the open carry movement, this per-
formance ultimately failed to get Moore elected to public office. But 
the failure has less to do with the symbolic efficiency of the cowboy or 
the rhetorical power of dog whistle politics than with his ability to per-
suasively embody the cowboy archetype. During the campaign, nine 
women came forward with allegations of sexual misconduct from his 
time as an assistant district attorney. One allegation involved the sex-
ual assault of a fourteen-year-old.51 Although the allegations in their 
own right likely dampened Republican turnout and mobilized demo-
cratic voters (Black women in particular), his history of sexual miscon-
duct contradicted his Western lawman persona. As moral exemplars, 
frontier heroes are supposed to protect women and children from the 
so-called savage masculinity of American Indians and frontier out-
laws.52 But the women who came forward offered lurid descriptions of 
Moore’s harassment, assaults, unwanted sexual advances, and stalking. 
They described how Moore abused his authority as a district attorney 
to extort silence from his victims. Such behaviors are at odds with the 
moral virtue and chivalry that American cultural mythology attributes 
to the frontier lawman. Moore was nearly elected to the Senate despite 
credible evidence of his gross sexual misconduct. This event illustrates 
how the display of guns by white men automatically confers moral 
legitimacy. It is only when overwhelming evidence to the contrary is 
presented that white men might be denuded of their metonymic rela-
tionship to the law.
DEADLY ENACTMENTS
This chapter illustrates how displaying deadly firearms in public 
embodies a white male identity politics that is responsive to expressed 
feelings of powerlessness. Extending the work of networked men’s 
rights media, open carry represents a concerted effort on the part of 
white men to domesticate the trauma of their supposed displacement in 
public and commercial life. Open carry consummates a number of per-
secution fantasies that circulate throughout the manosphere and con-
servative media outlets, including that of an oppressive state deposed 
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by armed sovereign citizens, feminized commercial spaces re-mascu-
linized by self-deputized white men, and the reins of political leader-
ship returned to gun-slinging lawman of frontier mythology. In each of 
these fantasies we see how guns are phallic implements that operate as 
symbolic substitutes for white men’s misguided feelings of powerless-
ness. As such, guns are part of an economy of signs that reorganizes 
public space according to the imperatives and priorities of white men, 
including individualism, competition, self-reliance, strength, and vio-
lence. Gun culture offers white men an identity of empowered margin-
ality that need not explicitly reference race or gender—though it can 
certainly be read between the lines.
The case studies presented herein illustrate how the culture of guns 
coerces spectators to both respect white male power and attend to its 
expressions of fragility. Speaking to the former, open carry demands 
that audiences recognize white men’s power. The threat of force sup-
plants the authority of a feckless state with the seemingly inherent sov-
ereignty of the armed male citizen. As for the latter, the threatening 
presence of guns in public demands not only that white men be heard 
but that their fears and anxieties be prioritized over others. White 
men’s safety and security is predicated on the precarity of those most 
likely to be the victims of white masculine violence. Open carry is yet 
another case in which white masculinity is organized around images 
of death; a culture in which embattled white men must be ready to use 
force in the absence of a just and effective state apparatus. The public 
display of firearms militarizes public space and normalizes the threat 
of violence as a substitute for civic norms, all to procure for white men 
an illusory sense of self-mastery and coherence.
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Midnight in America
Donald J. Trump and Political Sadomasochism
IN HIS nomination acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National 
Convention, then candidate Donald Trump painted a dark portrait of 
American life. Defying the narrative conventions of uplift and hope 
that typify the genre, Trump presented a vision of America as a postin-
dustrial landscape strewn with the wreckage of abandoned factories 
and failed dreams; a country whose citizens had been sold into bond-
age by their own government; entire communities held hostage by for-
eign enemies; an entire nation humiliated and victimized by globalist 
schemes to transfer America’s wealth to its unfit and unworthy adver-
saries. Dispensing with such frivolity as inspirational candidate biogra-
phies and encomiums to the American Dream, Trump boldly declared,
Our Convention occurs at a moment of crisis for our nation. The 
attacks on our police, and the terrorism in our cities, threaten our 
very way of life. Any politician who does not grasp this danger is not 
fit to lead our country. Americans watching this address tonight have 
seen the recent images of violence in our streets and the chaos in our 
communities. Many have witnessed this violence personally; some 
have even been its victims.1
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In Trump’s unconventional address, he portrayed himself as a great 
emancipator; the only one capable of restoring law, order, and safety 
to our overrun and decimated communities. Struck by his arresting 
vision of the republic, political commentator Paul Begala observed 
the vast chasm between Trump’s rhetoric of doom and the unbridled 
optimism of President’s Ronald Reagan’s portraiture of “morning in 
America.” For Trump, he averred, it was “midnight in America.” He 
elaborated, “Donald Trump’s America is fearful. Afraid of crime, afraid 
of terrorism, afraid of immigrants. His America is angry. Angry about 
political correctness. Angry about international trade. Angry with 
President Obama. And very, very angry about Hillary Clinton’s candi-
dacy.”2 While Begala rightly observes Trump’s attunement with the fear, 
anxiety, and rage percolating among his followers, he overlooks the 
veiled messages of deliverance that mingle between the lines of obliv-
ion. After declaring himself the voice of the forgotten people, Trump 
goes on to lay out his platform for national redemption, in which his 
“new Administration will be to liberate our citizens from the crime 
and terrorism and lawlessness that threatens their communities.”3 For 
his supporters, the message might appear as a response to a distress 
call, a rare acknowledgment from a politician of a crisis hiding in plain 
sight. In his address, the nation’s foreign enemies are expelled and its 
birthright entitlements to wealth and prestige are restored. The people 
are virtuous because they suffer, and their humiliation will be revisited 
upon their tormentors. Darkness is a matter of perspective.
At the same time, Trump’s rhetorical vision of America pivots on 
a sense of vulnerability experienced as structural oppression and the 
promise of revenge of behalf of his forgotten electorate. Expressions 
of victimization are the price of entry into Trump’s project of national 
redemption; yet, for his white supporters there is no need to demon-
strate the veracity of one’s claim of marginalization beyond that of feel-
ing that it is the case—be they an unemployed coal worker in West 
Virginia or a wealthy corporate CEO in California. Victimization, in 
turn, underwrites a vague theory of retributive justice wherein one 
feels entitled to count coup on their enemies and take delight in see-
ing their supposed cruelty revisited upon them. His harsh invectives 
against international trade agreements, Islamic extremism, gangs, and 
Mexican immigrants are matched by the counterweight of enthusi-
asm for the brutality entailed in avenging America’s humiliation. Paul 
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Johnson’s erudite observations about Trump’s fixation with humiliation 
suggests that his repeated use of collective pronouns such as “we” and 
“our” reference not Americans in general but instead those who con-
sider themselves weak and victimized by the nation’s foreign enemies. 
America’s strength is defined not by its commitment to democratic 
values but instead by “its capacity to repel foreign penetration and 
deport threats to the nation’s purity.”4 Trump calls forth an American 
subject who understands themselves in opposition to the acceptance 
of the kind of cultural pluralism and racial equality that democracy 
nominally entails. To this point, Robert Terrill points out how Trump, 
unburdened of having to acknowledge race, authorizes his white audi-
ence to reject any sense of shared civil obligations to build racial trust 
or strive for civil virtue. Instead, his rhetoric “invites us to dig our-
selves in, and then to defend our positions, so that our presumptions 
and prejudices are not questioned but calcifıed.”5 In expecting noth-
ing except unflinching loyalty, Trump’s subject is owed something that 
was taken from them by racial Others: jobs, respect, prosperity, safety, 
freedom, and community without the threat of difference.6 And while 
his speeches are often untruthful, incoherent, and even perverse, they 
nonetheless validate his audience’s feelings of marginalization, fear of 
difference, and entitlement to something greater.7 The revenge they are 
promised will be sweet.
This chapter seeks to situate Donald Trump’s rhetoric within white 
masculinity’s broader turn to the macabre. I suggest that his dark por-
traiture of American life, under siege by treacherous enemies, provides 
an exigence for cruelty and national regeneration through violence. 
And although one might hope it would be otherwise, there are no 
shortage of recurring discursive forms that already modulate the pub-
lic’s enjoyment of cruelty—even if it comes at their own expense. 
Trump’s sadism is attuned to a public saturated in reverence for hyper-
masculine blood sports such as football, boxing, and mixed-martial 
arts. His masculine revenge fantasies are not unlike those commonly 
played out in blockbuster action adventures and horror films.8 His 
apocalyptic and prophetic visions share a great deal in common with 
the eschatology taught in contemporary Christian churches. His com-
petitiveness, bluster, insults, and callousness toward others reflect the 
values of reality television.9 His naked embrace of cruelty and glibness 
are at home in the Twittersphere. His melancholia for a bygone era 
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without safe spaces and political correctness fits well with the selective 
public memories of the 1950s that once filled our television screens. In 
many ways the popular enjoyment of contemporary media culture as 
a whole, through its compulsive repetition of form, has courted in his 
devout electorate an investment in this structural perversity. Through 
a combination of reality television, social media, and rock-concert-like 
rallies, Trump stokes fantasies of opulence and success all the while 
cultivating resentment toward those enemies that would deny their 
entitlement.
These unconventional forms of public address afford Trump oppor-
tunities to both maneuver around traditional public intermediaries and 
speak in such a brash manner as to dispense with pesky conventions 
like civic virtue and empathy. Kendall Phillips argues that Trump’s 
political style is attuned to what he characterizes as the changing affec-
tive structures of public life. He writes that “the public feelings circu-
lating within American culture in the years preceding the 2016 election 
resonated with a particular shift in American cinematic myths about 
the state, the notion of cruelty, and the role of violence.”10 This insight 
builds from the recognition that American media culture through-
out the War on Terrorism has been fixated on survival and extreme 
suffering—preoccupied with subjecting bodies to “brutal, anonymiz-
ing death.”11 Mary Stuckey suggests that Trump’s hyperboles and dis-
avowals are effective because they speak directly to this highly charged 
“affective environment” in which political rhetoric is “unmoored from 
its institutional routines.”12 Trump’s rhetoric is “aimed at the viscera,” 
meaning that institutionalized conventions and common virtues have 
lost their symbolic efficiency.13 In many ways, Trump does not merely 
use networked media to access his electorate; his behaviors are a reflec-
tion of the norms that those networks manifest. His political address, 
then, patterns itself after the transgression and perversity of networked 
media—its cruelty, lack of empathy, paranoia, narcissism, and negative 
emotions. While seemingly repellant to his opponents, Gunn recently 
observed, Trump’s rhetoric is structured around routinized enjoy-
ment of civil and psychic transgressions such as those routinely found 
in networked media.14 Trump’s address demonstrates a simultaneous 
awareness and denial of social conventions—cruelty delivered with a 
menacing yet ambiguous smirk of irony. That is to say that Trump’s 
patterned disavowals, his use of ad hominem attacks, his liberal use 
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of occultatio and paralipsis, his delight in cruelty, and his indifference 
to civil norms all constitute a style, genre, and statement of political 
perversity.
I would suggest that this perversity is a reflection of rhetorical con-
ventions nurtured elsewhere—networked media and reality television—
that have cultivated an appetite for Trump’s unconventional style. I 
wish to draw from these insights to consider how Trump’s expressions 
of cruelty and doom operate as an extension of the modalities of spec-
tatorship and the culture of networked media that condition our rela-
tionship to pain—lived and simulated.15 It is not simply that Trump’s 
rhetoric is indifferent to the pain of others—that would hardly differen-
tiate him from his predecessors—but that his political perversity aligns 
with affective attachments, cultivated elsewhere, to a cultural form of 
sadomasochism that fetishizes both the delivery and the receipt of pain 
and suffering—particularly that of white men. My interest here is not 
to rehearse the many ill-advised and unsolicited public psychologi-
cal diagnosis of the flesh-and-blood Trump but instead to make sense 
of the figure or persona who manifests the rhetorical perversities that 
repeat across the culture.16 Here, we find a figure who draws on our 
collective sadistic compulsions and directs our psychical investment 
toward outcomes that hurt or humiliate “our” (and his) enemies: the 
press, immigrants, gangs, Islamic extremists, China, Democrats, celeb-
rities who speak ill of Trump, and the list goes on.
But it does not stop there. The Trump spectator is also enjoined in a 
masochistic relationship—that is to say, one typically characterized by a 
request for the infliction of pain and humiliation, and from which the 
supplicant derives pleasure. Note that Trump does not merely validate 
the pain of his supporters by addressing them as aggrieved subjects but 
also delivers to them a painful and humiliating portrait of their own 
existence. Although Trump offers to take away their pain with uto-
pian promises to “Make American Great Again,” Trump’s speeches also 
wallow in the audience’s misery and humiliation—all under the veil 
of him “telling it like it is.” It is not uncommon for an attendee at one 
of his rallies to hear that the American Dream is dead, they have been 
“raped” by multilateral trade agreements, and laughed at by criminals 
and foreign adversaries.17 Trump keeps his audience’s wounds fresh 
and, thus, always in need of tending. Yet, his rallies are often festive, 
if not carnivalesque events that convey a celebratory tone even as sup-
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porters are joyfully berated with painful news of their latest defeat. At 
the same time, his opponents are also caught in a masochistic relation-
ship when they consume a ceaseless flow of articles, comedy routines, 
late-night news segments, and videos that capture his latest obnoxious 
stunt. In sum, this chapter seeks to disentangle the sadomasochistic 
entailments of Trump’s rhetoric and how his abject vision of America 
invites his supporters, white men in particular, to invest in both their 
own suffering and the suffering of others. Trump is a president who 
reflects the enjoyment of casual cruelty encoded into the ecology of 
new media—the vindictiveness routine portrayed on reality television 
and the dissolution of empathy cultivated in social networks.
Trump supporters’ motives are the subject of constant debate 
and scrutiny by the press.18 Confounded by his transgressive behav-
ior, media pundits compulsively decry the seemingly unwavering sup-
port of his base. Their incredulous response to his perversity remains 
“this is not normal!” They ask: Is there no offensive statement or odi-
ous behavior that they will not tolerate? Are there no lies or contra-
dictions so beyond the pale that they will refuse to accept? Is there 
no humiliation or debasement of their own self-interests that they will 
not endure? Addressing the media’s incredulity, Trump’s short answer 
was “no.” During an Iowa campaign event, Trump himself confidently 
declared “I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot some-
body and I wouldn’t lose any voters.”19 Expressing nostalgia for a time 
when a misplaced sigh or an overzealous yelp was enough to disqual-
ify a candidate for the presidency, the press remains astonished with 
Trump’s ability to evade rebuke from his loyal electorate. Gunn right-
fully points out that Trump’s detractors seem to neglect the enjoyment 
of transgression, the affective charge of Trump’s refusal to obey civic 
conventions, and the fantasy that one might enact similar transgression 
in their daily life (i.e., imitating his rejection of “political correctness” 
concerning issues of race, gender, and sexuality). Although it is not 
possible to speak here about the psychology of Trump supporters, it is 
feasible to account for the psychical structures of enjoyment that orga-
nize his rhetorical appeal. In this light, I want to situate the enjoyment 
of Trump’s rhetoric within the categories of sadomasochism to make 
sense of what perverse investments he generates in his electorate. In 
other words, why might an individual enjoy vacillating between being 
subjected to humiliation and suffering at one moment and, in the next 
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moment, doling it out to others? The answer to this question returns 
to the subject of cultural trauma and the death drive introduced at the 
outset of this book to explain how white masculine victimhood has 
come to be defined by both self-abasement and violence toward others.
MORAL MASOCHISM AND THE TRUMP AUDIENCE
Despite its incoherence, Donald Trump’s style and content does not 
tend to vary. He is inclined to cover the same subjects with various lev-
els of cogency and formality depending on the context. Although his 
rallies are more transgressive (or unhinged) than his formal speeches, 
the content often vacillates between declarations of victimhood and 
promises of revenge against the nation’s enemies. His more formal 
speeches contrast apocalyptic imagery of America overrun by rap-
ists, murders, drug dealers, ISIS, MS-13, and Mexicans against a virtu-
ous public forgotten by special interests and career politicians. And, of 
course, his speaking style is hypermasculine: he brags and embellishes 
his personal accomplishments, portrays life as competition with win-
ners and losers, emphasizes radical individualism, fantasizes about vio-
lence and revenge, insults and humiliates women who challenge him, 
valorizes domination and control, and speaks assuredly without exper-
tise. At the same time, he also devotes significant attention to bemoan-
ing even the slightest criticism, noting how poorly he has been treated 
by the media, foreign leaders, Democrats, Republican detractors, and 
even celebrities on Twitter. Across a vast majority of his publicly avail-
able speeches, suffering and humiliation are the dominant themes.
Here, I would like to consider the entailments of masochism in 
Trump’s rhetoric; namely, the repetitive listing of grievances and 
humiliations that he and his supporters have been continually forced 
to endure. More specifically, I consider the submissive position of the 
audience in Trump’s rhetoric—a persona invested in its own subjuga-
tion.20 At his rallies, he subjects his audience to news of the latest usur-
pation by their enemies, inducing a call-and-response expectation for 
the audience to “boo” or chant “lock her up,” “USA,” or “build the wall” 
at appropriate moments.21 At times he summons his audience’s rage to 
support policies that will unlikely benefit his working-class supporters. 
But masochism is more nuanced than simply the receipt of sexual grat-
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ification as the result of a partner’s cruelty. Recall that Freud observed 
three forms of masochism: erotogenic, female, and moral. The first he 
argued was sadism—the residue of the death drive—introjected back 
toward the subject and registered as the physiological experience of 
pain as pleasure. The second—problematized in the introduction—he 
classifies as feminine passivity, which he equates with the child’s fan-
tasy of being beaten by their father.22 It is the third category, moral 
masochism, that makes sense of Trump’s overtures to suffering. Moral 
masochism is detached from an external object (as well as sexual-
ity) and is characterized by unconscious guilt that must be assuaged 
through punishment. Freud observes that “the suffering itself is what 
matters; whether it is decreed by someone who is loved or by someone 
who is indifferent is of no importance. It may even be caused by imper-
sonal powers or by circumstances; the true masochist always turns his 
cheek whenever he has a chance of receiving a blow.”23 Moral masoch-
ism of the ego requires a cruel superego to enact self-punishment for 
unconscious guilt. It is for this reason that Savran argues that Marcuse’s 
concept of surplus repression is virtually synonymous with moral mas-
ochism, as in both cases the ego learns to enforce its own repression 
through guilt, and, consequently, the masochistic subject takes pleasure 
in their own subjugation.24
The masochism that organizes Trump’s relation to his audience 
manifests in two forms: (1) continual references to the nobility of 
enduring the torment of one’s enemies, and (2) an expressed desire 
for impenetrable obstacles.25 As with melancholia, the first compels 
the subject to repeat and endure traumatic experiences that render 
them passive and thus capable of deriving pleasure from subjugation. 
The second addresses the subject’s disillusion and displeasure with 
defeating their rival. In short, upon achieving their object of desire, 
one shrugs: “is that it?” These expressions of masochism are related by 
their investment in subjugation but differ in how they manifest. For 
instance, René Girard explained that in the latter form a masochist 
requires a rival to play a triumphant role so that they can be the object/
victim of their violence. He writes, “The only type of model that can 
still generate excitement is the one who cannot be defeated, the one 
who will always defeat his disciple.”26 In this case, only the creation of 
an impenetrable obstacle can generate excitement (i.e., “a big fat beau-
tiful wall”). As I illustrate below, Trump’s rhetoric focuses on abstract 
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policy goals where it is difficult to discern their attainment as well as 
rivals who, even with all his political power, can never be vanquished. 
The moral masochist is not one who finds pleasure in pain per se but 
one who positions themselves to never be satisfied.
Sharply departing from his predecessors, Trump devotes significant 
attention to America’s passivity and humiliation by sexually aggres-
sive enemies and predatory states. Unbound by “political correct-
ness,” Trump routinely subjects his audience to the harsh “truth” of 
their victimhood. For instance, in his RNC acceptance address, before 
listing America’s failures, he explained that “here, at our convention, 
there will be no lies. We will honor the American people with the 
truth, and nothing else.”27 This theme was established early when he 
announced his candidacy. At that time, he decried how America was 
being “beaten” by their foreign adversaries:
We used to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last 
time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill 
us. I beat China all the time. All the time. When do we beat Mexico 
at the border? They’re laughing at us, at our stupidity.28
Here, America has been debased and forced into submission, not 
because of the strength of other nations but because of the nation’s 
own willingness to accept such treatment. He goes on to sexualize 
the nation’s victimhood by reminding his audience that their bor-
der has been penetrated by Mexico, who are “bringing drugs, they’re 
bringing crime. They’re rapists.”29 Drawing from racist lore of dark-
skinned predators who prey on the innocent, Trump positions Amer-
ica as prone—ostensibly inviting tormentors into their communities 
and even their bodies. As our enemies get stronger, he reminds us, 
America has lost its phallic potency: “Even our nuclear arsenal doesn’t 
work.”30 Thus, he constructs the nation as a womanly object of sadis-
tic violence. The implication here is that the nation has lost its desire 
to make other countries submit to its will. It is not that our nation is 
incapable of asserting its power; it is that we have collectively agreed 
to submit to others: “We have losers. We have losers. We have people 
that don’t have it. We have people that are morally corrupt. We have 
people that are selling this country down the drain.” In Trump’s estima-
tion, “the American dream is dead.”31 While he also presents a sadis-
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tic fantasy that I discuss later, note here that Trump says nothing of 
the strength and resilience of the national character, and avoids talk of 
America overcoming obstacles or any subject that might illustrate the 
agency of his audience.
Instead, Trump positions his audience as weak, submissive, naïve, 
and subject to the whims of sadists. As a nation, we have expressed 
a desire to be dominated; that is to say, we used to enjoy beating our 
competitors but now we have collectively chosen to let them play the 
triumphant role in our economic and diplomatic relationships. If we 
take him at his word, his bid for the presidency was not premised on 
empowering the American people. Instead, this address extends to his 
audience an offer to be dominated by an autocratic strongman. He 
promises that “if I get elected president I will bring it [the American 
Dream] back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we 
will make America great again.”32 As he goes on to note in his RNC 
acceptance speech, “I alone can fix it.”33 While America seems unable 
to beat its competitors, Trump brags: “I beat China every time.”34 The 
lack of a collective vision in this address reflects an image of a passive 
audience that must cede their agency to a powerful leader who can sin-
gularly make the nation strong again. The imagined audience here is 
invited to exchange one relationship of dominance and submission for 
another—to forsake foreign adversaries for a domestic paternal figure.
Elsewhere, Trump routinely characterizes his public as agentless 
victims: forgotten and abandoned by weak and ineffective leaders. In 
his inaugural address he refers to his electorate as a “forgotten peo-
ple” who will be “forgotten no longer.”35 His vision of their reality is 
quite bleak: “Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner 
cities; rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the land-
scape of our nation; an education system, flush with cash, but which 
leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of knowledge; and 
the crime and gangs and drugs that have stolen too many lives and 
robbed our country of so much unrealized potential.”36 At the RNC he 
claimed, “Not only have our citizens endured domestic disaster, but 
they have lived through one international humiliation after another. 
We all remember the images of our sailors being forced to their knees 
by their Iranian captors at gunpoint.”37 As Johnson rightfully observes 
of this passage, imagery of Americans forced to their knees bespeaks 
an implicitly sexualized humiliation of being coerced into submis-
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sion by a rapist.38 I would add that his choice of verbs associated with 
criminal violence reinforces this point. Note that Americans have been 
“trapped,” have been “robbed,” have “endured”—all of which bespeak a 
fundamental lack of audience agency. Government regulations in par-
ticular operate as signs of coercion. Describing anonymous support-
ers who Trump claimed approached him with “tears in their eyes,” he 
recounts their lament at being “forced to pay not to have health care. 
Very unfair.”39 When speaking about international trade agreements, he 
compares the nation’s adherence to global norms and domestic regula-
tions as doglike obedience. At an August 22, 2017, rally in Phoenix, he 
claimed that we “were like the lap dog. Great for other countries. Our 
country was so behind.”40 Later he extends the dog obedience meta-
phor by suggesting that abolishing regulations is “unleashing our econ-
omy,” a phrase he continually invokes.41
Based on such ruminations, his ideal audience seems to be one 
that recognizes themselves as victims—who in finding their way to 
Trump’s vision of America are implored to attach meaning and iden-
tity to their suffering. They are invited to find themselves to be a his-
torically oppressed people who share a serial relationship to ruthless 
persecution manifest in everything from environmental regulations to 
taxes. Ironically, Trump’s valorization of the “forgotten people” renders 
suffering and exile as the preconditions for political subjectivity. The 
problem, however, is that suffering must continue for this subject to 
claim their place in the polity. This exemplifies the perverse structures 
of enjoyment that Trump’s speeches offer to his adherents. Recall that 
the masochist is incapable of gratification when their rival is absent. 
Moreover, Lundberg and Collins remind us that the politics of the 
demand locates enjoyment in lodging the complaint. This is an imag-
ined audience constituted via cultivated investments in its own vic-
timization. Though he never explicitly references their gender or race, 
Trump’s strongest appeal is to a subject looking for an identity politics 
but seemingly lacking access to symbolically efficient categories such 
as race, gender, and sexuality. This ideal auditor would feel shut out 
of national dialogues about suffering and attacked by the visibility of 
identity movements that seem to out-compete them for national atten-
tion. Although Trump acknowledges their suffering and claims to be 
above the fray of insider politics, his rhetorical challenge is to find new 
ways for his adherents to coalesce around suffering and stay on the 
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margins while also taking back their country. In short, he must invent 
new ways in which his audience suffers even as they “Make America 
Great Again.”
Trump’s solution, then, is to identify new enemies—and resurrect 
old ones—to both signal his attunement to his audience’s grievances 
and continue their political exile. This task was not difficult during the 
2016 presidential campaign, as conservatives had nearly twenty-five 
years of practice demonizing Hillary Clinton.42 As such, no amount 
of hyperbole was off-limits. In his RNC acceptance speech, he linked 
Clinton to nearly every major military and foreign policy blunder of 
the past two decades, concluding, “This is the legacy of Hillary Clin-
ton: death, destruction and weakness.”43 Despite his electoral victory, 
“crooked Hillary” still makes regular appearances in his Twitter posts, 
usually to observe what he believes to be the unfairness that Clinton is 
not also under investigation by the FBI Special Counsel—an investiga-
tion he has referred to as the “single greatest witch hunt in American 
history.”44 “Lock her up!” remains in the repertoire of chants one might 
hear from the crowd at a Trump rally.
While Islam, gangs, and immigrants play their part in Trump’s nar-
rative of victimhood, the main adversary of Trump and his electorate 
remains the news media. Targeting the press enables Trump to laud his 
putatively unreported victories without ceding the moral high ground 
of victimhood. Claims of “fake news” enable him to disavow comments 
and actions that draw public scrutiny and undermine his critics’ abil-
ity to engage in reality-referencing.45 A survey of Republicans revealed 
that four out of ten agree with Trump that the press is “the enemy of 
the people.”46 He has referred to the press as the “very crooked media” 
and asserted that they have “committed a lot of atrocities when you 
look.”47 His frequent finger-pointing at the press covering his rallies is 
greeted with reflexive boos, insults, and obscenities by the crowd. At 
one rally Trump drew attention to “the very dishonest media, those 
people right up there with all the cameras [pointing] .  .  . and I mean 
truly dishonest people in the media and the fake media, they make up 
stories.”48 Drawing clear battle lines between the press and people, he 
referred to the media as a collective of “sick people” because they do 
not want to “make our country great again, and I honestly believe they 
don’t.”49 These examples illustrate how Trump navigates between two 
contradictory representations of his electorate. On the one hand, his 
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audience has made America great again and are therefore victorious, 
triumphant, and strong. They have eviscerated their enemies and taken 
back the country. On the other hand, his audience is victimized by a 
powerful cabal of dishonest journalists who continually thwart their 
efforts. While his demonization of the media serves a variety of pur-
poses, including scapegoating and disavowal, his comments are also 
vital if he is to continue to cultivate audiences’ affective investment in 
their own marginalization.
Alongside Trump’s perpetual rival is the impenetrable obstacle: “the 
Wall.” Although some of Trump’s campaign promises were abstrac-
tions, a menacing wall that would stretch the length of America’s 
southern border with Mexico was materially quantifiable and distinct. 
Though not yet built, the wall serves as a metonymic object that stands 
in for the Trump administration’s “America First” agenda and testifies 
to Trump’s skill as a builder.50 When he announced his candidacy, he 
boasted, “I will build a great wall—and nobody builds walls better than 
me, believe me—and I’ll build them very inexpensively. I will build 
a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico 
pay for the wall. Mark my words.”51 While the call to build the wall 
energizes his supporters, the pragmatics of such a grand gesture have 
proved difficult for the administration.52 As a result of funding and 
logistical difficulties, Trump’s description of the wall has varied widely.53 
Is it a wall or a fence? Will it cover all 1,954 miles of the border, or sec-
tions designated as priorities by the border patrol? How much will it 
cost? Will Mexico pay for it? If so, how? Such tedious questions about 
policy specifics and implementation have proved somewhat burden-
some and ultimately serve to dissipate the affective discharge of such 
a bold demand. This in no way denies that his supporters desire the 
wall; to be sure, they do. But rather I suggest that it is the demand for 
the wall itself that matters more than the tiresome details concerning 
how it will be ultimately achieved. For the wall to serve as an impen-
etrable object, its achievement must be perpetually deferred yet seem 
possible enough to warrant the demand. There must be an obstacle or 
group that is inimical to its completion. In Freud’s words, “The suffer-
ing entailed by neuroses is precisely the factor that makes them valu-
able to the masochistic trend.”54 In other words, the wall must remain 
a source of frustration, a roadblock that can then serve as the raison 
d’être for the Trump electorate; a group already constituted through 
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their shared pain. Put even another way, if the wall was built, the moral 
masochist would be denied the extended gratification entailed in mak-
ing the demand.
Trump’s rhetoric on the subject of “the wall” provides precisely this 
form of enjoyment. That is to say that he speaks of the wall as both pos-
sible and perpetually deferred. At the 2018 CPAC convention, Trump 
remarked:
You’re getting the wall. Don’t worry. I heard some—getting the wall. 
Had a couple of these characters in the back say, oh, he really doesn’t 
want the wall. He just used that for campaigning. I said, are you—can 
you believe it? You know, I say every time I hear that, the wall gets 
ten feet higher, you know that. Every single time. Okay. Now, we’re 
going to have the wall. Or they’re not going to have what they want. 
We have a problem. We need more Republicans. We have a group of 
people that vote against us in a bloc.55
In this passage, Trump vacillates between absolute guarantees that the 
wall will be built and doubts that they have enough support to make 
the wall a reality. “Build that wall” is qualified by a secondary demand, 
“We need more Republicans.”56 He seems to also demonstrate aware-
ness that his opponents believe that the wall is nothing more than an 
empty campaign slogan. Upon relaying this critique, Trump prom-
ises a wall that is even bigger than first imagined: “ten feet higher” 
added every time his opponents test him. Paradoxically, the demand 
becomes somehow more impossible, more grandiose, even as it prom-
ises to become a material reality. If the demand is denied, he offers 
his supporters a secondary form of enjoyment: revenge. If Trump 
does not get what he wants, his opponents will not get what they want. 
And while this threat is much more characteristic of sadism, his state-
ment reminds the audience that their perpetually deferred demand is 
thwarted by a ceaselessly frustrating rival. Elsewhere, Trump uses this 
paradox to disavow responsibility for making the wall a reality by ced-
ing agency to his opponents. After claiming that the wall will be built, 
he adds this caveat: “Democrats in Congress who oppose a border wall 
and stand in the way of border security: You are putting all of Ameri-
ca’s safety at risk. You’re doing that. You’re doing that.”57 Again, the wall 
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is both inevitable and yet also held prisoner by his opponents. In this 
way, the demand never loses its affective charge.
POLITICAL SADISM
Freud observed that sadism and masochism are frequently located in 
the same subject, entailing the possibility of vacillations between roles; 
hence his merging of the terms: sadomasochism. While Freud found 
sadism primarily in men and masochism in women, scholars have 
pointed out that his case studies for female masochism were all derived 
from his study of men. At any rate, the categories are not exclusive, 
and their structures of gratification are somewhat similar. For example, 
masochism can be understood as sadism turned inward. Conversely, 
sadism represents the externalization of the death drive—that which 
threatens to eviscerate the subject—onto others. Introducing the lit-
erary works of the Marquis de Sade, John Yankowski points out that 
“cruelty is an expression of the death impulse; it is the translation into 
physical terms of the emotion of hate.”58 In other words, where Eros 
works to preserve the ego, the death drive “seeks to destroy that which 
would imperil the ego.”59 The sadist forgoes relationships in which cas-
tration is a possibility in favor of relational configurations where the 
submission of another permits that “what might happen to the subject 
passively” can be “done actively to others.”60 Submission by others alle-
viates any guilt that might inhibit the sadist’s enjoyment.
Much like the earlier discussion of masochism, sadism also under-
writes a political-rhetorical perversion that is characterized by a 
speaker’s transgressive fantasies of violence, cruelty, and humiliation 
of others without compunction or remorse. Violence need not serve 
a particular end; the subject may reference the norms against such 
fantasies and indulge them nonetheless. While political sadism is not 
an exclusively male phenomenon, it is a perversion that countersigns 
hypermasculine political movements, fascist and terrorist organiza-
tions, and cults that demand submission and obedience from their 
subjects. Political sadism is organized around masculine rhetorics of 
control, domination, and enjoyment in the suffering of one’s opponent. 
It can be characterized in a fashion similar to Jasbir Puar’s exploration 
of debilitation, the sovereign right to designate certain bodies as avail-
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able for injury that manifests as the slow wearing-down of vulnerable 
populations.61 The right to maim, Puar argues, is overdetermined by the 
demands of white fragility to be compensated for its superficial inju-
ries. Similarly, the political sadist invents an enemy with superlative 
capacities in order to facilitate the ongoing debilitation of vulnerable 
populations.
It should come as no surprise to the reader that there is no shortage 
of examples wherein Trump indulges his affinity for political sadism. 
One need look no further than his 2016 campaign rallies to find shock-
ing footage of protestors beaten and bloodied by his supporters and 
gleeful cheers for expressions of political violence. Rather than con-
demning such behavior, Trump told his supporters, “Knock the crap 
out of them . . . I promise you, I will pay for the legal fees.”62 Mere men-
tions of Hillary Clinton were reflexively greeted by the popular chant 
“lock her up!” which mirrors a masculine rape/bondage fantasy of a 
powerful rival forced into total submission. Discussions of immigrants 
or foreigners invited the audience to boo and yell obscenities, while 
fantasies of revenge were cheered and applauded. But it matters not 
merely that Trump’s political affect can be characterized as sadistic; it is 
that certain tropes of cruelty garnered enjoyment and served particular 
political ends.
Here I offer two ways of organizing Trump’s statements of cruelty. 
First, Trump identifies an abject out-group for whom the audience 
should feel no guilt about punishing. This trope can best be charac-
terized as justified cruelty. Here, Trump makes use of plural posses-
sive pronouns to draw essential distinctions between the identity of 
the dominant in-group and the submissive out-group. Foreign Others 
(China, Mexico, Islam) are cast as inimical to our wealth, our safety, 
and our sovereignty. For instance, in one form or another he repeats 
the mantra “We’re going to bring back our jobs, bring back our wealth, 
and we are going to bring back our dreams, and we are going to bring 
back, once again our sovereignty as a nation.”63 Adopting the credo 
“America First,” the collective pronoun “our” is relatively narrow in 
scope when defining who might benefit from America’s power.64 The 
nation’s internal and external enemies share a common nefarious char-
acteristic: they are takers. He warns, “They will repeal your tax cuts, 
they will put judges in that you wouldn’t believe, they’ll take away your 
Second Amendment, which we will never allow to happen, they’ll take 
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away your Second Amendment. Remember that. They will take away.”65 
In addition to wealth, jobs, and rights, Trump points out that “they’re 
trying to take away our culture. They are trying to take away our his-
tory.”66 Here, “our” narrows again to include only those supporters of 
both an unbridled Second Amendment and those who identify with 
both American exceptionalism and Confederate nostalgia. The in-
group (mostly white, mostly male) is pitted against “they,” a virtually 
indistinguishable horde of “takers” who desire nothing more than to 
dispossess “us” of “our” birthright entitlements. These in-group/out-
group distinctions occasion a kind of justified cruelty against those 
whose very identities are inimical to the national interest.
Agonistic group distinctions serve as the basis for legitimate yet also 
enjoyable acts of revenge. For instance, Trump often boasts about law 
enforcement’s capacity to revisit cruelty upon criminals and undocu-
mented immigrants. At the same time, he often speaks about criminals 
and undocumented immigrants as deserving of legal and extralegal 
violence, punishments he seems eager to administer. Sharing a like-
ness to the racial mythology of the Black rapist, Trump talks of illegal 
immigration as an “infestation” of “animals” and “predators” who tar-
get innocent victims (typically white women).67 For instance, he notes 
that “the predators and criminal aliens who poison our communities 
with drugs and prey on innocent young people, these beautiful, beau-
tiful, innocent young people will, will find no safe haven anywhere 
in our country. And you’ve seen the stories about some of these ani-
mals.”68 After highlighting violent crimes committed by undocumented 
immigrants, Trump promises his audience revenge: “These families, 
the deaths of their loved ones will not have been in vain. I promised 
them.”69 Pointing out their lack of humanity, he assures his audience 
that “they cut them up into little pieces. These are animals. We are get-
ting them out of here. We’re throwing them in jails, and we’re throwing 
them out of the country. We’re liberating our towns.”70 Elsewhere he 
brags that “people that treat us badly, we treat them much worse than 
they could ever imagine. That’s the way it has to be. That’s the way it 
has to be.”71 For Trump, the inhumanity of America’s enemies alleviates 
the government of any legal or moral responsibility for protecting due 
process or human rights. Furthermore, the nation’s response to cruelty 
must be asymmetrical and merciless. While he can vividly imagine the 
cruelty of foreign “predators,” he boasts that his cruelty is beyond even 
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their imagination. Yet, he testifies that it is this cruelty that liberates the 
nation, much like a foreign military freeing an occupied nation from 
oppression. But revenge is not only efficacious, it is righteous.
Trump expresses satisfaction whenever criminals receive their just 
deserts. For instance, he shares his personal fantasy of turning the 
tables on those who might wish him harm. At one rally, Trump chained 
out a personal revenge fantasy by comparing himself to Charles Bron-
son’s character in the 1974 film Death Wish. In that film, Bronson 
played Paul Kersey, a man who goes on a vigilante killing spree fol-
lowing the rape and murder of his wife and daughter. It is important 
to note that Bronson’s character sought revenge not only on the attack-
ers but also on the entire criminal element in New York City. Trump 
described a hypothetical revenge scenario in which someone attacked 
him while he carried a concealed weapon:
I have a license to carry in New York, can you believe that? Some-
body attacks me, can you imagine somebody says “there’s Trump, 
he’s easy pickin’s” what you say? [Gun gesture]. What was the famous 
movie, remember? Where his wife was hurt so badly and killed .  .  . 
Charles Bronson right? The late great Charles Bronson. Death Wish! 
Remember that? Oh, we’re gonna cut you up sir . . . uh, uh, uh, bing 
[making gun noise]. One of the great movies. You can’t make that 
movie because it’s not political correct. But could you image with 
Trump, somebody says ah, all these big monsters aren’t around, he’s 
easy pickin’s, Shing [makes gun gesture]. This is about self-defense 
plain and simple.72
With a lighthearted smile, Trump mimics gun sounds and gestures as 
he delights in a glamorous portrayal of vigilante violence. His portrayal 
of “plain and simple” self-defense is in no way reluctant or solemn but 
rather delights in pleasures of righteous violence. And while this exam-
ple is a bit tongue-in-cheek, it is consistent with his general expressions 
of pleasure when discussing the myriad ways in which our law enforce-
ment agencies, or vigilantes, might exact a retributive “eye for an eye” 
justice against suspected criminals.
The second kind of cruelty expressed by Trump, more characteris-
tic of classical sadism, is violence for the enjoyment of power. In other 
words, Trump often relishes the overwhelming potential of the nation 
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to inflict violence upon others. For him, American power seems to be 
premised on the ability to impose its will capriciously and without jus-
tification. Displaying toughness garners the respect of the nation’s ene-
mies and, consequently, portends their submission to its will. When 
discussing MS-13, he observes, “We have tough people. I’ll tell you 
what, when you deal with MS-13, the only thing they understand is 
toughness. They don’t want anything. All they understand is toughness. 
If that ICE agent or border patrol agent is tougher than them, they 
respect him. We have the toughest guys you’ve ever seen. We got tough. 
They don’t respect anything else. And they shouldn’t be in our coun-
try.”73 This passage is indicative of Trump’s fascination with toughness 
and brutality as characteristics that engender the respect and admira-
tion of a sadistic rival. According to Trump, toughness is defined by the 
capacity to make others submit to one’s will. Their respect and admi-
ration of toughness alleviates any guilt that might interfere with the 
enjoyment of enacting violence against a submissive subject. Hence, 
he relished that “our ICE goes in there they [sic] grab by the neck, they 
throw them in the Paddy Wagon, they get them the hell out of our 
country.”74 That is to say that the key attribute of America’s toughness 
is illustrated by the complete domination of an enemy. In this fan-
tasy, MS-13 members are physically dominated, stripped of legal and 
bodily protections, and exiled from the polity. In this scenario, these 
once powerful gang members are rendered vulnerable to the whims of 
stronger, superior men. To be grabbed by the neck, incarcerated, and 
stripped of due process is to be superlatively powerless.
Trump also boasts about the monstrous cruelty of the nation’s 
border patrol. In the passage below, Trump dispenses with humane 
treatment of suspected criminals with the dismissive label of “polit-
ical correctness.” Often asserting that Democrats coddle criminals 
and restrain the brutal powers of law enforcement, Trump distin-
guishes himself by taking pride in transgressing our formal laws and 
tacit norms against police brutality. In this extended quotation, Trump 
muses on his vision of a hypermasculine, “politically incorrect,” model 
of law enforcement:
We are dismantling and destroying the bloodthirsty criminal gangs, 
and well, I will just tell you in, we’re not doing it in a politically cor-
rect fashion. We’re doing it rough. Our guys are rougher than their 
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guys. I asked one of our great generals, “how tough are our people? 
How tough are they?” He said, “sir, you don’t want to know about it.” 
Then I saw one guy come out, a customs officer who is a monster. I 
said, “so general, you think I could take that guy in a fight?” He said, 
“Mr. President, sir I don’t even want to think about it.” I said “you’re 
right, actually.” We have tough people. Our people are tougher than 
their people. Our people are tougher and stronger and meaner and 
smarter than the gangs.75
Trump’s gleeful tone belies the abject brutality entailed by “doing it 
rough.” A far cry from President George W. Bush’s call for “compas-
sionate conservatism,” Trump’s vision of a meaner and more monstrous 
America relaxes our collective prohibitions against the extralegal use of 
force. This is not to suggest that Trump’s predecessors are not respon-
sible for policies that lead to similar acts of brutality, but rather that 
the difference is in terms of enjoyment. What distinguishes Trump as 
a political sadist is his lack of caveat, moral justification, or reluctance 
to use force only when necessary. His political sadism is marked by 
his willingness to openly transgress the norms against human rights 
abuses and state-sanctioned violence against noncitizens. Here we find 
an unapologetic endorsement of primal masculine violence devoid of 
any sense of ambivalence or redemption. While violence may also be 
demonstrative of America’s power, it is primarily warranted for its own 
sake.
There are countless other examples that one could draw from to 
demonstrate Trump’s sadism; however, these passages illustrate a 
larger pattern of discourse in which the president extolls the pleasures 
of humiliating and physically dominating the nation’s enemies. The 
appeal of political sadism is that it dispenses with perfunctory expres-
sions of morality that often accompany the use of force or any form of 
guilt that might arise and inhibit one’s ability to derive pleasure from 
violence. His embrace of the will-to-power liberates his audience from 
the strictures of empathy. Political sadism foregrounds the nation’s 
subjugation of any and all challengers but, most importantly, takes 
pleasure in the submissive admiration of those subjected to violence. 
Sadism also eradicates the symbolic threat of castration and emascu-
lation presented by the nation’s rivals. As such, with the tables turned, 
those who were once “laughing at us” will be made to suffer a much 
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worse, unimaginable fate. Trump’s rhetoric attempts to re-masculinize 
the nation by enacting fantasies of dominance and subjugation on infe-
rior, dark-skinned men. Trump’s rhetoric even forsakes redemption as 
the end of white masculine violence for a primal violence that is its 
own end. Physical abuse, torture, family separation, unlawful incar-
ceration, and similar acts of cruelty are not only possible in this world; 
they are mandatory.
A MONSTROUS AMERICA
Trump’s rhetoric of victimhood and revenge represent an abject form of 
white masculinity that is constituted through hierarchal relationships 
of domination, control, and violence. While Trump positions his audi-
ence as subservient, feminine, and subjugated, his vision of state power 
is “tough,” “mean,” “monstrous,” and not “politically correct”—capable 
of inflicting unimaginable suffering on those who violate America’s 
sovereignty, wealth, and safety. Trump offers to take the reins of power 
on his public’s behalf and, in exchange for their obedience, offers to 
inflict pain on their enemies. But Trump’s enactment of political sado-
masochism is symptomatic of the larger structural forces at work in the 
cultural psyche of white men. Although it is easy to scapegoat Trump 
for igniting the perverse desires of his audience, he is but one pathway 
by which the affective intensities of white men are directed into per-
verse political forms. In response to a forty-year effort to paint white 
men as victims of social and economic change, Trump simply chan-
nels white male ressentiment and melancholia into a form of political 
agency organized around justified cruelty. He addresses his audience as 
if they were agentless victims of cultural trauma, thus affirming their 
identity as aggrieved subjects who are owed retribution and compen-
sation. His attacks on political correctness remove the stigma and guilt 
associated with the perverse entailments of white identity politics, 
including, if necessary, violence. As Trump’s America is a graveyard of 
rusted factories occupied by foreign armies, the nation does not have 
the luxury of kindness and civility in achieving its liberation.
Trump’s personal kinks and political perversions remain a con-
stant source of speculation in the news media. Titillating tales of hush 
money paid to Playboy models, spankings by porn stars, watersports 
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in Russian hotel rooms, and the like speak to the perverse enjoyment 
of the news media and its anti-Trump spectators. Trump’s opponents 
have seized on his perverse masculinity and his transparent overcom-
pensation to suggest that he is an aberration of contemporary white 
masculinity.76 Protestors have generated countless images of Trump as 
queer, womanly, transgender, and emasculated in an effort to call out 
his grotesque enactment of white masculinity. Images include that of 
Trump as a submissive in a BDSM relationship with Russian president 
and “leather daddy” Vladimir Putin, Trump kissing Putin, Trump car-
rying Putin’s child, Trump as a castrated eunuch, and so on. Trump’s 
opponents engage in problematic efforts to combat his personal and 
political perversity by suggesting that his performance of masculinity 
is abnormal and that he in no way reflects contemporary white man-
hood. These portrayals rely on the commonsense logic of homopho-
bia and transphobia to exonerate and wrest white masculinity from its 
perversions. My concern here is that efforts to fight Trump’s perversity 
fail to address its underlying appeal. That is to say, presenting Trump 
as deviant belies how his rhetoric and identity performances align with 
hegemonic white masculinity. Thus, although political sadomasoch-
ism is perverse, it is not an extreme abnormality. Instead, it reflects the 
broader structures of enjoyment that have become sutured to white 
masculinity as an identity constituted through logics of domination 
and submission. Suffering has become the sine qua non of entry into 
white male identity politics. Trump’s political perversity is not simply 
an aberration; instead, it represents an intensification of white mascu-
linity’s demand politics. His rhetoric hails a subject who can at times 
find investment in their own suffering and at others derive gratification 
from the suffering of others.
153
C O N C L U S I O N
Return to Charlottesville
IN SPIkE LEE’S  2018 film BlacKkKlansman, Black police detective Ron 
Stallworth (played by John David Washington) and his Jewish part-
ner Flip Zimmerman (Adam Driver) infiltrate the Colorado Springs 
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, in the process thwarting a violent attack 
against a group of Black college activists. Based on the real Detective 
Stallworth’s autobiographical account of foiling the KKK in the 1970s, 
the film shows how Stallworth developed an over-the-phone per-
sona that Zimmerman acted out in person in order to trick the likes 
of David Duke and infiltrate the organization. In the spirit of 1970s 
blaxploitation cinema, Stallworth heroically outsmarts white suprem-
acists and wins the support and admiration of his fellow police offi-
cers. As audiences reach the film’s dénouement, he and his girlfriend 
Patrice Dumas (Laura Harrier) debate whether the two have a future 
together—Patrice still a committed activist and Stallworth still a police 
detective. Suddenly, there is an unsettling knock on Stallworth’s door. 
Attentive to the possibility of retribution, the two pull their guns and 
face the anonymous visitor at the door. Guns pointed at the camera, 
the two float down the hallway toward an ominous threat in a brief 
interlude of cinematic surrealism. There is a fire in the distance that 
the camera, upon closer inspection, reveals to be a burning cross. The 
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atmosphere of hopeful jubilation engendered by KKK’s defeat is dashed 
by the hardnosed realism of racism’s endurance.
But the film does not end there. Before the credits appear and the 
audience begins to gather their things and exit the theater, the camera 
cuts to footage of the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville. The 
images are uncannily familiar. Nazi salutes. Police protecting march-
ers chanting “Jews will not replace us!” White supremacists violently 
assaulting counterprotestors with improvised weapons. A homicidal 
driver careening their vehicle into the crowd. Screams of anguish and 
abject terror. Chaos in the streets. Cries for help. The nation’s presi-
dent refusing to condemn, in his words, these “fine people.” Onlookers 
in disbelief. The audience is delivered from a fantasy of racial tran-
scendence to the brutal reality of their racist present. In the here-and-
now, there are neither myths of racial progress nor warm platitudes 
from which a white audience might draw to restore their faith in liberal 
democracy. Those vile racists cleverly thwarted by Stallworth and Zim-
merman are not hermitically sealed in some screen fiction; they live in 
your neighborhood, attend your church, work in your office, and rep-
resent your interests in elected bodies. Quieted by the experience of 
cinematic whiplash, the audience is led to a terrifying conclusion: we 
have done this all before and we will do this all again. Of course, this is 
not news to audiences of color. Instead, Spike Lee confronts his white 
audience with the cruel reality that the KKK, Nazis, and other white 
supremacists have a voice in contemporary white America—one that 
reaches all the way to the top elected official in the nation.
In August 2018, Unite the Right organizers sought to mark the one-
year anniversary of the events in Charlottesville by organizing a march 
in Washington, DC. This time, a small band of marchers were vastly 
outnumbered by swarms of protestors who effectively shouted down 
their message and swiftly ended the march without incident. As if to 
yet again confirm Marx’s adage that history repeats, “first as tragedy, 
then as farce,” the group’s attempt to march on Washington wilted and 
relegated supporters back to the dark recesses of the manosphere, at 
least for the time being.1 But I am less sanguine that this fragile peace 
will hold. Nor am I convinced that what we are witnessing is some sort 
of aberration in white masculinity that will wither when white men 
come to their senses with the hindsight of history. Revisiting Charlot-
tesville, we are reminded more of the logistical difficulties of organiz-
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ing hate groups offline than the disinfecting qualities of public light. 
Of course, men who marched unapologetically and with no fear of 
recourse in 2017 found themselves less organized and employable in 
2018. Although reflective of some changes in public sentiments, much 
of the work to unsettle and resist white supremacy in the Trump era 
takes place in diffuse political movements such as antifascism (Antifa) 
and Black Lives Matter.
Since the march at Charlottesville, there have been a number of 
other significant public reckonings for white men wherein the rhetoric 
of victimhood has both shown its ugly face and been repudiated. For 
instance, in October 2017 film producer Harvey Weinstein was fired 
and expelled from the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences 
following over eighty separate allegations of sexual abuse, rape, and 
harassment.2 The shocking details of Weinstein’s crimes and the cou-
rageousness of the women who came forward to share their stories 
helped promulgate the #MeToo social media campaign to both pub-
licize sexual harassment perpetrated by powerful men and cultivate 
empathy among the survivors. The #MeToo movement was originally 
founded by Tarana Burke as an effort to raise awareness and build con-
nections between survivors of assault, particular women of color. In 
sharing their stories, survivors were afforded the opportunity to join 
social support networks, empathizes with others, and build solidar-
ity to oust serial abusers and check white male power. The #MeToo 
movement is a fitting response to the networks of entitlement, power, 
and impunity outlined in this book—networks that prevent men from 
being held accountable for their actions, from Weinstein to Trump. As 
Michelle Rodino-Colocino writes, “Whereas Trump’s cruelty seeks to 
legitimize and actualize white supremacist patriarchal power, Me Too’s 
and #MeToo’s mobilization of empathy counters the othering, distanc-
ing, and ultimately, the unequal relations of power that sexual assault 
symptomatizes and reinforces.”3 Here we see the emergence of a coun-
ternetwork, afforded by social media, that works against its masculine 
media ecology. Despite serving as a vector for men’s rights networks, 
#MeToo seized Twitter to aggregate disparate women’s voices and cre-
ate a counternetwork, underwritten by empathy, to expose structures 
of impunity and build networks of support. #MeToo demonstrates the 
degree to which mediated forms are at times constraining and, at oth-
ers, malleable. The hashtag became a powerful point of identification 
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that enabled survivors to swarm the entrenched networks of white 
male power without fear of reprisal. Networked media need not nour-
ish narratives of victimization but instead create new pathways and 
conduits by which the marginalized can challenge the powerful.
The emergence of counternetworks is necessary if we are to pro-
vide an effective antidote to the poisonous intoxicant that is white male 
victimhood. Men’s rights networks will neither cede power willingly 
nor lose adherents by virtue of negative publicity. Perhaps no other 
event exemplifies the character of white male backlash than the 2018 
Supreme Court confirmation hearing of Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Pro-
fessor Christine Blasey Ford testified that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted 
her in 1982. Kavanaugh and his congressional supporters responded 
with fiery incredulity to the accusations, painting the Justice as an all-
American guy who had been victimized by a movement that had accu-
mulated too much power. The confirmation hearing transformed into 
a public trial of the #MeToo movement that ostensibly shifted the bur-
den of proof onto the victims of sexual assault and further insulated 
the powerful from accountability. Kavanaugh portrayed himself as a 
victim of a “political hit job” on the part of a vast network of conspira-
tors determined to take down the powerful “by any means necessary.”4 
In his statement to Congress, he exclaimed, “This confirmation pro-
cess has become a national disgrace. The Constitution gives the Senate 
an important role in the confirmation process. But you have replaced 
‘advice and consent’ with ‘search and destroy.’”5 President Trump 
rushed to his aid by imploring, “Think of your son. Think of your hus-
band. Think—I’ve had many false accusations. I’ve had it all the—I’ve 
had so many—and when I say it didn’t happen, nobody believes me. 
But it’s me. It’s my job description.”6 Trump blamed Ford for besmirch-
ing Kavanaugh’s character, commenting, “This woman had no clue 
what was going on. No clue. And yet she made the most horrible 
charges against a number one in his class at Yale, perfect human being, 
great father, great husband. This is a great person.”7 It is perhaps fitting 
that the only public apology Trump has issued in office to this point 
has been to Kavanaugh and his family. The Kavanaugh hearing pro-
vided an opportunity for white men to make the case that the #MeToo 
movement was premised not on empathy but on vindictiveness—a 
conspiracy hell-bent on destroying the lives and careers of hardwork-
ing white men. The hearings helped cast doubt on the claims of sur-
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vivors and built sympathy for those who assert that they have been 
falsely accused. This moment demonstrated that white men’s networks 
will fight tooth and claw to retain their privileges and evade scrutiny 
for their treatment of women and the vulnerable. Victimhood remains 
a refuge for white men to, when cornered, turn the tables on the mar-
ginalized when they demand justice. Furthermore, white male vic-
timhood serves as the occasion for recuperating a moment in time 
when white men were not subject to such extraordinary scrutiny. Yet, 
the nourishment and solidarity cultivated by the #MeToo movement 
offers a model of how marginalized groups can form networks capa-
ble of transforming broader cultural narratives. Though not a pana-
cea, marginalized networks demand a different model of justice that 
includes both collective support for survivors and accountability for 
the perpetrators.
Despite the backlash politics of the moment, men must be held 
accountable. They must also hold themselves and each other account-
able. The call to transform white masculinity, and masculinity writ 
large, has also materialized from within. For instance, the Gillette 
razor company launched a #MeToo-inspired advertising campaign 
that asked men to take the lead in addressing toxic masculinity. In the 
television commercial, the narrator explains, “You can’t hide from it. 
You can’t laugh it off, making the same old excuses,” such as “boys will 
be boys.”8 The ad presents scenes in which men demonstrate empathy 
and intervene to stop fellow men from bullying, catcalling, and harass-
ing women. The narrator concludes, “It’s only by challenging ourselves 
to do more, that we can get closer to our best.” Although we should 
be skeptical of a multibillion dollar company such as Proctor & Gam-
ble using progressive messages to brand their products, the message is 
nonetheless one that men need to hear. Predictably, some men pushed 
back. They posted videos of themselves burning their razors and vow-
ing to boycott the company for impugning men’s character. On You-
Tube, the ad received twice as many dislikes as likes.9 But the message 
of accountability is remarkable because it provides men the opportu-
nity to divest in privilege while reclaiming masculinity as a source of 
empathy and a commitment to justice.
This form of masculinity is exemplified by actor Terry Crews, who 
revealed that he, too, was a survivor of sexual assault. His public state-
ments address a common sense of vulnerability that provide space for 
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men to acknowledge the role that toxic masculinity plays in impeding 
men’s ability to empathize and change their behavior. Explaining why 
he felt compelled to speak out, Crews observed,
I’d actually just read a comment someone made on Twitter about 
one of Weinstein’s accusers. It went something like: She’s just look-
ing for attention and a payday. It really affected me. I couldn’t stop 
thinking about it. I remember going to my phone and I started writ-
ing. And I couldn’t stop. What it became was this sixteen-tweet mis-
sive from me. I just remember having to say what I felt. I was really 
angry because these women were being discounted. These women 
were being discarded. Their pain was just—it was nothing. I wanted 
to join in. I wanted to say something. I wanted to support. But I did 
have to let these women know they weren’t alone. And that I under-
stood. My whole mission was to give them strength. Don’t accept the 
shame that people are giving you. Because that’s what it was. They 
were being shamed. They were being victimized again. I just couldn’t 
stand for it.10
Crews’s comments provide a positive model of ally-ship with those 
who have been harassed, assaulted, dismissed, and silenced. For Crews, 
listening to the voices of survivors compelled him to speak out without 
consideration for his own reputation or the possibility of reaping credit 
for his actions. His remarks speak to a kind of justice that privileges 
healing, redemption, and solidarity.
In addition to the networked power of men—both on- and offline—
efforts to disrupt the victimhood narrative must construct a model 
of justice that does not simply focus on individual perpetrators but 
instead addresses the systematic, structural, and psychical dimensions 
of white melancholia. Crews’s bold yet remarkably straightforward 
remarks suggest the possibility that men can address their accumu-
lated privileges without seeing themselves as powerless. As a Black 
man and survivor of assault, Crews is likely in a unique position to 
speak about empathy and victimization. There is something uniquely 
promising about his expressions of solidarity. In other words, divesting 
from masculine privilege means developing a productive politics that 
does not simply absolve ourselves of culpability by expelling the preda-
tors in our midst without considering the structural conditions—both 
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political and symbolic—that will invariably propel us, again and again, 
toward new moments of reckoning.
Of course we know that simply voting Trump out of office or exil-
ing doomsday preppers and men’s rights activists back to their home 
turf will bring us no closer to unraveling the politics of white male vic-
timhood. This is why I argue that the death drive is central if we are to 
understand white men’s investment in victimhood and, consequently, 
develop a convincing portrait of accountable masculinity. Above all, it 
explains that the traumatic loss that characterizes the subject can be 
sutured to ideological belief structures that invite the subject to invest 
in and restage loss under the misguided belief that there was some 
object or object-relation that could be recovered. What all aggressive 
forms of white male identity politics share in common is that they offer 
seemingly coherent explanations for white men’s suffering. In other 
words, the rhetoric of victimhood asserts that alienation is neither an 
effect of subjectivity nor capitalism’s iron grip on the drives (i.e., Mar-
cuse’s performance principle). Instead, the threat is external to these 
conditions—projected onto caricatures of man-hating feminists, ille-
gal immigrants, and big government. Implored to ruminate on spe-
cific loss, white men are misdirected from the psychical and economic 
structures that leave them wanting. Such a politics can never follow 
through with specific mandates or well-defined courses of action lest it 
reveals its own emptiness. Assuming white men could simply legislate 
away their list of grievances, they would still be left disappointed. After 
defeating their foes, it’s not difficult to imagine one muttering to them-
selves: “Is that it?” Assuming one were able to “Make America Great 
Again,” as abstract as that is, they would then be deprived the jouis-
sance of demanding that America be made great again. One would be 
forced to find new foes, impenetrable objects, and moments in the past 
to which one can return without ever achieving satisfaction.
Despite the inescapability of the death drive, it is important to 
note that what we are observing in the current iteration of the crisis 
of white masculinity is a particular enlistment of our compulsions 
toward a political end. Freud argued that traumatic loss grips the sub-
ject, demanding that they invariably return to and restage loss because 
this experience is the closest the subject ever gets to the hypothetical 
object—despite its impossibility or nothingness. One can merely repeat 
the process through which the object is lost; they can never recover 
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that which never existed. This is the very structure of subjectivity. The 
problem is that subjects are frequently mislead, often by ideological 
structures, to believe what was lost mattered and, if recovered, could 
make them whole (again). In other words, the men’s rights network, in 
all its forms, demands that its adherents take a particular orientation 
toward the loss of a privileged object—channeling the very experience 
that constitutes subjectivity toward some illusory sense of satisfaction. 
The illusion engendered by this demand is that it can free anyone of 
dissatisfaction. As Marcuse insists, the harnessing of the drives toward 
some greater political project—be it capitalism, nationalism, religion, 
or heteronormativity—only pushes us further away from freedom. 
The death drive, then, is what makes us vulnerable to political proj-
ects that tell us otherwise, that we can recover and restore ourselves to 
a period before the experience of loss. This is not possible, because it 
is the initial sacrifice we make when we enter language—the sacrifice 
of an undifferentiated world without objects or subjects—that makes 
subjectivity possible. Put differently, it is the drive to repeat this experi-
ence of loss that renders us desiring subjects. Despite the promises of 
a new world to come, each chapter in this book has illustrated that no 
recuperative project of white masculinity can reach past the very thing 
that predicates its own existence.
Take, for instance, the political project of nostalgia that is so central 
to contemporary men’s rights narratives. Nostalgia demands a return to 
a historical moment in which the subject enjoyed an unmediated and 
uninterrupted relationship with the hypothetical object. As McGowan 
writes, nostalgia “permits us to avoid seeing the necessity of the link 
between enjoyment and loss.” Instead, “the false image of enjoyment 
that nostalgia portrays is the source of its widespread appeal. As sub-
jects, we constantly turn ourselves toward both our individual past and 
our collective cultural history in an attempt to find what we have lost.”11 
The problem is that the subject is predicated on loss, and they never 
experienced the pure satisfaction promised by politics. Only politics 
can commandeer the drives by deluding the subject into believing that 
repetition achieves anything beyond its own enjoyment. What this sug-
gests about white masculine victimhood is that its proponents sell their 
audience on the impossible idea that loss serves some greater politi-
cal purpose, that one’s suffering has meaning, or that one’s suffering 
can be accounted for by some external threat. Herein is the optimism 
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that motivates this project: the weakness of a politics of nostalgia or 
righteous suffering is that it cannot afford to admit the existence of the 
death drive. This is why McGowan asserts that an acknowledgment of 
the death drive disabuses us of the notion that primary loss is external 
to the self and that a disavowal of loss will bring the subject any close 
to satisfaction. He explains that “a psychoanalytic politics of the death 
drive produces a thoroughgoing critique of ideology in all the forms 
that it takes up.”12 This is also why Lee Edelman invites a queer embrace 
of the death drive to indict the logic of futurism that is pervaded by het-
erosexual culture’s valorization of the child and the reproductive subject 
as ideal citizens. Delinked from the ideological confines of reproductive 
futurism, queerness partakes in the senseless compulsion of the drives 
while insisting on the unproductivity of loss.13 Freedom, then, is found 
in the intrinsic and nonproductive enjoyment of the drives.
On first glance, a politics premised on the pointless and forbidden 
enjoyment of the death drive seems too esoteric and abstract to con-
stitute a viable alternative future. Yet, I suggest that the necessary fail-
ure of white masculinity to provide a sense of mastery offers subjects 
the opportunity to divest from the doctrine of productive suffering. 
Crews’s public statements exemplify this divestment and leave us with a 
sense that masculinity could be something other than what it has been 
in the past and what it will be in the future. Victimhood is a power-
ful narcotic that in many ways defers a series of necessary social reck-
onings that perhaps would have helped us renegotiate the gendered 
division of labor; allowed the concept of masculinity to accommodate 
racial, sexual, and emotional diversity; and disarticulated success at 
any price and backbreaking labor from what it means to be a man, and 
to view gains by others as positive-sum victories for social progress. 
In search of a positive identity, white men were steered away from the 
idea that their unearned advantages might help others reach their level 
of achievement and instead toward the notion that their privileges were 
private property and that groups demanding equality ultimately seek to 
steal those privileges.
This version of white masculinity stands at the edge of oblivion—
willing to burn it all down rather than let others share their dwindling 
reserves of prosperity. If the case studies I have offered in this book 
teach us anything, it is that glorification of white male suffering has 
made it increasingly difficult for some white men to see that they have 
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an interest in common with others. Men’s consciousness-raising began 
as an effort to build the kind of solidarity occluded by the masculine 
mystique but has sputtered into a perverse contest of psychic wounds 
and incoherent cries of reverse discrimination. The doomsday prep-
per, the mass shooter, the Red Pill enthusiast, the gun activist, and the 
white man shouting the call to “Make America Great Again” are all 
trapped and isolated from others, including themselves, by their end-
less repetition of loss. These men are no closer to reaching liberation 
now than they were a generation ago. If social change is experienced as 
trauma, we are stuck between the untenability of the status quo and the 
inability to imagine a future of peaceful coexistence. It is in this tension 
where the apocalyptic imagination takes shape.
Are, then, white men consigned to ceaselessly externalize the death 
drive onto others? One way of addressing this question is to ask another 
question: have the rallying cries of white masculine victimhood actu-
ally helped improve men’s lives? Although I cannot speak to the per-
sonal feelings of white men, I can certainly surmise that many men 
in the white working class are less likely to earn more and be finan-
cially secure than the previous generation.14 This trend of downward 
mobility will continue if wages fail to keep pace with inflation, com-
panies continue to move overseas, the tax base shrinks and tax bur-
dens are shifted away from the wealthy, union membership dwindles, 
and the list goes on. Yet, in the Trump era, economic problems such 
as these are perpetually recast as identity troubles—takers, racial Oth-
ers, foreigners, criminals, and other worthless adversaries are the real 
reason you suffer, they are told. The problem is that men’s rights advo-
cates are correct about one thing: white men do suffer along with the 
rest of society. They are led astray, however, by a promise of mastery 
and coherence that no one can provide. And while they clearly retain 
an objective material advantage relative to others, they are treated as 
disposable, but it is often by the very people they are told have their 
best interests at heart. It is no surprise that many misguided white men 
are drawn to fantasies of national renewal and the illusory promises 
of a return to better days. Perhaps it is in the recognition of mutual 
suffering—different in degree yet common in cause—that might pull 
some back from the brink.
Furthermore, I wish to emphasize that it’s not that the death drive 
is inherently bad—after all, the death drive is an inevitable and neces-
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sary component of our symbolic existence. Instead, the central con-
cern of this book has been the way in which white men are invited to 
respond to the death drive. There might be productive embraces of the 
death drive that do not hurl us all toward collective oblivion. One pro-
ductive embrace (enjoyment) of the death drive is that it is a necessary 
accompaniment to Eros (the subject is never free of tension between 
these two forces). Marcuse asks a similar question: “Does Eros, in spite 
all the evidence, in the last analysis work in the service of the death 
instinct, and is life really only one long ‘detour to death’? But the evi-
dence is strong enough, and the detour is long enough to warrant the 
opposite assumption. Eros is defined as the great unifying force that 
preserves all life.”15 Freud observed that the constancy principle dictates 
that the psyche maintains a minimum of tension between Eros and 
Thanatos to keep from reaching its final discharge—or at the very least, 
the tension necessarily vacillates within the subject. At any rate, this 
book suggests that there may be more productive enjoyments of the 
death drive that accompany Eros, and, further, that Eros loses mean-
ing without the tension produced by the death drive. In the end, what 
I have observed is a deflection outward into political projects that har-
ness the drives for effect beyond repetition itself, manifesting in cru-
elty, scapegoating, and melancholia.
White masculinity could be something else. Strength could be 
defined by how one cares for others, demonstrates empathy and emo-
tional reciprocity. Masculinity could mean openness rather than fear of 
a wide range of experiences. It could mean investing in love and creativ-
ity while divesting from domination and toil. It could be composed of a 
variety of gender performances that span across a spectrum rather than 
a binary. It could be detached from idealized hard bodies that unfortu-
nately remain differently raced, sexed, and abled. It need not be defined 
by achievement, work, sexual performance, income, or the size of a gun. 
At any rate, whatever another version of white masculinity might come 
to be is dependent on the available rhetorical resources for white men 
to make sense of and act on their own inevitable feelings of vulnerabil-
ity. Of one thing I am certain: there must be something better.
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